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Abstract 
This work is entitled Hume and Human Error. My hope is that it may be of interest to at least two 
groups of readers: first, to those who are interested in understanding the philosophy of David 
Hume himself, and second, to those who are interested in explaining the human mind and our 
propensity to go wrong. My primary objective is to explain how Hume can account, or does 
account, for human error. In this sense, I am concerned with exposition, and exposition of a rather 
neglected section of an otherwise comprehensive body of Hume scholarship.  
 
There is a rich philosophical history of attempts to understand and provide solutions to the 
problems of error. Within this tradition, Hume’s account of error is particularly interesting because it 
should be understood in the context of his general strategy to completely redraft traditional 
concepts (e.g. substance, causation, self, power) in a way that does not rely on any metaphysical 
assumptions that cannot be justified by experience. Hume’s method, I argue, leads him to reject 
what I call the “common sense” or “correspondence” theory of error, according to which what it 
means to have a false belief (for example) is to have a belief that does not properly represent 
mind-independent facts about an external world. Exactly how, and in what sense, Hume rejects the 
correspondence theory is quite complicated, and touches on many of the issues at the heart of the 
New Hume Debate. With this debate in mind, I argue that Hume has a general strategy of 
redrafting traditional concepts in a way that does not rely on the existence of external objects, and 
that Hume’s Theory of Error should be understood in accordance with this general strategy. This is 
not to say that Hume denies that we can speak meaningfully about external objects, nor that he 
denies the existence of external objects. Rather, I argue that Hume’s Theory of Error should be 
understood along the same lines as his rejection of the traditional account of substance as 
substrata. I note, for example, that when Hume rejects the traditional conception of substance it is 
not because he flat-out denies the possibility that a substratum may exist. In fact, he thinks that we 
cannot help but believe that external objects exist. Rather, Hume denies the traditional account of 
substance on the grounds that we never perceive any such thing as a substratum1, and he infers 
from this conclusion that we must not ordinarily mean by “substance” what the metaphysicians had 
thought we mean2. But Hume does not stop there. He then goes on to provide an alternative theory 
of substance3 – one that is explained in terms of perceptions and the relations between them, and 
one that does not rely on the existence of a substratum. Hume’s theory of error should be 
understood with this same methodology in mind. First, he rejects the traditional correspondence 
theory of error on the grounds that we cannot perceive any relationship between perceptions and 
external objects. This does not mean that he must also deny the existence of external objects, or 
                                                 
1
 “We have no idea of substance distinct from a collection of particular qualities…” (T, 16) 
2
 “…nor have we any other meaning when we talk or reasoning concerning it.” (T, 16) 
3
 “The idea of substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas, that are united by the 
imagination, and have a particular name assigned them, but which we are able to recall, either to ourselves of others, 
that collection.” (T, 16) 
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the possibility of a relationship between perceptions and external objects. It is only the sceptical 
conclusion that since we do not perceive any such thing, there is no rational argument to make a 
case either way. But this sceptical conclusion is by no means the end of Hume’s story about error. 
Hume also proposes a positive theory about error – one that he explains in terms of his naturalistic 
science of man, and one that he intends to replace the traditional conception that he rejects. 
 
With this framework established, the remainder of the thesis then goes on to explore the interesting 
and difficult issues that arise in the attempt to put forward such a theory. This leads us to consider 
a series of related and under-explored issues in Hume scholarship, including Hume’s treatment of 
physiology, his account of normativity in natural belief, his idea of the self as created by the 
passions, and his conception of certainty. Exploring Hume’s conception of human error allows us 
to see all of these separate accounts as unified in a different way that has seldom been explored. 
 
As a result of Hume’s novel methodology, many difficult questions arise with regard to providing an 
account of error. Here are just a few: 
 
 If Hume’s theory of error does not rely on the existence of external objects, how can he 
explain what it means to be fooled by an optical illusion? Surely when we call something an 
“illusion” what we mean is that the way things seem is different from the way things are. 
How can Hume help himself to this sort of distinction? 
 Why, if Hume thinks that perceptions are all we can know, does he appeal to physiology as 
a means to explain how errors of association arise? 
 Given that Hume rejects the traditional conception of the self, how can he possibly explain 
the activity and agency involved in error? Errors don’t simply occur; errors are made by 
agents who could and should have done otherwise. In other words, we think of error as a 
normative notion. If Hume rejects the idea of the self as an active and unified substance, 
how can he account for the agency without which an explanation of error would appear 
impossible? 
 Does Hume think that any if our beliefs are immune to error? Are we certain of anything? At 
some points he suggests that relations of ideas (for example simple mathematical truths) 
are absolutely certain, but at other times he says that all knowledge resolves into mere 
probability. 
 
By examining Hume’s own body of work, and by discussing this work in the context of the tradition 
to which Hume responds, I attempt to resolve all of these questions, and others. 
Of course, there are many different kinds of errors, and I do not attempt to provide an account of all 
of them. I do, however, strive to provide a sort of general framework by which all errors, on Hume’s 
view, might be explained.  
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Ultimately, for all its difficulties, I argue that Hume can indeed provide a very rich and fruitful 
account of error in his own naturalistic terms. According to this account, error must always be 
explained in terms of the features of perceptions themselves and the relations between them. If we 
want to know what any particular error involves, we must ask about the observable conditions that 
tend to accompany those errors, or how those errors “strike the mind”. Hume’s is a naturalistic 
theory of error which, like that of the Epicureans, locates error at the level of judgement rather than 
immediate sensation. But unlike the Epicurean tradition, Hume’s conception of judgment is not 
explained as the function of a free will or even as the product of an independent mental faculty, but 
rather as the outcome of the naturally occurring laws that govern perceptions. The pressure to 
avoid error is also naturalised – it comes from the tendency of creatures like us to avoid the 
cognitive dissonance that arises from incoherence or contradiction.  
 
For those who want a more robust or absolute sense of error, Hume’s account may well prove 
unsatisfying, but Hume’s is one of the earliest attempts to demystify error – to rid it of metaphysical 
assumptions – and so it is interesting and important for that reason, if for no other.  
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INTRODUCTION  
We humans are often wrong. We hold false beliefs, we misjudge distances, we remember events 
incorrectly, we make errors of calculation, we are fooled by optical illusions, we may even 
hallucinate, and so on. Any good account of the human mind should be able to explain these errors. 
This work is entitled Hume and Human Error. My hope is that it may be of interest to at least two 
groups of readers: first, to those who are interested in understanding the philosophy of David Hume 
himself, and second, to those who are interested in the history of attempts to explain the human 
mind and our propensity to go wrong. If anyone happens to fall into the overlap as I do, all the 
better. For the most part I will be discussing how Hume can account, or does account, for the 
various ways in which humans err. In this sense, I am concerned with exposition, and exposition of 
some rather neglected sections of an otherwise comprehensive body of Hume scholarship.  
The central problem I want to discuss is simply: is it possible to provide an adequate explanation of 
human error on Hume’s terms? In order to understand just what this question means, and why it is 
important and difficult, we will first have to understand the history of the problems with which 
Hume is concerned and how Hume relates to the tradition to which he responds. As such, this work 
is concerned not only with discussing Hume’s theory of error, but also with discussing the 
longstanding problems of error in Hume’s most excellent company. 
Hume’s is a particularly interesting account of error because he rejects many of the traditional 
metaphysical doctrines that had been invoked by the tradition in an effort to account for error. We 
will discuss both Hume and the tradition in a moment. For now, however, let us briefly discuss an 
example that will help provide a general idea of the problems to be discussed. 
A PRELIMINARY EXAMPLE 
Imagine that, for whatever reason, I happen to believe that Earth is larger than Jupiter. I am wrong, 
of course. But why am I wrong? What does it mean to say that I’m wrong? The common response is 
simply to point to a difference between the planets themselves (the real objects) and my own beliefs 
about them (defined perhaps by intentional objects in my mind). This is what we shall call a 
correspondence explanation of error. According to this explanation, a mental state is in error when 
it does not correspond to (or “depict” or “accurately represent”) what is actually the case in a mind-
independent world. Even if I sincerely believe that Jupiter is smaller than Earth, I am mistaken 
because Jupiter and Earth are objects that exist apart from my ideas of them, and, of course, Jupiter 
is really much larger. 
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Hume recognises difficulties with this correspondence theory of error when he denies that we can 
know anything about objects that exist independently of our perceptions of them. According to 
Hume’s empiricism, perceptions are all that we ever directly experience. This does not necessarily 
mean that perceptions are all that exists. In fact, it is a complicated question to decide whether 
Hume also denies the existence of anything that is not a perception. (That is one of the chief topics 
to be discussed in Chapter Two.) But what Hume certainly denies is our ability to compare our 
perceptions with anything that is not also a perception. On Hume’s view we do not know in any 
absolute sense whether or not there are mind-independent external objects to which our perceptions 
might correspond. Consequently the correspondence theory of error which relies on external objects 
may seem problematic. 
But if Hume does not adopt the correspondence theory of error, then it is not immediately obvious 
what other theory of error he can have. Some writers, Nicholas Rescher for instance, have argued 
that correspondence is the only game in town: 
The very idea of error involves subscribing to some sort of realism: Error calls for 
incorrectness, for conflict with the actual facts, and were there no actual matter of fact there 
would be no error either.
4
  
But if Rescher is right, then Hume may well be inconsistent since, as we will see, Hume is not 
necessarily a realist (at least not in the traditional sense) and yet he frequently admits the existence 
of error. Indeed, here are some initial examples of different kinds of errors that Hume allows. 
With regard to the confusion of imagination and memory Hume says that: 
…an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate to such a degree, 
as to be taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other hand an idea of the imagination 
may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass for an idea of the memory, and counterfeit 
its effects on the belief and judgment. (T, 86) 
This happens, for example, in the case of liars, 
…who by the frequent repetition of their lies, come at last to believe and remember them, as 
realities. (T, 86) 
With regard to our moods or constitution interfering with our sensation: 
                                                 
4
 Rescher, Nicholas. “Error” (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2007) p. 80 
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A man in a malady feels a disagreeable taste in meats, which before pleas’d him the most. 
Upon the different complexions and constitutions of men: That seems bitter to one, which is 
sweet to another. (T 226) 
With regard to optical illusions: 
If you wheel about a burning coal with rapidity, it will present to the senses an image of a 
circle of fire; nor will there seem to be any interval of time betwixt its revolutions (T, 35) 
With regard to hallucination or madness: 
When the imagination, from any extraordinary ferment of the blood and spirits, acquires 
such a vivacity as disorders all its powers and faculties, there is no means of distinguishing 
betwixt truth and falsehood; but every loose fiction of idea, having the same influence as the 
impressions of the memory, or the conclusions of the judgment, is receiv’d on the same 
footing, and operates with equal force on the passions. (T, 123) 
With regard to distances: 
The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove father from it: but the real table, 
which exists independent of us, suffers no alteration. (E, 152) 
The last of these examples may seem to suggest that Hume wants to help himself to the 
correspondence view after all. He speaks of the “real table, which exists independent of us”. But, in 
fact, Hume sets up this view only to reject it. For immediately following this passage we find that, 
“…it was therefore nothing but it [the table’s] image that was present to the mind.” And, in the next 
paragraph, when we come to ask, 
By what argument it can be proved, that the perceptions of the mind must be caused by 
external objects…? (E, 152-3) 
We are told that we cannot possibly experience any such connection. 
It is a question of fact, whether the perceptions of the senses be produced by external 
objects, resembling them: how shall this question be determined? By experience surely; as 
all other questions of a like nature. But here experience is, and must be entirely silent. The 
mind has never anything present to it but the perceptions, and cannot possibly reach any 
experience of their connexion with objects. (E, 153) 
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In summary, I will argue that Hume is sceptical of much of the traditional metaphysics but 
nonetheless wants to explain our propensity for error, and this presents him with a challenge. Can 
Hume meet this challenge? That is what I intend to explore. 
There are many different kinds of errors, and although I shall draw on a variety of examples, I do 
not hope to provide an exhaustive catalogue of each and every one of them. Rather, more generally, 
I intend to provide a sort of framework by which the key elements of error, on Hume’s view, might 
be explained. According to the account that I will attribute to Hume – Hume’s Theory of Error – 
error is described in terms of observable features of perceptions and the relationships between them, 
and without reliance on the existence of mind-independent external objects. This explanation, I will 
argue, is consistent with Hume’s overall methodology in the Treatise – the same methodology that 
he tells us is the only foundation on which our knowledge could “stand with any security”. (T, xvi)  
AN OUTLINE OF WHAT FOLLOWS 
There is a longstanding history of attempts to discuss and provide solutions to the problems of error. 
In Chapter One I provide a survey of the key figures within that tradition, and a summary of 
Hume’s relationship to them. In particular, I discuss the ideas of the Epicureans, and of Descartes, 
Locke, Malebranche and Berkeley. This chapter provides the historical context that underlies the 
remainder of the thesis. 
In Chapter Two I consider how, and in what sense, Hume rejects the traditional correspondence 
theory of error, and why he is led to propose an alternative theory. The reading for which I argue is 
a methodological one: that in the Treatise Hume is led by his scepticism to redraft traditional 
concepts in a way that does not rely on the existence of external objects, and that Hume’s theory of 
error should be understood in accordance with this general methodology. This discussion touches 
on many of the complex issues at the heart of the New Hume Debate. 
I draw a link between Hume’s conception of objects and Hume’s Theory of Error. When it comes to 
objects, Hume’s method leads him to substitute the question, "Are there external objects?" for the 
question, "How do we come to have ideas about objects (that we think of as being external)?" 
Similarly, in the case of error, Hume substitutes the question, "What does it mean to be mistaken?" 
for the question, "How do we come to think of some perceptions and not others as being mistaken?" 
With this framework established, the remainder of the thesis goes on to explore the issues that arise 
in Hume’s attempt to answer that question. 
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In Chapter Three I examine a curious passage in which Hume attempts to account for errors of 
association by describing physiological processes – i.e. the paths of the animal spirits. This passage 
of the Treatise is particularly perplexing because Hume prefaces it with the consideration that 
although he has otherwise “neglected any advantage” that might be gained by providing a 
physiological explanation, he must nonetheless “make recourse” to physiology in order to “account 
for the mistakes that arise” from the association of ideas. (T, 60-1) I argue that although Hume can 
quite consistently consider the physiological causes of error, he cannot consistently appeal to 
physiology in order to ground an explanation of error in anything more fundamental than 
impressions and ideas. 
Chapter Four examines three specific kinds of errors that Hume himself considers at some length, 
namely: errors involving memory and imagination, errors involving optical illusions, and errors 
involving evaluation or judgment. By considering those cases, I develop a kind of framework by 
which we can understand Hume’s Theory of Error more broadly. Ultimately, I find that for Hume 
error is always a comparative concept. If we regard some memory, or impression, or processes of 
evaluation as faulty, what we mean is that we have rejected that perception in light of other 
perceptions that strike us with more vivacity. As Hume puts it, “…An idea assented to feels 
different,” from one that we reject.  
In Chapter Five I relate Hume’s Theory of Error to his rejection of the traditional concept of the 
self. Specifically, I consider how Hume can both reject the traditional explanation of the self as a 
unified and active substance, and yet allow that we think of error as a normative concept. In other 
words, Hume thinks there are cases of error for which people can and should be held responsible. 
He allows that there is a difference between mere mistakes or misfortunes (which involve no agency 
on my part), and errors (which I commit by my own free will). Yet it is not obvious how Hume can 
explain this normativity without appealing to the traditional conception of the human soul as an 
agent that wills with some measure of metaphysical freedom. By discussing Hume’s account of the 
passions, and of pride in particular, I argue that Hume in fact provides a rich and interesting account 
of activity within his own naturalistic system, and without reliance on the traditional metaphysics. 
This account of activity, I contend, provides Hume with the conceptual tools that might allow him 
to explain the normativity of error. 
In Chapter Six I consider whether Hume thinks any of our ideas are completely immune to error. 
The question is difficult because on some occasions Hume suggests that relations of ideas (for 
example simple mathematical truths) are absolutely certain, but at other times he tells us that all 
knowledge resolves into mere probability. I argue that Hume’s considered position is that absolute 
18 
 
certainty is not possible, and that all of our beliefs are subject to error in some degree. Nonetheless, 
I observe that Hume retains a distinction between knowledge and probability, and uses this 
distinction to explain why we regard some of our beliefs as more certain than others. In this way, 
Hume provides a framework for understanding the degrees to which our various ideas are prone to 
error. 
In Chapter Seven I offer conclusions, and some closing remarks. There are many problems with 
Hume’s Theory of Error, and it is not my primary intention to defend it. I do contend, however, that 
even with the limited explanatory tools at his disposal, Hume provides a rich and complex account. 
Certainly, Hume’s is one of the earliest attempts to demystify error – to rid our explanations of 
unfounded metaphysical assumptions – and so it is fascinating and important for that reason, if for 
no other. 
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CHAPTER ONE: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE  
PROBLEMS OF ERROR 
 
The philosophical problems about error are at least as old as the Eleatics, Parmenides and Zeno. 
With these Greeks they began as puzzles about the possibility of non-existent objects, and these 
puzzles arose as a result of their theory concerning falsity. Falsity, they maintained, involves stating 
“that which is not”. In other words, they held that false statements are false by virtue of their 
reference to an un-reality. On the face of it this is a fairly intuitive theory, since it draws a parallel 
between that which is “false” and that which is “not the case” – i.e. that which is not real. But these 
Eleatics also believed that there is no such thing as an unreality. “Unrealities” are not real. And in 
this way a puzzle arises: error seems to involve the task of thinking about, or referring to, non-
existent objects, and yet this must be impossible, since we cannot think of something that “is not”, 
for what “is not” is not anything at all – not something that could be the object of thought. As 
Gorgias puts it: 
All subjects of thought must exist and Not-being, since it does not exist, could not be 
thought of. But if this is so, no one…could say anything false, not even if he said that 
chariots compete in the sea. For everything would be in the same category.
5
  
In the Theaetetus the Platonic Socrates addresses this puzzle. For Socrates, the way out of the 
dilemma is to reject the Eleatic theory of falsity altogether. On his view, error cannot really involve 
making positive assertions about things that don’t exist, but must instead involve making negative 
assertions about things that do exist.
6
 In other words, it is not that false ideas depict non-existent 
objects, but that they inaccurately depict objects that do exist. Once the theory is adopted, one 
doesn’t need to ascribe properties to a non-existent object in order to make a false claim.7 Consider, 
for example, the false claim: “Julia Gillard has a daughter called Mary.” On the Socratic theory, the 
reason this statement is false is simply that Julia Gillard doesn’t have a daughter at all, let alone a 
daughter by that name. There is no need to refer to a non-existent Mary, or to ascribe to this 
imaginary daughter the peculiar property of never having been born. One problem with this account 
is that it has trouble explaining the truth or falsity of statements about objects that really do appear 
to be non-existent – unicorns, for example. The sentence, “A unicorn has three horns,” is plainly 
                                                 
5
 Gorgias, “On Non-Being” in Sextus Empiricus, Against the Professors, trans. R.G. Bury (Loeb Classical Library, 
1949) 
6
 Plato, Theaetetus in Plato. “Complete Works” ed. Cooper, John M. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997) 252 e5-6 
7
 See also: Denyer, Nichloas. Language, Thought, and Falsehood in Ancient Greek Philosophy (London: Routledge, 
1991) 
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false as any child will tell you, but it can’t be evaluated easily using the Socratic analysis, since 
there is no thing called a “unicorn” to which the sentence can refer. 
This ancient puzzle is also the lineage of many modern problems about non-existents in the 
philosophy of language. Russell, for example, is concerned with just this problem, albeit a more 
complex version of the problem, when evaluating the truth conditions for statements about the non-
existent present King of France.
8
 Russell asks why the following statement is false: “The present 
King of France is bald”. The answer, he says, is just that there is no such thing as the Present King 
of France, let alone one whom is bald. Russell’s primary concern is really to understand how the 
terms in that false sentence refer, and his somewhat complicated analysis goes like this: 
There is an x such that x is a present King of France, and for all y, if y is a present King of 
France, y = x, and x is bald. 
On Russell’s analysis, as in Plato’s, the reason such a statement is false is because there is simply 
no x that at present satisfies the requirement and satisfies it uniquely – no thing that is the one and 
only present King of France.  
In the Greeks we also find the origin of the long history of attempts to explain error in terms of 
correspondence. Whether falsity consists in talking about “what is” in a negative way (as Plato held 
it), or “what is not” in a positive way (as the Eleatics thought), what we have is a conception of 
error that treats falsity as involving correspondence to what is – in other words: to objective facts 
about the world. On each of these views, the concept of error is bound to a concept of independent 
existence.  
Furthermore, in the ancients we also find the first debates about which faculties of the mind are to 
be blamed for error. Epicurus, for example, denied that our senses can ever be mistaken
9
 holding 
instead that there is simply no such thing as sensory error. Epicurus maintained that all sensation is 
irrational
10
, by which he really meant what we would call  
“a-rational” – that rationality has nothing to do with sensation. The ‘reports’ given by sensation are 
always ‘true’, said Epicurus11, but what he really meant is that the reports given by sensation are 
never false. In other words, sensations are not the type of things that fall under the categories of 
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truth and falsehood. Aristotle held a similar view, although only for certain kinds of sensory 
experiences. Arisrotle divided the qualities of sensation into two categories: specific sensibles and 
common sensibles. Regarding the first category (which includes colours, sounds, tastes, smells and 
tactile sensations), the direct perception of any one of those qualities by the sense organ that is 
given to sensing it, cannot possibly fall into error. Regarding the category of common sensibles, 
however, (which include shapes, sizes, and motions), he says that our senses are very prone to error.  
“In dealing with each of the senses we shall have first to speak of the objects which are 
perceptible by each. . . . I call by the name of special object of this or that sense that which 
cannot be perceived by any other sense than that one and in respect of which no error is 
possible; in this sense colour is the special object of sight, sound of hearing, flavour of taste. 
Touch, indeed, discriminates more than one set of different qualities. Each sense has one 
kind of object which it discerns, and never errs in reporting that what is before it is colour or 
sound (though it may err as to what it is that is coloured or where that is, or what is sounding 
or where that is). Such objects are what we propose to call special objects of this or that 
sense. ‘Common sensibles’ are movement, rest, number, figure, magnitude; these are not 
peculiar to any one sense, but are common to all.”12  
Nonetheless, neither Epicurus nor Aristotle denied that we can make errors about the things we 
sense; they only insist that errors are always the result of an opinion or judgment that is added to the 
sensation.
13
 As Diogenes Laertius reports: 
For the opinion they [the Epicureans] use the word hepolepsis, which they claim can be right 
or wrong.
14
  
Rist explains: 
We are not given sufficient help by sensation to enable us to judge the truth or falsehood of 
the vast majority of propositions. In order to do that we have to compare our various 
sensations with one another and with our general concepts and feelings. We need to invoke 
what Epicurus calls the principles of ‘supporting evidence’ and of ‘absence of contrary 
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evidence’ in order to understand the ‘true’ evidence of our senses and formulate 
propositions whose structure accurately reflects the world as our senses describe it. 
15
  
It is in this comparison that error occurs. Error is a matter of judgment. Consider the Epicurean 
example of misperceiving a tower: 
If we wish to make a statement about a tower, which is some distance away, we observe the 
phenomenon and make judgments about it. We think, for example, that the tower which is 
square is round. We then approach closer and observe the tower again. Each observation 
supplies us with evidence about the tower. We are checking the validity of our judgments by 
adducing supporting evidence… Each sensation provides us with new data. If a sequence of 
sensations adds further evidence in favour of our original judgment, then that judgment is 
confirmed and we may say that a proposition embodying it is true. If our inspection provides 
any counter evidence, then the judgment is false. Of course the falseness of a particular 
judgment about the tower does not mean that our sensation was false, but that our thought 
about the sensation was false.
16
 
This general idea – that errors must involve judgments and not mere sensations – is intuitive. It 
seems straightforward to say that although it is an error to believe that a straight stick protruding out 
of the water is bent, it is not an error to see it as if it were bent. Although it is an error to believe that 
Escher’s Impossible Stairs are possible, it is not an error to acknowledge that they appear possible 
in his brilliant lithograph.
17
  
But other intuitions pull in another direction. Sometimes we do want to say that our senses are 
faulty even if no faulty belief results from them. If my senses are inclining me to believe something 
that is not true, then surely they are not representing reality exactly as it is. And this could be 
regarded as a kind of error, as we discuss further when we come to Descartes. If I see spirals where 
there are only circles, something has gone wrong. If the lines in the Müeller-Lyer illusion appear to 
be of unequal length, then surely my visual system is being fooled, even if I am not fooled. At the 
very least there must be a strong connection between the sense in which we can be tricked by an 
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optical illusion or some faulty suggestion of our sensory organs, and the sense in which we make an 
error when believe or judge something falsely.  
Incidentally, this interest in the ability of optical illusions to fool our senses is very old. In his 
Natural History, Pliny the Elder recounts a pleasing story of two Greek painters who set out to fool 
each other in the Fifth Century BCE: 
Zeuxis…produced a picture of grapes so successfully represented that birds flew to the stage 
buildings; whereupon Parrhasius himself produced such a realistic picture of a curtain that 
Zeuxis, proud of the verdict of the birds, requested that the curtain should now be drawn and 
the picture displayed; and when he realized his mistake, with a modesty that did him honour 
he yielded up the prize, saying that whereas he had deceived birds Parrhasius had deceived 
him, an artist.
18
 
Attempts to explain optical illusions are also very old. Take, for example, the illusion, well known 
to Aristotle
19
, and still discussed in contemporary psychology
20
, that the moon appears larger on the 
horizon than it does when it is higher in the sky. As Francis Egan puts it: 
…the moon illusion may be our most persistent scientific puzzle. It has resisted explanation 
for over 2500 years. Unlike other recalcitrant phenomena in the history of science…the 
puzzle has persisted through massive changes both in our overall physical theory, and in our 
very conception of the scientific enterprise.
21
  
Indeed, the explanations vary greatly. Ptolemy, for example, offered at least two accounts of this 
phenomenon. First, in his Almagest, he explains the illusion in terms of physics.
22
 Later, however, 
in his Optics, he describes the error as involving physiology and possibly psychology.
23
 Hobbes 
explained the illusion physically as a result of atmospheric refraction.
24
 Descartes
25
 and 
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Malebranche
26
 both explained it in terms of a fact about the observer: namely, that when we view 
the moon on the horizon we also see distant objects (such as trees or buildings) and these provide us 
with points of reference – they allow us to judge the size of the moon more accurately than we are 
able when the moon is as its zenith and there are no such objects to provide a comparison. 
Expanding on this idea, Berkeley attempted to explain the illusion more broadly in terms of the 
“circumstances which are wont to attend the vision of distant objects.” In addition to Descartes’ and 
Malebranche’s observation about points of reference, Berkeley also appealed to other facts about 
the observer that may serve as an explanation of the phenomenon – for example the differing angle 
of one’s head in viewing the moon at the different positions. There are several factors, Berkeley 
thought, that come to “influence the judgements made”, and thus make some objects, 
…appear less than otherwise they would. For any of those things that caused an object to be 
thought greater than in proportion to its visible extension being either omitted or applied 
without the usual circumstances, the judgement depends more entirely on the visible 
extension, and consequently the object must be judged less.
27
 
In any case, returning to the broader history of the problems of error, we have observed that 
Epicurus maintained that judgment and not sensation is the faculty of mind responsible for error. 
This theory was popular not only among the Epicureans, but almost universally throughout the 
middle ages and the Early Modern period. Augustine held this view, even if he recognized problems 
with it.
28
 Aquinas also denied that the senses themselves can be deceived, but maintained that other 
faculties can fall into error when they make use of sensations. He says, for example, that we can 
make an error when we recall the sensation to ourselves.
29
  
For Aquinas, error is construed as an abnormal product of the mind, which, by God’s design, is 
really supposed to be a faculty of truth. As Keeler summarises, (quoting Aquinas): 
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The mind being the faculty of truth, error cannot be its normal fruit, but will necessarily 
have the character of a defective byproduct, an accidental disorder, a miscarriage 
comparable to ‘monstrous births’ in nature.30 
Aquinas also introduced an important distinction between error on the one hand, and mere 
ignorance on the other, and he explains this distinction by appealing to the activity of the mind. For 
example, it is not an error to simply be ignorant about the relative sizes of the planets, but it is an 
error to actively believe that Earth is larger than Jupiter.  
Error thus adds a certain act to mere ignorance, because one can be ignorant without passing 
judgment on the things one is ignorant of. One is then unknowing but not in error.
31
 
Duns Scotus similarly held that error relates to activity, and is caused by man’s poor exercise of his 
free will.  
As Duns Scotus saw it, all error – cognitive and moral alike – stems from acts of the will. 
Cognitive error arises from improper decisions to acceptance in matters of belief, and moral 
error arises from improper decisions to action in matters of practise.
32
 
Man’s will is active and free, but it is prone to error having been tainted by The Fall in the Garden 
of Eden. Indeed, these theological grounds were the chief reason in the medieval period for denying 
that a passive faculty could be the origin of error. Error was lumped-together with sin, and since sin 
is morally reprehensible, all error must involve an activity that is, at least in principle, avoidable. 
(God would not hold us responsible if we could not have done otherwise.) As Evans points out, it 
was in accordance with this tradition that Anselm
33
 made a unity of moral “rightness” and 
intellectual “correctness”, and afterwards this unity formed the “important ground of the belief that 
sin has epistemological consequences.”34  
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This blurring of theological sin and intellectual correctness is something that tends to separate 
Medieval accounts from our contemporary neurophysiological accounts of the mind. For many of 
the Medievals, explaining the bodily functions involved in sensory and cognitive error was of less 
interest than the issue of interference with these mechanisms by sin.
35
 But even if contemporary 
psychology is concerned with neurophysiology rather than theology, the fact remains that error has 
always been treated as a normative concept, and rightly so. If I hallucinate and become convinced 
that that there is a tiger on my desk, then there are normative facts at play here. My senses really 
shouldn’t be deceiving me in this fashion; the electrical impulses in my brain aren’t working 
properly. Of course, we do not say in these cases that I have sinned – these errors are not morally 
reprehensible. But there are normative claims at play nonetheless; we would say that my mind is not 
“working as it should be”.  
Perhaps this claim – that the mind should be working in any particular way – will make the reader 
sceptical. I hope so, because this is one of the problems with which I will be concerned. Hume is 
going to find it difficult to explain how any normative fact about the workings of the mind (or the 
brain) can be justified. For now, suffice it to say that if we allow that the mind makes errors at all, 
then it appears that we have to think of them in normative terms. No one, except perhaps the most 
sceptical of philosophers, believes that when I hallucinate that there is a tiger on the desk, this is just 
“another way of perceiving” as valid as any other. Errors qua errors are deviations from a standard 
of correct perception and hence normative by definition. To say that an error has occurred, and to 
say that something has gone wrong, is to say the same thing twice.  
DESCARTES 
Descartes is particularly important for the tradition because, as against the Epicurean school of 
thought, he allows the possibility of sensory error, and this poses a dramatic challenge to 
Aristotelian empiricism. Indeed, Descartes draws a distinction between two different kinds of error: 
errors in judgement (which Descartes calls ‘formal falsity’), and errors that occur at a pre-
judgmental or sensory level (which Descartes calls ‘material falsity’). To understand these two 
kinds of error and why they are important for the period we will need to briefly discuss Descartes’ 
theory of ideas. 
For Descartes, ideas are a type of thought, and the term “idea” can be taken in two senses: 
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[T]here is an ambiguity here in the word ‘idea.’ ‘Idea’ can be taken materially, as an 
operation of the intellect… Alternatively, it can be taken objectively, as the thing 
represented by that operation...
36
 
These two senses are roughly akin to the difference between mental-acts and mental-objects. For 
example, when I have an idea of the sun my mind is engaged in a certain activity – i.e. thinking 
about the sun – and this is my having an idea of the sun in the material sense. On the other hand, 
when I have an idea of the sun I also have an idea about something – about the sun – and this is my 
having an idea of the sun in what Descartes refers to as the objective sense. Insofar as ideas are 
taken only materially there is, says Descartes, “no recognizable inequality among them.” The ideas 
of the sun, a motion and a chimaera are all equally ideas. But in terms of the different objects by 
which ideas are differentiated, they differ enormously. As Descartes puts it, insofar as they 
“represent different things, it is clear that [ideas] differ widely.”37 For example, I may have various 
ideas “of a man, or a chimaera, or the sky, or an angel, or God,”38 and all of those ideas are different 
because of the differences between the things they represent. 
That distinction concerns ideas, but Descartes also draws another related distinction concerning 
objects which is as follows. Objects have “being” in two senses: on the one hand they have being in 
themselves (which Descartes calls “formal being”), and on the other hand, they have being as 
objects of thought (which he calls “objective being”). In other words, the sun has being both by 
virtue of existing as an external object in the sky, and also by virtue of our thinking about it. 
 
At this point the whole story gets confusing, because these two different distinctions (the first 
concerning ideas, the second concerning objects) are related in messy ways. Most obviously, 
something must be said about the relationship between the objective being of the object and 
the objective reality of our idea object. Intuitively, given what we’ve been told so far, it would 
appear that the two must in fact be identical. After all, Descartes explained that an object’s objective 
being is just the sense in which it exists as the object of an idea, and an idea’s objective reality is 
just the sense in which an idea has an object. Surely, we might think, they must be the same thing. 
But it would be problematic for Descartes to equate the sun as it appears in my idea with the 
objective being of the sun, because Descartes also tells us that the objective being of the sun is (in 
some sense) the sun itself. In other words, the sun in my idea would be the very same thing as the 
sun formally existing in the heavens. Of course, that is objectionable because Descartes cannot have 
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it that ideas and external objects are identical since he also holds that external objects exist 
independently of thought.  
 
Now, all of that is complex, but for our purposes here the point to be gleaned is that it relates to the 
following problem concerning error. If the sun that is the intentional object of my idea were really 
identical with the sun that is the external object in the sky, then it is difficult to see how my idea of 
the sun could ever misrepresent the sun in any way. In other words, it would seem impossible that 
my idea could involve any error.  
 
Descartes avoids this problem, at least on one charitable reading, by denying that there is a 
straightforward relationship of identity between the idea in the mind and the mind-independent 
object trading on the idea that things may be not really distinct (and so bound by relations of 
metaphysical dependence) without being numerically identical. Just what Descartes’ view really is 
concerning this relationship is a complex matter, and one that is hotly debated. The issue has 
dramatic ramifications for how we understand Descartes for whether an idea just is the same thing 
as its external object or only the same as some internal proxy, for it determines the character of 
Descartes’ epistemology. As Brown puts it: 
 
Confusion on this very issue has produced a division within the scholarly community 
between those who think that Descartes is a representational realist – i.e. someone who 
thinks the direct objects of thought are immanent or intentional objects from which the mind 
infers the existence of extramental things – and those who think that he is a direct realist – 
someone who thinks that the objects of ideas and judgments are the extramental things 
themselves, by means of their special mode of being in the intellect.
39
 
The outcome of this dispute will matter, because it will have implications for Descartes’ ability to 
make sense of error. Those who read Descartes as a direct realist will have to provide a good story 
about how, although the objects of ideas and judgements are the external objects themselves, ideas 
of objects can nonetheless fail to get those objects right. As we will discuss further in a moment, 
they will also need to come up with a story about what it means to say that some ideas have no 
external objects at all – for example, ideas of unicorns. 
The scholarly division regarding Descartes view is understandable, since Descartes’ own 
explanation is quite obtuse:  
                                                 
39
 Brown, D. J. “Descartes and the Passionate Mind” (Cambridge University Press: New York, 2006) p. 90 
29 
 
“…the idea of the sun is the sun itself existing in the intellect — not of course formally 
existing, as it does in the heavens, but objectively existing, i.e., in the way in which objects 
normally are in the intellect”40  
 
However mysterious, Descartes does say explicitly that the idea of the sun is (“of course”) different 
(somehow) from the formally existing sun in the sky. And in this way, he leaves open the 
possibility that the faultiness of our faulty judgments can be cashed-out by appealing to differences 
between our ideas of objects and the mind-independent external objects themselves.  
 
In any case, as I mentioned, Descartes thinks there are two ways that an idea can fall into error. The 
first is formal falsity, which we have been discussing. The other kind is called material falsity. 
Material falsity, unlike formal falsity, does not directly involve judgment and for this reason is more 
interesting, or at any rate more novel, since it goes directly against the Epicurean tradition. 
Although falsity properly speaking, or “formal” falsity, cannot be found except in judgments 
(as I noted a little while ago), still there is, surely, another “material” falsity in ideas, when 
they represent a non-thing as a thing...
41
 
So what is a materially false idea? What does it mean to represent a non-thing as a thing? Descartes 
provides examples: 
…[ideas] like light and colors, sounds, odors, tastes, heat and cold, and other tactile 
qualities, are not thought by me except very confusedly and obscurely, so that I do not even 
know if they are true or false, that is, whether the ideas, which I have of them, are ideas of 
particular things, or of non-things. …The ideas I have of heat and cold are so far from being 
clear and distinct that from them I cannot say whether cold is just a privation of heat or heat 
a privation of cold, or both are real qualities, or neither. And since ideas are only as of 
things, if cold truly is nothing other than the privation of heat, an idea that represents it to 
me as something real and positive is not without reason said to be false, and so on for the 
rest.
42
 
One of the keys to understanding these examples is to emphasise the role of confusion. “I do not 
know if they are true or false,” says Descartes; “I cannot say whether cold is just a privation…” 
This emphasis is necessary, since Descartes’ description of materially false ideas as representing 
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“non-things as things” is liable to mislead. It might sound as if material falsity is only another case 
of an idea of an object failing to correspond to the object itself. For example, one might think that 
Descartes’ point about heat and cold is just that it’s possible to have a faulty idea about the thing 
called “cold” that misrepresents what cold really is. But this is not what Descartes has in mind, 
because Descartes thinks there is no such positive entitiy called “cold” at all. In the case of 
materially false ideas, my idea is faulty not because it misrepresents cold, but because it is of an 
object called “cold”, when in fact there is no such thing. Cold is only a privation. 
Arnauld famously pointed out a problem with this view – that the whole notion of “representing a 
non-thing as a thing” should be impossible according to Descartes’ theory of ideas. The objection43 
goes like this: since Descartes thinks that having an idea of an object is for that object to be 
“objectively in the intellect” then it should be impossible to have ideas of “non-things” at all. As 
Arnauld argues: 
What is the idea of cold? Cold itself, insofar as it is objectively in the intellect. But if cold is 
a privation, it cannot be objectively in the intellect by way of an idea of which the objective 
esse would be a positive ens. Therefore, if cold were only a privation, there could never be a 
positive idea of it, and so none that would be materially false.
44
 
Arnauld’s idea here is reminiscent of the Eleatic dilemma with which we started this chapter: it 
cannot be that error involves having positive ideas of non-things, since non-things are not things at 
all, and so cannot possibly be the objects of positive thoughts. Descartes has said that all ideas have 
objective reality, and having objective reality implies the existence of a positive entity. Arnauld 
extracts the problem: 
…This idea of cold, which you say is materially false – what does it exhibit to your mind? A 
privation? Then it is true. A positive being? Then it is not the idea of cold.
45
 
Arnauld’s objection is that material falsity must be impossible on Descartes’ own terms since 
Descartes cannot have it that we ever represent “non-things” as things. The idea of cold may either: 
1. Be represented as a privation of heat (but in this case the idea is true and there is no error); 
or 
2. Be represented as a positive entity, (in which case an error of some sort has occurred, but it 
cannot really be the idea of cold that is being represented. Descartes has said that to have an 
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idea of an object is for that object to exist objectively in the mind, and if the idea is of a 
positive entity, then it cannot be the idea of cold, since cold is not a positive entity. 
It is true that Descartes does indeed maintain the theory of ideas that Arnauld attributes to him, and 
does indeed say that materially false ideas involve representing “non-things” as things. Descartes, 
however, insists that he has been misunderstood. His reply is quite baffling, because his objection 
appears to insist that having a materially false idea of cold, does not depend on the objective 
presence of cold: 
When, however [Arnauld] says that the idea of cold is coldness itself as it is objectively in 
the intellect I think that a distinction is necessary: for it often happens in confused and 
obscure ideas, among which those of heat and cold are numbered, that they are referred to a 
thing other than that of which they are ideas. Thus, if cold is only a privation, the idea of 
cold is not cold itself…but another thing which I take wrongly for that privation.46 
The response appears unsatisfactory but note how it is reminiscent of the ancient disagreement 
between the Eleatics and Plato. Recall that Plato responded to the Eleatic dilemma by arguing that 
error involves having false ideas about things, rather than positive ideas about non-things. Similarly, 
Descartes here says that having a materially false idea about cold involves having an idea about a 
positive entity (“another thing”), and falsely taking that idea to be of cold (which in reality is a non-
thing). Descartes is perhaps right to insist that these sorts of errors can and do occur, but he’s wrong 
to think that this move can save his notion of material falsity. If my faulty idea is of a positive entity 
that I am calling “cold” (even though it cannot really be a positive idea of cold, since cold is not a 
thing at all), then I have simply made an error of judgment. I am judging that the positive 
intentional object of my idea is cold itself, but this is an error because there is no positive entity that 
is the thing called “cold”. 
This passage aside, Descartes offers another response to Arnauld that is more enlightening. I’m not 
sure that it successfully saves the notion of material falsity in the context of his theory of ideas, but 
it may well explain why Descartes thinks there’s a concept worth saving at all. According to the 
particular response I have in mind, what characterises materially false ideas is that they provide 
material for false judgment.
47
 As Descartes says: 
…It seems to me that [materially false ideas] cannot be said to be materially false in any 
other sense that that which I have explicated: namely, whether cold is a positive thing or a 
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privation, I do not have an idea of it other [than the one I have]; instead it remains in me the 
same one I have always had; and this I say provides matter for error.
48
 
With this emphasis, the purpose of materially false ideas is that they explain “why we are prone to 
certain kinds of errors”, errors of judgement or formal falsity.49 Because they are obscure and 
confused, materially false ideas are false in the sense that they incline us to make errors of 
judgment. The interesting question is whether the reason that Descartes defends a notion of material 
falsity is because he wants to defend the idea that error can occur at a pre-judgmental level. On this 
view, it is not only false judgments that we call errors, but also confused sensations that may incline 
us to have those false judgments. Material falsity is advocated as a second kind of error on the 
grounds that formal falsity simply cannot explain all of errors that we make. 
As we have already noted, it is somewhat strange to think of an inclination to error as being an error 
itself. It’s true, perhaps, that the bent stick in water might incline us towards falsity, but we are not 
often actually fooled. We don’t actually make any error. Perhaps this is why Descartes is reluctant 
to describe material falsity as “proper” falsity.  
Although falsity properly speaking, or “formal” falsity, cannot be found except in judgments 
(as I noted a little while ago), still there is, surely, another “material” falsity in ideas, when 
they represent a non-thing as a thing...
50
 
Descartes can only bring himself to say that materially false ideas are “not without reason said to be 
false”.51 And this reluctance, I think, will prove an interesting point of comparison between 
Descartes and Hume. Descartes never abandons the idea that “proper falsity” must involve a 
judgmental faculty over which we humans can exercise a free will, even though he goes to some 
length to insist that error can occur, at least in some sense, at a pre-judgmental (and therefore 
passive) level. But Hume who ultimately reduces all mental processes, judgments included, to 
natural principles, can enjoy a greater freedom to collapse the dichotomy and explore the idea that 
the relationship between error and judgment lies along a spectrum. At one extreme there are errors 
that occur at a purely passive and sensory level. These are not “proper errors” since we do not think 
of them as involving activity or any “wrongdoing” on our part. Nonetheless, to the extent that these 
sensory errors are causally related to errors of judgment we do indeed think of them as involving 
error. Then, at the other extreme, there are errors of careful deliberation (i.e. judgment), and these 
we think of as errors proper. I take my time over the arithmetic, for example, but still I get the 
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wrong answer. This surely is a proper error – one for which I may be held accountable. The point is 
just that on this view there is a whole range of errors. The extent to which an error results from our 
judgment, and the extent to which sensory errors incline us towards errors of judgement, are both 
matters of degree. This, I think, is an idea born in Descartes, but raised in Hume.
52
  
Possibly, however, Descartes deserves even further credit for developing this line of thought. 
Indeed, Brown points out that Descartes’ conception of error involves a spectrum in at least two 
ways. The first is that materially falsity is a matter of degree in the sense that some confused ideas 
are more confused than others. Any idea that inclines a false judgment may be called materially 
false, says Descartes, but the term ‘material falsity’ is only really applicable in cases where the 
inclination is great.
53
  
Confused ideas that are consciously constructed at will, such as those of a chimera or false 
God, typically provide little scope for error, whereas ideas from the senses, particularly 
those relating to appetite, provide the greatest scope for error and most deserve being called 
materially false.
54
  
One might debate whether Descartes is right to think that ideas of a false god provide little scope for 
error, especially on Jesuit terms
55
, but the general point is a good one. If material falsity is a matter 
of degree it can explain why some confused ideas are more likely to lead us to hold false beliefs 
than others. Earlier we wondered whether it was strange to think of the confused idea of the bent 
stick as involving error, since it does not actually incline us to hold false beliefs. But perhaps our 
scepticism was only warranted in that instance because the example of illusion was a weak one. The 
“confused” idea of a submerged stick is not really all that confused. Other examples of confused 
ideas may prove more convincing.  
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The other sense in which Descartes may allow that error involves a spectrum is that he seems to 
think that there are degrees of judgment, and hence possibly degrees of error. Alanen has argued 
that for Descartes it is “necessary to suppose that sensations and passions involve a non-volitional 
judgment”.56 Brown, on the other hand, rejects this view on the grounds that a non-volitional 
judgment cannot be consistent with what Descartes says elsewhere about judgments always 
involving the will. But, nonetheless, Brown observes: 
Descartes is prepared…to acknowledge the habitual and speedy (but essentially) intellectual 
‘judgments’ we make at the ‘third grade’ of sensory response, and to admit that this is where 
falsity occurs. (AT, VII, 437-9) But if it is such judgments that account for the 
representational content of sensory ideas, it is difficult to know whether Descartes is 
assuming that there is an act of assent involved, or whether he is invoking a different sense 
of judgment.
57
 
The relevant point is that it is “difficult to know” whether Descartes regards sensation as involving 
any voluntary act of assent. Possibly the problem is merely exegetical – i.e. that Descartes simply 
isn’t clear about the matter. But another possibility is that the reason Descartes isn’t clear is that the 
issue itself is not clear. In other words, perhaps the reason for the ambiguity is that Descartes (like 
Hume) noticed that judgment is sometimes an ambiguous concept – something that can be 
intermingled with sensation and can admit of various degrees. I’m not suggesting this view is 
actually consistent with Descartes’ wider philosophy; only that he may have recognised the problem 
or the possibility.  
An intermediary figure on this point is Malebranche, who we will discuss more fully shortly, and 
who admits quite explicitly that sensation involves an involuntary form of judgment that is different 
from the kind of judgment associated with volition. For example, Malebranche says that when we 
perceive an object the soul is “led to judge”58 (falsely) that the cause of sensation is the object itself. 
This is, he explains, a passive and instinctual form of judgment. The function of this judgment for 
Malebranche is, as Carl Doxcee puts it, “to guide and preserve the bodily life – a purely practical 
office.”59 This, as will see, is remarkably similar to Hume’s later claim that “nature…determines us 
to judge as well as to breathe and feel,” (T, 183)60 and it is a long way from the “official” Cartesian 
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position, that error must involve judgment, and that judgment must involve volition. Perhaps, 
therefore, there is a line of thought that leads from Descartes through Malebranche to Hume on the 
subject of natural judgment. If so, it is one that is worth tracing if we want to make sense of the 
relationship between judgment and error in the period. 
Setting aside these issues for later chapters, another facet of Descartes’ discussion of error is his 
theodicy – his concern with answering the theological question as to why error should occur at all in 
a world created by an all loving and all powerful designer.
61
 Descartes’ answer is that having senses 
that sometimes deceive us is in fact part of a perfect design. One must understand that the senses are 
given to us for a purpose – to seek out what is beneficial and to keep us from harm62, and the 
appearance of imperfection may arise if do not understand them in these terms. The appearance of 
imperfection in God’s creation can also arise because we lack a sufficiently broad scope. The 
general laws that govern optics, for example, are those that allow us to see, (and they are perfect,) 
but they are the same laws that make the submerged stick appear bent.  
It seems to me that, rather than looking at a single creation in isolation when asking whether 
God’s works are perfect, I ought to look at all of them together. For a thing that seems 
imperfect when viewed alone may seem completely perfect when regarded as a part of the 
world.
63
 
If we, by our own free will, give assent to an unwarranted proposition – that the stick is actually 
bent – then we fall into error. If so, this is not God’s imperfect design, but our own imperfection. 
Error, for Descartes, is the result of two things: our limited scope, and our imperfect use of our 
God-given freewill. 
I notice that these errors depend on two concurrent causes: my ability to know and my 
ability to choose freely…64  
Descartes explanation regarding our limited scope influenced the widely held belief in the modern 
period that sensory errors occur only in specific contexts for which man’s general faculties were not 
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designed. This idea, for instance, was echoed in Leibniz’ strange suggestion that the actual world, 
for all its apparent faults, is in fact the most perfect of all possible worlds. But a weaker version of 
this thesis was widely held in the general culture of the century that followed. Pope’s Essay on 
Man, for example, asks, “Why has not man a microscopic eye?” and answers: “For this Plain 
reason: Man is not a fly.” Man’s faculties are designed for man, and they are perfect for that 
purpose. “Say what the use if finer optics given / to inspect a mite not comprehend the Heav’n?” 
Indeed, the general argument in that whole section of Pope’s famous Essay is that all the apparent 
imperfections of the human condition are only imperfections in appearance. It may seem to man 
that his auditory system (for instance) is overly limited and prone to error, but: “If nature thunder’d 
in his opening ears / And stunned him with the music of the spheres / How would he wish that 
heaven had left him still / The whisp’ring zephyr and the purling rill?”65 
LOCKE 
Locke is a very important figure, because Hume borrowed from Locke the theory of ideas that 
underlies all of his explanations of the human mind, including our propensity to err. Indeed, so 
influential is Locke that when Hume comes to explain his theory of ideas in the Part I of his 
Treatise, he apparently feels no need to explain the theory of ideas as a controversial conjecture to 
be proven, but simply states it as it were a series of evident and foundational facts about human 
experience. Indeed, Hume seems to assume that his division of the human mind into various kinds 
of perceptions, which borrows substantially and conspicuously from Locke, is straightforward and 
uncontroversial. In reality, neither Locke’s nor Hume’s theory of ideas is either of those things. But 
it is important to understand that Hume held Locke’s system in this regard. We will discuss the 
theory of ideas that Hume borrowed from Locke, and its implications for providing an explanation 
of error, in the following chapter. For now, however, I intend to summarise more generally Locke’s 
place in the history of attempts to address the problems of error. 
Locke’s own theory of error, aligned with the tradition, is that error should be explained in terms of 
a lack of correspondence (or a lack of “conformity” as Locke puts it) between our ideas and the 
external world. 
[W]henever the Mind refers any of its Ideas to any things extraneous to them, they are then 
capable to be called true or false…the Mind in such a reference makes a tacit Supposition of 
their Conformity to that Thing’66 
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Ideas themselves, in so far as they are just appearances, cannot be said to involve error.  
…the ideas in our minds, being only so many perceptions or appearances there, none of 
them are false; the idea of a centaur having no more falsehood in it when it appears in our 
minds, than the name centaur has falsehood in it, when it is pronounced by our mouths, or 
written on paper. For truth or falsehood lying always in some affirmation or negation, 
mental or verbal, our ideas are not capable, any of them, of being false, till the mind passes 
some judgment on them; that is, affirms or denies something of them.
67
 
Rather, Locke is another member of the Epicurean tradition that regards judgment as the faculty of 
mind that is responsible for error. 
Knowledge being to be had only of visible and certain truth, error is not a fault of our 
knowledge, but a mistake of our judgment, giving assent to that which is not true.
68
 
Another important element of Locke’s conception of error is that Locke borrowed from Descartes a 
theory of adequate ideas
69
, which he modified to suit his own empirical project, and from which, in 
turn, Hume later borrowed and modified to suit his own ends. In all cases, one of the things that a 
theory of adequate ideas is supposed to explain is the range of ideas that preclude the possibility of 
error. According to Locke, for example, adequate ideas, 
…perfectly represent those Archetypes, which the Mind supposes them taken from; which it 
intends them to stand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate Ideas are such, which are 
but a partial, or incomplete representation of those Archetypes to which they are referred.
70
  
Their adequacy means that, “we are sure that they agree to the reality of Things.”71  
Hume attempts to borrow some of this theory from Locke. For example, Hume’s theory of ideas is 
based on the theory of impressions which, he tells us, like Locke’s adequate simple ideas, “seem 
what they are, and are what they seem” (T, 190). The point of Hume’s explication of impressions, 
once again, is similar to the Epicurean view that it is impossible to be mistaken about sensation 
itself. One might be mistaken in judging a round tower to be square, but if one perceives a tower as 
square one cannot be mistaken that the tower appears square. This appearance is an example of 
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what Hume would call an impression, and, as I will argue in Chapter Four, Hume maintains that 
impressions are immune to error. 
But Hume also applies Locke’s theory of adequate ideas to more complex problems – for example, 
when he explains his own theory of space and extension:  
Wherever ideas are adequate representations of objects, the relations, contradictions and 
agreements of the ideas are all applicable to the objects; and this we may in general observe 
to be the foundation of all human knowledge. But our ideas are adequate representations of 
the most minute parts of extension. (T, 29) 
 
This is interesting, because it is not obvious that Hume can consistently help himself so greedily 
and easily to this tradition. For both Descartes and Locke, the distinction between adequate and 
inadequate ideas is only possible because they both describe to another distinction between what is 
given in perception, and what is not. Locke, for example, says that inadequate ideas are “incomplete 
representations” of the external objects to which they are referred. Ideas of substances are 
inadequate: 
Because those Qualities and Powers of Substances whereof we make their complex Ideas, 
are so many and various, that no Man's complex Idea contains them all.
72
 
In other words, our ideas of ordinary objects do not include the “full picture” of the objects they are 
supposed to represent. My idea of a horse, for example, certainly lacks many of the features that 
horses actually possess. There are various breeds of horses, for instance, and since I knowing next 
to nothing about these, my idea of a horse must therefore be inadequate in that sense. But, even if I 
knew much more about horses – even if I were an equestrian expert – still my idea of a horse would 
be inadequate in some degree because it would not contain, as Locke puts it, all of the secret 
“Qualities” and “Powers” of horses themselves. Besides, he says, even “if we could have, and 
actually had in our complex Idea, an exact Collection of all the secondary Qualities, or Powers of 
any Substance,” still our idea of a substance would not be adequate, because we would still not 
know how those qualities “flow” from the internal constitution of the object – our faculties are not 
“fitted to penetrate into the internal Fabrick and Essence of Bodies.”73  
But Hume, as we will see, has grave doubts about Locke’s account of external objects and 
substances and indeed refuses to affirm the existence of anything that we do not perceive
74
. 
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Consequently, it will prove difficult for Hume to explain how there can be any inadequate ideas at 
all in the sense that Locke describes. If Hume doesn’t have the metaphysical apparatus to talk about 
objects as existing unperceived, then it would appear that he cannot explain how an idea could be 
inadequate by referring to the difference between the idea and the mind-independent object itself. 
In fact, Hume anticipates this objection directly after the passage above in which he offers the 
explanation of space that refers to the adequacy of ideas: 
Twill probably be said…that I explain only the manner in which objects affect the senses… 
without endeavouring to account for their real nature and operations. (T, 63) 
And in response to this problem, as Ainslie notes
75, Hume’s tactic is simply to “plead guilty”, 
…by confessing that my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or 
explain the secret causes of their operations. (T, 64) 
 
How, then, can Hume have an account of inadequate ideas? The answer matters, because if Hume 
can’t explain how an idea could fall short of “completely representing” an object, then it would 
seem that all Humean ideas must be adequate. This is plainly objectionable because, according to 
the tradition, adequate ideas are immune to error, and Hume cannot have it that all ideas are 
immune to error. This is something we will discuss in Chapter Six. 
A more general point, relevant to explaining Locke’s influence in the tradition, is that Locke was 
among the first opposed to the so-called Rationalists, who attempted to shift explanations of many 
of the traditional questions of philosophy (those concerning substance, persistence, identity, natural 
kinds, etc.) towards psychology and away from metaphysics. In this way Locke is one of the key 
influences on Hume’s scepticism. Descartes had said that, 
Philosophy is like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose 
branches, which arise from the trunk, are all the other sciences.
76
 
Locke did not deny this model as a view about ontology, but he certainly doubted its usefulness as a 
model of explanation. For Locke, there are indeed metaphysical roots that support the world of 
experience, but experience imposes strict limits on our ability to say much about them. We may 
well suppose certain metaphysical suppositions – that there is substance, for example – but we can 
only experience these truths indirectly. As a point of methodology, then, it becomes clear that our 
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epistemology cannot have its roots in an indirect science. We must begin, instead, from what is 
directly known: facts about our own minds that are immediately confirmable by introspection. 
It is on the basis of these Lockean doubts that Hume later rejects the systems of metaphysicians 
altogether, and attempts to replace them, methodologically speaking, with a wholly observational 
account of the human mind – one that includes his explanation of human error. Indeed, this is 
exactly the direction in which Hume sets-off in his introduction to the Treatise: 
‘Tis evident, that all the sciences have a relation, greater or less, to human nature; and that 
however wide any of them may seem to run from it, they still return back by one passage or 
another… ‘Tis impossible to tell what changes and improvements we might make in these 
sciences were we thoroughly acquainted with the extent and force of human understanding, 
and cou’d explain the nature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in 
our reasonings… In pretending therefore to explain the principles of human nature, we in 
effect propose a compleat system of the sciences, built on a foundation almost entirely new, 
and the only one upon which they can stand with any security. (T, xv-xvi) 
MALEBRANCHE & ARNAULD 
A stranger influence on Hume’s rejection of the traditional metaphysics is Malebranche who was 
himself a metaphysician. Although in the past Hume’s debt to Malebranche has been less 
recognised than his debt to Berkeley and Locke, the influence is certainly no less direct, and it is 
now well recognised. Hume certainly read Malebranche
77, and indeed Malebranche’s influence 
extends variously to Hume’s treatments of association, causation, passions, the self, reason, ethics, 
and sympathy.
78
 Indeed, as McCracken pointed out in his Malebranche and British Philosophy, 
many of Hume’s arguments against metaphysics are borrowed from Malebranche almost word-for-
word.
79
 This is intriguing since, as McCracken puts it, no two “philosophies are finally more remote 
from each other than Malebranche and Hume’s.”80 Malebranche’s philosophy is concerned with 
teaching the utter dependence of all things on God, while Hume’s science of man wants nothing to 
do with the “Supreme Being”. Indeed, in the Enquiry, when Hume comes to discuss Malebranche’s 
account of God and Occasionalism, Hume simply decries, “We are got into fairyland. Long ere 
have we reached the last steps of our theory.” (E, 72)  
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Given this wide disparity between the two philosophers, what is it in Malebranche that Hume found 
so alluring? McCracken’s answer is that Hume was interested in Malebranche because Hume read 
Malebranche’s Search After Truth as an attempt to provide a catalogue of the errors to which human 
beings are prone, and therefore regarded it as a “good textbook for a sceptic”.81 Along these same 
lines, P. J. E. Kail has argued that when Hume borrowed from Malebranche he did so in a deliberate 
attempt to use Malebranche’s own sceptical arguments against him. In other words, Hume saw that 
Malebranche had used sceptical arguments to explain the false ideas that stand between mankind 
and Christianity, and Hume intended to use these very same arguments to demonstrate the false 
assumptions that underlie the Frenchman’s own philosophy. “Hume…exploits Malebranche’s 
arguments, views and materials against this religious ‘true philosophy’ and in support of his own 
secular view of nature.”82  
To understand the relationship between Hume and Malebranche, we should first understand 
Malebranche’s own theory of ideas. According to Malebranche, objects are known to us through 
ideas that we see in the mind of God. This is a strange position, and as with many strange positions 
in the history of philosophy, the chief argument in its favour is a process of elimination. 
Malebranche proposes what he takes to be an exhaustive list of the different ways that we could 
possibly have ideas of objects, and then, having eliminated all the other options one by one, he 
concludes that the remaining theory must be the correct one.
83
 Only having established the 
conclusion in this way does he then go on to offer some supporting arguments in its favour.  
Before considering the list of serious possibilities, however, Malebranche first rejects off-hand the 
suggestion that we might directly perceive external objects themselves. “Everyone agrees,” 
Malebranche says, “that we do not perceive objects external to us by themselves,” because it is 
obviously impossible that “the soul [could] leave the body to stroll about the heavens to see the 
objects present there.”84 Unsurprisingly, not everyone agrees. Most notably, among the objectors 
was Arnauld who argued that, 
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…ideas, taken in the sense of representative beings, distinct from perceptions, are not 
needed by our soul in order to see bodies.
85
 
Arnauld’s chief objection is that Malebranche has one too many entities in his process. He notes 
that Malebranche treats ideas as a whole category of intermediary objects that stand mysteriously 
between our perceptions on the one hand, and objects on the other. Why not simply think that ideas 
are the same as perception, and then claim that what we perceive are the objects themselves? 
This is an interesting objection, but it is not clear that Arnauld is really in a place to throw stones. It 
is true that Malebranche does indeed seem to define an idea as something separate to the act of 
perceiving. An idea, Malebranche tells us in the Search, is "the immediate object or what is closest 
to the mind when it perceives some thing.”86 But it is not clear that Arnauld can consistently deny 
this. After all, as Malebranche points out, Arnauld himself draws a distinction between (i) “the 
perception of a square” which “indicates…the soul as perceiving the square, and (ii) the “idea of a 
Square” which “indicates more directly the square insofar as it is objectively in the mind.”87 In this 
way, it would appear that Arnauld is committed to the same core assumption as Malebranche, 
namely: ideas must be distinguishable in some sense from the act of perceiving. As for how they are 
distinguishable – this leads Malebranche and Arnauld to a lengthy debate about the Cartesian 
puzzles we have already mentioned, and of which a full analysis is far beyond my present scope. 
There is, however, an important point to observe that is relevant to Hume. Arnauld’s objection to 
Malebranche is an attempt, on his part, to downplay or conflate the distinction between the act of 
having an idea (perceiving), and the idea itself (the thing that is perceived). In so doing, Arnauld’s 
strategy is to insist that the idea should really be explained in terms of the act of having that idea. 
Ideas, he argues, are not a distinct category of existence
88, but are only “modifications of the soul”. 
In other words, Arnauld argues that the objective reality of an idea is not really distinct from the act 
of having the idea. This is relevant to Hume because I think we can read Hume as attempting to 
conflate that very same distinction, but in exactly the opposite way. Arnauld’s strategy, as we saw, 
is to collapse the distinction by explaining the perception-as-object in terms of the perception-as-
act. But Hume’s strategy goes in the other direction. Hume attempts to explain the act of perceiving 
in terms of intrinsic features of the objects he calls “perceptions”. Take, for example, Hume’s 
conception of belief.  Belief, he says, should not be explained as something superadded to an idea. 
The act of believing is not something ontologically different from the act of having an idea. Rather, 
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for Hume, the act of believing is explained in terms of the vivacity or liveliness of the ideas 
themselves. (T, 86)   Belief is not a separate mental faculty or activity, but only an idea that ‘feels a 
particular way’ (T, 103; E, 48), or has a ‘great influence’ on our other ideas (T 118-20). Moreover, 
as I will argue in Chapter Five, Hume attempts to explain many of our ideas about the activities and 
powers of the human mind in terms of the intrinsic features of perceptions and the observable 
relations between them, and in this way, once again, deliberately conflates the activity of perceiving 
with the perceptions themselves.  
This comparison between Arnauld and Hume is instructive because Hume is sometimes accused of 
being oblivious to these Cartesian distinctions, and this is unfair. Richard Price, for instance, 
famously accused Hume of being “misled” by language into regarding the “immediate object of the 
mind in perception to be the same with [the act of] perception...”89 Certainly Price is right that 
Hume often does conflate the two, but I’m not so sure that we should attribute this move to mere 
carelessness or ignorance on Hume’s part. 
Setting Arnauld’s objection aside, Malebranche follows Descartes in thinking of ideas as objects – 
i.e. the things that we perceive. Taking this as a premise, he then proposes the following list of the 
possible ways in which we might come to have ideas: 
We assert the absolute necessity, then, of the following: either (a) the ideas we have of 
bodies and of all other objects we do not perceive by themselves come from these bodies or 
objects; or (b) our soul has the power of producing these ideas; or (c) God has produced 
them in us while creating the soul or produces them every time we think about a given 
object; or (d) the soul has in itself all the perfections it sees in bodies; or else (e) the soul is 
joined to a completely perfect being that contains all intelligible perfections, or all the ideas 
of created beings.
90
 
Malebranche offers various arguments against all of the first four options (a) – (d), leaving him with 
(e) – which he takes to be the correct explanation. The most complex and interesting of his 
arguments to this end is his argument against possibility (c) – that God creates ideas of objects in 
each of our own souls. That possibility Malebranche rejects according to the following argument. 
We know that there must be an infinite array of possible ideas. We imagine a particular triangle, for 
instance, and we understand that by adjusting the length of its sides or angles by tiny increments, 
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there are infinitely many possible triangles that could be derived.
91
 It is not that we ever actually 
perceive the whole infinite set of ideas – the soul is finite and cannot contain an infinite set.92 
Rather, it is only that we have a general idea that an infinite number of possible ideas must exist. 
And because we know that we humans could not possibly contain the infinite set, it must exist 
outside of ourselves. Moreover, even if we suppose that our souls could contain an infinite set of 
ideas there would still be a problem as to how the soul could choose which idea to present to itself 
on any given occasion.  
But even if the mind had a store of all the ideas necessary for it to perceive objects, yet it 
would be impossible to explain how the soul could choose to represent them to itself, how, 
for example, the soul could make itself instantly perceive all the different objects whose 
size, figure, distance and motion it discovers when it opens its eyes in the countryside. 
Through this means it could not even perceive a single object such as the sun when it is 
before the body’s eyes. For, since the image the sun imprints in the brain does not resemble 
the idea we have of it (as we have proven elsewhere), and as the soul does not perceive the 
motion the sun produces in the brain and in the fundus of the eyes, it is inconceivable that it 
should be able to determine precisely which among the infinite number of its ideas it would 
have to represent to itself in order to imagine or see the sun and to see it as having a given 
size.
93
 
The straightforward objection is that the objects themselves might determine which idea we have. 
Why not think that I contain within my soul an infinite stock of possible ideas of the sun 
(representing the sun as having various sizes, colours, etc.), and that the sun itself causes me to have 
one of these ideas (or some subset of these ideas) rather than all the others. Malebranche’s 
anticipates this suggestion, and replies simply that the sun does no such thing. According to the 
physics Malebranche adopts from the period, there is no mechanism by which the sun could 
transmit intentional forms through matter to the sense organs,
94
 and thus no causal process by which 
the sun could pick-out a particular idea from within my soul.  
With these assumptions granted, Malebranche arrives at the following argument. Somehow I 
manage to choose a particular idea from an infinite set. My soul doesn’t do it, and neither does 
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nature. Therefore, it must be God who does it. The soul must be “joined to a completely perfect 
being that contains…all the ideas of created beings.”95 
Hume, of course, does not agree with Malebranche’s conclusion, but he does recognise the 
importance of the problems that Malebranche is attempting to solve. Hume agrees, for example, that 
there are infinitely many possible ideas about a triangle. Indeed, the mind, Hume tells us, has 
“unlimited power of mixing, compounding, separating, and dividing…ideas.” (E, 47) We can 
mentally adjust the size and angles of a particular triangle to imagine other related ideas, and since 
there are an infinite number of possible modifications we could make to the size and angles of a 
triangle, there must be an infinite number of possible ideas. For Hume, unlike Malebranche, this 
does not imply that the infinite set of ideas must really exist somewhere – neither in the mind of 
God, nor lying latent in the soul. Nonetheless, Hume still acknowledges that there is a mystery 
regarding how it is we manage to produce any particular idea from an apparently infinite set. 
Unfortunately, rather than offering a solution, Hume simply says that it is beyond our ability to 
solve. He says of our apparent power to produce ideas: 
We only feel the event, namely, the existence of an idea, consequent to a command of the 
will: but the manner, in which this operation is performed, the power by which it is 
produced, is entirely beyond our comprehension. (E, 68) 
One of the difficulties of Malebranche’s conclusion that all ideas are in the mind of God, is that he 
has to come up with an explanation of how we humans make errors, without also attributing those 
errors to God himself. One might think, after all, that if all of our ideas are God’s ideas, and some of 
our ideas are faulty, then it follows that some of God’s ideas must be faulty. But, of course, this 
conclusion would be incompatible with Melbranche’s belief that God is perfect, and so 
Malebranche is in need of a work-around. His proposed solution involves two important steps. The 
first is to follow Descartes in explaining error as resulting from man’s imperfect judgment. That is: 
we have a free will, but having been tainted by the Fall in the Garden of Eden, we sometimes 
exercise our will poorly when we do not make decisions in accordance with Grace. The second, and 
more complex part of Malebranche’s account, is to draw a distinction between ideas and sensations. 
On the one hand, ideas, as we have seen, are located in the mind of God. But sensations, 
Malebranche goes on to argue, are located in us. Sensations are simply modifications of our own 
souls. 
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It is certain that the soul sees in itself, and without ideas, all the sensations and passions that 
affect it at the moment—pleasure, pain, cold, heat, colors, sounds, odors, tastes, its love and 
hatred, its joy and sadness, and all the rest…96 
Importantly, ‘the soul’s sensations and passions” do not “represent anything resembling them 
outside the soul.”97 In other words, sensations do not give us ideas of objects. They are simply the 
raw sensual content we experience at any given moment. 
Now, as for error: that occurs Malebranche explains when the soul, by its own free will, confuses 
sensations with ideas – for example if the soul judges that mere sensations actually represent real 
objects in the mind of God. The stick appears bent to sensation, and we make an error if we confuse 
our sensation of the stick for a true idea of the stick. Or, to use Malebranche’s implausible example, 
the sun may appear to our senses as being only a few feet in diameter, and we make an error when 
we judge that the sun really is as it appears. Error is made possible by the fact that we are naturally 
led to attribute sensations to objects,
98
 and error actually occurs when our imperfection leads us to 
judge that the sensations really do belong to the objects.  
Malebranche also adds that the reason we humans are so liable to error is that our sensations and 
passions are more lively than our ideas. The passions “dazzle our mind with false lights,” and 
because we are such flighty creatures, we are therefore disposed to the confusion that leads to error. 
This idea finds echoes in Hume who, as will discuss in the following chapter, similarly holds that 
sensations are more lively than ideas. 
Setting aside Malebranche’s core thesis that objects are known to us through ideas in the mind of 
God, there are many more particular features in Malebranche’s philosophy that appealed to Hume, 
and from which Hume borrowed. Consider, for example, Hume’s famous rejection of the Cartesian 
conclusion that each of us has a clear and distinct idea of our own self as a unified thing. 
Undoubtedly, Hume was heavily influenced by Malebranche in this respect: 
I am unable, when I turn to myself, to recognize any of my faculties or my capacities. The 
inner sensation which I have of myself informs me that I am, that I think, that I will, that I 
have sensory awareness, that I suffer, and so on; but it provides me with 
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no knowledge whatever of what I am - of the nature of my thought, my sensations, 
my passions, or my pain – or the mutual relations that obtain between all these things.99 
Indeed, the similarity between Malebranche’s scepticism, and Hume’s later rejection of the 
Cartesian conclusion is astounding: 
There are some philosophers who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of 
what we call our self […] For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, 
I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love 
or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and 
never can observe any thing but the perception. (T, 252) 
Understanding Hume’s debt to Malebranche on this point is particularly important for 
understanding Hume’s Theory of Error because, as we will discuss in Chapter Five, these doubts 
about the self make it difficult for Hume to subscribe to the traditional concept of agency. The 
difficulty arises because the traditional concept of agency appears to be a prerequisite for explaining 
error. The things we call “errors” – holding false beliefs, making false judgments, etc. – do not 
simply occur; they are made. Errors are made by agents who could and should have acted 
otherwise. Hume is therefore confronted by the following problem: if he cannot provide a robust 
concept of agency, it seems he cannot explain how errors are made; he could only ever have it that 
what we call errors are simply acts of nature over which we lack control and responsibility And 
that, as we will discuss later, would be a very unsatisfying account of error.  
Descartes had already wrestled with these problems about agency when he recognised the power 
that our passions exert upon our will.
100
 But the similarity between Malebranche and Hume on this 
point is more interesting, since Malebranche’s treatment of agency anticipates not only Hume’s 
problem with the traditional conception of agency, but also a good part of Hume’s proposed 
solution. Let me explain. There is a problem, well known in the Early Modern period, that the 
traditional conception of a free will stands threatened by the fact that our ability to act freely is so 
often at the mercy of our passions, habits and inclinations and these, by definition, are not formed in 
us freely. One traditional response to this problem is to emphasise the power of man’s metaphysical 
will, set apart from his natural flow of emotions, which can stand defiant against the flow of 
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passionate stimuli. On this view, the will and the passions are thus adversaries in a sense that relates 
to metaphysical freedom. Another option, one that Malebranche glimpsed, is that key features of 
our experience of agency (for example, the orienting of attention away from direct impulses and 
towards reasoned deliberation) can themselves be explained in terms of interactions between 
passions. In this sense, our experience of choosing freely is not, therefore, the enemy of the 
passions, but instead something that might be explained by them (at least in part). Certainly, as we 
shall see, this is the view that Hume adopts, but it has its roots in Malebranche (and possibly 
Descartes). Take, for, example, Malebranche’s discussion of the passion called “wonder”. Wonder, 
according to Malebranche, arrests motion in the body, and in this way might be thought of as 
“buying time” before action – allowing the subject to consider a matter more fully in the light of 
reason before falling headlong into error. Moreover, since the chief object of wonder is the 
infinite
101, wonder turns our attention to God’s grace, and this, by the will of God, steers us towards 
truth and away from error. As Brown comments: 
So long as wonder remains active, there is no reason to think it cannot help arrest the natural 
buffeting of the will by passions and provide it with a motive for deploying reason to 
examine the objects and ideas under consideration.
102
 
Malebranche’s discussion of wonder is interestingly similar to Hume’s discussion of pride, which I 
shall examine in Chapter Five. In each case a feature of our experience of agency is explained by 
appealing to the associative effects of certain passions – passions less in the grip of direct stimuli, 
and related more closely to ideas of the self.  
Of course, Malebranche does not go so far as Hume as to reject the metaphysical conception of the 
will entirely. In fact, if anything, Malebranche renders the metaphysics somewhat more mysterious 
by arguing that action is made possible by the illuminating power of God. Nonetheless, 
Malebranche’s account of the self in which the orienting of attention and the experience of agency 
are explained in terms of associations between passions suits Hume wonderfully. As Passmore puts 
it: although Malebranche saw all things in God, “God, Hume thought, he could excise.”103  
As a general point, despite the fundamental difference in the respective conclusions of Hume and 
Malebranche, their stated methodologies are really quite similar. In the introduction to the Treatise, 
for example, Hume lays-down his proposed methodology with some fanfare, declaring that he will 
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rely exclusively on the introspective science of man, and that he will use it to set the traditional 
questions of philosophy on a “foundation almost entirely new”. “There is no question of 
importance,” Hume says, “whose decision is not compriz’d in the science of man.” (T, xvi) Perhaps 
Hume was the first to attempt to rely exclusively on this method, but it should be noted that 
Malebranche had already told us, “Of all the sciences the science of man is the most worthy.”104 
BERKELEY 
Before turning directly to Hume and more specific issues related to the problem of error, we must 
examine Berkeley’s view, since of all the philosophers we have looked at, Berkeley is the closest to 
Hume on the theory of ideas and he and Berkley share a variety of broad assumptions that leads 
them to share a variety of problems when it comes to explaining error. Most importantly, it was 
Berkeley, before Hume, who extended the scepticism of Locke concerning material substance to the 
point of outright rejection. Berkeley’s works, as Hume says in the Enquiry, contain “the best lessons 
of scepticism, which are to be found either among the ancient or modern philosophers.” (E, 155)  
Without matter, Berkeley’s metaphysics is then left with only two categories: ideas and spirits. 
Berkeley rejects Locke’s conception of mind-independent material substance with a series of 
arguments, the main thread of which is that we never perceive material substance.  
It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and 
in a word all sensible objects have an existence natural or real, distinct from their being 
perceived by the understanding…yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it in question, 
may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the 
forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense, and what do we perceive besides 
our own ideas or sensations…?105 
Influenced strongly by Locke, Berkeley realises that this argument is open to the straightforward 
objection that even if the objects we perceive are indeed just ideas and sensations, this conclusion 
does not provide us with any reason to refute the position that our ideas could be representations of 
other things – things that we don’t directly perceive but which resemble our perceptions – i.e. 
Locke’s material substances. In response to this anticipated objection, Berkley introduces the 
“likeness principle”: 
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But say you, though the ideas themselves do not exist without the mind, yet there may be 
things like them whereof they are copies or resemblances, which things exist without the 
mind, in an unthinking substance. I answer, an idea can be like nothing but an idea; a colour 
or figure can be like nothing but another colour or figure.
106
 
Just why we should adopt this likeness principle, however, Berkeley does not quite adequately 
explain. As Winkler notices, one possible explanation is provided in his Philosophical 
Commentaries when Berkeley tells us that, “Two things cannot be said to be alike or unlike till they 
have been compared.”107 The question then turns on whether or not it is possible to compare ideas 
with mind independent objects, and in what is sometimes called the Master Argument, Berkeley 
argues that such a comparison is impossible: 
…if you can but conceive it possible for one extended moveable substance, or in general, for 
any one idea or any thing like an idea, to exist otherwise than in a mind perceiving it, I shall 
readily give up the cause…. But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, 
for instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive them. I 
answer, you may so, there is no difficulty in it: but what is all this, I beseech you, more than 
framing in your mind certain ideas which you call books and trees, and at the same time 
omitting to frame the idea of any one that may perceive them? But do not you your self 
perceive or think of them all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only 
shows you have the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew 
that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist without the mind.
108
 
Basically, Berkeley’s argument is that whenever you try to compare your ideas with something else 
– something mind independent – you must inevitably fail, since the best you can do is compare your 
idea with other ideas. There are problems with this argument – most notably that Berkeley seems to 
conflate the tools we use to think of an object (i.e. our perceiving) and the object that is being 
represented (i.e. the content of our perception)
109
. It is trivially true that in the act of perceiving the 
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objects of thought are always thought-of (i.e. perceived). But this does not mean that the objects 
themselves, things represented by the content of the thought, might not exist unperceived. We will 
consider these problems in the following chapter in the argot of Hume. My intention for the 
moment is only to trace a history – to show that these arguments find echoes in Hume. Here, for 
example, is a Humean version of Berkeley’s argument against our ability to conceive of material 
substance. 
…since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions and since all ideas are deriv’d 
from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that ‘tis impossible for us so 
much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and 
impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our 
imagination to the Heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance 
a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive of any kind of existence, but those perceptions 
which have appear’d in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor 
have we any idea but what is there produc’d. (T, 67-8) 
Berkeley and Hume both deny that we have coherent ideas of mind independent material 
substances; what is the particular problem with relation to error? The problem is that the reasons for 
rejecting mind-independent substance, are also reasons for doubting the “common sense” 
correspondence theory of error. If there are no mind-independent objects to which my ideas 
correspond – that is, no independent objects that my ideas are supposed to represent or be about – 
then it is not clear how on earth my ideas could ever be said to be true or false. The problem is: if 
my ideas cannot possibly be measured against something else – some independent truth maker or 
yard stick – then in what sense could they possibly fail? 
Berkeley discusses this problem in the Dialogues when he has Hylas ask: 
What say you to this? Since, according to you, men judge of the reality of things by their 
senses, how can a man be mistaken in thinking the moon a plain lucid surface, about a foot 
in diameter; or a square tower, seen at a distance, round; or an oar, with one end in the 
water, crooked? 
Berkeley’s response, given by Philonous, is similar to the Epicurean line that we have already 
discussed – namely, that although the perceptions themselves cannot be faulty, we can nevertheless 
make false judgments about those perceptions if we make unjustified inferences from them. 
He is not mistaken with regard to the ideas he actually perceives; but in the inferences he 
makes from his present perceptions. Thus in the case of the oar, what he immediately 
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perceives by sight is certainly crooked; and so far he is in the right. But if he thence 
conclude, that upon taking the oar out of the water he shall perceive the same crookedness; 
or that it would affect his touch, as crooked things are wont to do: in that he is mistaken.
110
 
The difference between Berkeley’s version and the Epicurean version, however, is that Berkeley 
has no mind-independent objects, and therefore his conception of “faulty judgment” cannot be 
explained in its faultiness by appeal to any deeper correspondence between judgments and mind-
independent facts. And moving the problem from sensation to judgment won’t help. According to 
Berkley’s theory of mind, if I make the false judgment that a round tower is square, it must be that 
my error is explicable solely in terms of mind-dependent things. There’s nothing else to which my 
error could possibly refer.  
Berkeley sets about meeting the challenge of explaining error in terms of mind-dependent facts by 
observing, simply, that when I get closer to the tower (and have a better look), I discover that the 
tower is in fact round, and not square as I had mistakenly predicted. The faultiness of the belief is 
explained in terms of that faulty prediction. Now I’m closer to the tower, I find that I am having 
ideas of roundness, and not ideas of squareness as I had previously thought. My former judgment 
was faulty because it does not cohere with these new sensations. As Berkeley puts it: 
…[the] mistake lies…in the wrong judgement he makes concerning the ideas he apprehends 
to be connected with those immediately perceived.
111
  
What Berkeley has, therefore, is a theory of error that appeals not to correspondence between ideas 
and something else, but to ideas themselves and the coherence of connections between them. This is 
something Hume too will find very appealing, and it commits them both to all sorts of interesting 
problems. Not least of these problems is that without mind-independent truth makers, error appears 
a very flimsy notion. For example, it may be true, as per Berkeley’s example, that on closer 
inspection the tower turns out to appear round and not square, and for this reason I think that I made 
an error and revise my beliefs. But am I right to think that I made an error? What good reason do I 
have to prefer these new perceptions to the old ones? By what criterion can I decide that some 
perceptions are better than others? I get closer to the tower to have a “better look”. But if the tower 
is only an idea in my mind, then in what sense is the look now to be privileged?  
Interestingly, Berkeley seemed to have a way out of this problem that he does not take – namely, 
“let God decide!” Berkley is very well known and often derided for the view that God sustains the 
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existence of objects when we do not perceive them. Recall, for example, the Knox limerick
112
. But 
if we do allow him that doctrine, then it seems he could have simply escaped the problem described 
above by helping himself to a version of the correspondence theory after all. That is: our ideas are 
false insofar as they do not correspond to the perfect ideas that exist in the mind of God. This option 
should remind us of Malebranche. On this view, the facts about the tower would be decided by 
whatever God thinks about them. If there is a difference between my ideas of the tower and God’s 
ideas of the tower, then I must be the faulty one, because God doesn’t make mistakes. There would, 
perhaps, remain a puzzle about how I could ever compare my ideas with God’s ideas, but regardless 
of whether I could ever know about error in this sense, there would at least be an absolute fact of the 
matter.  
But Berkeley does not take this path. He does not take it because, as Fred Ablondi puts it,  
Berkeley [does] not conceive of the relation between God’s idea and our idea as one of 
original-to-copy…his direct realism prohibits this sort of ‘it looks like x but really it’s a ‘y’ 
type of scenario. All of which I am, or can be, aware is what is immediately perceived by 
me, and these are my sensations.”113  
God sustains the existence of objects, on Berkeley’s view, but he doesn’t do it in the sense that he 
makes the objects ‘hang about’ – as if material objects – whenever we are not thinking about them. 
This would simply be a version of the doctrine of material substances, the very thing Berkeley 
rejects, and he will not have it. Just how God sustains objects on Berkley’s view is a very complex 
question, and somewhat beside the point for our purposes since Hume does not appeal to God’s 
conserving role anyway. But the point to understand is simply that Berkley opts to reject the 
correspondence theory of error, even if that theory would appear open to him at a prima facie level. 
As Ablondi summarises Berkeley’s view: 
There is no material substance with an absolute existence, that is, an existence independent 
of any perceiving mind, to which my sensation can be compared for accuracy, nor do God’s 
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ideas stand as the model to which my perceptions need to be tested for their correctness. So 
however Berkeley is to account for errors in perception, it cannot be due to a failure of the 
sensation to ‘match up’ to its ideal.114 
Lastly, we should note an important point of different between Berkeley and Hume. Berkley is 
absolutely committed to the rejection of the correspondence theory of error in a way that Hume may 
not be. The reason is that Berkeley not only doubts the existence of external material objects, but 
explicitly denies their existence. Some commentators, in the history of Hume Scholarship, have 
read Hume as sharing with Berkeley in this conclusion. T. H. Green thought that in this respect, 
“Hume is as much a Berkeleian as Berkeley himself.”115 But Green’s reading of Hume, I shall 
argue, is mistaken, and I cannot think of any contemporary scholar who would read Hume in this 
way. Just what Hume’s view of external objects really is, however, is a very complex and 
disputable question, and it is the chief subject of the next chapter. The outcome matters a good deal, 
because if it turns out that Hume is merely agnostic about the existence of material substance, then 
it follows that Hume need not outright reject the correspondence theory as Berkeley does.  
Hume certainly shares with Berkley the view that we are unable to compare our perceptions with a 
mind-independent material objects. But if it remains possible that if Hume is agnostic about 
material substance then, regardless of whether we know it or not, our ideas may correspond to 
external objects, and we might still think that error should be explained in terms of correspondence. 
It is crucial therefore, that we understand what Hume thinks about external objects, and where he 
stands in relation to the tradition that we have discussed. 
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CHAPTER TWO: UNDERSTANDING HUME’S THEORY OF ERROR IN 
THE CONTEXT OF HUME’S THEORY OF MIND 
 
Hume has a primary goal in both the Treatise and the Enquiry to explain the human mind in terms 
of observable facts about perceptions. He adopts this methodology because he wants to rid Moral 
Philosophy – that is, “the science of human nature” (E, 5) – from what he describes as the “noise 
and clamour” of metaphysics. Indeed, Hume says, the problem with the metaphysical systems is 
that they tend to arise, 
…either from the fruitless efforts of human vanity, which would penetrate into subjects 
utterly inaccessible to the understanding, or from the craft of popular superstitions, which, 
being unable to defend themselves on fair ground, raise these entangling branches to cover 
and protect their weakness. (E, 11) 
In direct opposition to these “abstruse” speculations that pretend to uncover what cannot be 
uncovered, Hume makes it his stated goal to never “go beyond experience, or establish any 
principles which are not founded on that authority”. (T, xvii) By relying only on what can be 
observed, he hopes to “establish…a science, which will be much superior in utility to any other of 
human comprehension.” (T, xix) The study of perceptions, Hume says, is the only foundation on 
which human knowledge can “stand with any security.” (T, xvi) 
In this chapter I will explain how this methodology that underlies Hume’s theory of mind also 
provides the context for understanding Hume’s Theory of Error. This discussion will lead us to 
examine the complex question about how we should interpret Hume’s rejection of the traditional 
metaphysics, and how we should understand his positive project as a response to his scepticism. 
More specifically, I will consider how we should read Hume’s sceptical arguments concerning the 
existence of external objects. Getting to the bottom of Hume’s view of objects is important since, as 
we saw in the previous chapter, the traditional explanation of error that we find, for example, in 
Descartes, is very tightly bound to a theory about the relationship between our ideas on the one 
hand, and the mind-independent objects of the material world on the other.  
Ultimately I will argue that Hume is deeply sceptical of any theorising about external objects 
conceived as mind-independent material substances. Unlike Berkley, this does not lead Hume to 
deny the existence of material objects. His scepticism does, however, lead him to propose an 
alternative theory of objects in terms of his own empirical science of man. Once again, this is part 
of his overarching project to place knowledge on a more secure foundation of experience. We will 
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find that according to Hume’s proposed alternative theory, everything is to be explained in terms of 
perceptions and the associative principles that govern their interactions. 
My goal in this chapter is to provide a framework for understanding Hume’s Theory of Error and to 
explain why Hume proposes an alternative theory of error at all. The answer, in short, is that Hume 
wants to tackle the traditional problems of error that we discussed in the previous chapter in just the 
same manner that he tackles the other traditional problems of philosophy: by relying only on facts 
that can be confirmed by observing one’s own perceptions.  
TWO THEORIES OF ERROR 
Let us begin by contrasting two theories of error. According to the first view I have in mind, error 
involves a lack of correspondence between my perceptions and the world. I may, for example, 
believe that Earth is larger than Jupiter, but it isn’t. That belief doesn’t correspond to facts about the 
external objects themselves, and that’s why it’s false. Planets are things that exist in space, 
independent of my mind, and their respective volumes are what they are regardless of what I 
happen to think about them. On this view, the world itself serves as a standard of correctness for my 
beliefs and judgements. If they don’t match the world, then my judgments are mistaken – and that’s 
that. I will call this view the “correspondence” theory of error, and use that term to include any 
explanation of error that relies on the relationship between perceptions on the one hand, and 
external mind-independent objects on the other. 
Now, there is a difficulty with the correspondence theory of error – one that Hume was keen to 
stress, and one that I intend to explore in this chapter: we never directly experience the external 
objects themselves. If Hume is right about that, a puzzling question arises: how can I meaningfully 
appeal to the world as the standard for determining whether my beliefs are true or false? Everything 
of which I am immediately aware is a perception of some sort. I cannot, when it pleases me, 
transcend my own experience and apprehend the mind-independent objects of the external world. 
For this reason, I have no way to compare my perceptions with anything that isn’t also one of my 
perceptions. And if this is right, then it is good reason to doubt the common sense view of error, 
since it means we have no way to judge the faultiness of perceptions by checking how they relate to 
something of a different kind. If it is impossible to make a comparison between perceptions and 
things that aren’t perceptions (i.e. external objects), then we better not hang too much hope on a 
theory of error that relies on such a comparison. Or so the argument goes. 
A second and alternative theory of error is that instead of explaining error in terms of the relations 
between perceptions and external objects, we should explain it in terms of the relations between 
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different perceptions themselves. On this view, which we’ve already seen advanced by Berkeley, 
the reason that my belief about the planets is faulty is that it does not fit or cohere
116
 with my other 
experiences. For example, I have read scientific books; I have seen diagrams depicting the relative 
sizes of Jupiter and Earth; I could, perhaps, use a telescope and learn how to make the necessary 
calculations for myself. And if I really did believe that Earth is larger than Jupiter my friends would 
all insist that I am mistaken. All of these activities involve building a body of experience. In 
Hume’s language, they involve having a variety of perceptions. And according to the alternative 
view of error, it is because my faulty belief does not fit with this wider body of experience, that it is 
indeed mistaken.  
Contra Berkeley, however, it is important to note that adopting this alternative explanation of error 
need not entail idealism. The position in question is only that everything we know about objects is 
gleaned from the content of perception. This is an important distinction to make, since even if 
Berkeley is right that everything we know is a perception of some sort, it remains possible that there 
are other things that we do not know – mind-independent external objects, perhaps. Moreover, it 
remains possible that whether I know it or not, my beliefs sometimes correspond to these external 
objects and sometimes fail to correspond, and error may consist in exactly such a failure to 
correspond. It should therefore be recognised that the two theories of error outlined above are not 
mutually exclusive. For example, it might be argued that the correspondence theory of error is a 
theory about what error is, and the second alternative view is a theory about how we come to detect 
our errors. This is just the difference between a metaphysical explanation of error and an 
epistemological one. In what follows, however, I will argue that Hume adopts the alternative 
explanation both as a theory of what we know about error, and also as an explanation about what 
error is or at least what “error” means. This is not because Hume outright denies the possibility that 
there are mind-independent objects which our perceptions represent, truly or not. It is because 
Hume also has a positive project: to completely redraft the meaning of various traditional concepts 
by relying only on the introspective “science of man”, for the purpose of putting human knowledge 
on a more secure footing.  
In order to explain this method, I propose to compare Hume’s Theory of Error with Hume’s account 
of the traditional account of substance as substrata. As we will see, when Hume rejects this 
conception of substance it is not because he denies the possibility that such a substratum may exist. 
What he denies is that we ever perceive a substratum on the grounds that we never have an 
impression of any such thing
117
, and he infers from this sceptical conclusion that we must not mean 
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by “substance” what the metaphysicians had thought we mean118. But Hume does not stop there. He 
then goes on to provide an alternative explanation of substance
119
 – one that is described in terms of 
perceptions and the relations between them, and one that does not rely on the existence of a 
substratum. And this process is the blueprint for the whole Humean method. Indeed, it is the same 
process he follows when it comes to his treatments of causation and the self. In each case Hume 
rejects the traditional conceptions on the grounds that we never perceive any such thing (i.e. no 
necessary connection, no unified-soul stuff), and then goes on to completely redraft the traditional 
terms in light of his own science of man – that is, in light of the study of perceptions. What I will 
argue, is that Hume’s Theory of Error should be understood in this same way. Hume rejects the 
traditional correspondence theory of error on the grounds that we cannot perceive any relationship 
between perceptions and anything that is not a perception. But this doesn’t lead him to deny the 
possibility of correspondence, nor is it the end of his story. Hume also offers the beginnings of a 
positive theory about error – one that is cashed-out in terms of his naturalistic science of man, and 
one that he intends to replace the traditional conception that he rejects. I propose to follow that 
theory to see where it leads. 
In any case, to piece of all this together we will need to look more closely at Hume’s rejection of 
the traditional metaphysics, and how he attempts to re-explain the traditional concepts in his own 
naturalistic argot. All of that I intend to explain in what follows. Before proceeding, however, let 
me note right from the outset that the alternative theory of error that I attribute to Hume – Hume’s 
Theory of Error – raises all sorts of difficult and possibly damning questions, and in later chapters I 
will explore these. For many reasons it is worth doubting Hume’s theory, and it is not my primary 
intention to defend it. What I do claim, however, is that getting to the bottom of Hume’s Theory of 
Error will prove revealing – both of Hume’s wider philosophy, and also of the tradition to which 
Hume responds. My overriding intention is to understand the account of error to which Hume does 
subscribe, or to which he could subscribe given his theory or mind. In accordance with how 
seriously you regard Hume’s philosophy, you may variously regard the resulting theory of error as a 
legitimate theory, a troubling reductio, or just another nail in the coffin of Hume’s crazy 
empiricism. I don’t mind – Hume is interesting and important, regardless. 
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THE EXEGETICAL PROBLEM CONCERNING EXTERNAL OBJECTS 
Understanding Hume’s view about external objects is difficult, because Hume often appears to 
contradict himself. In Section VI of his Treatise, for example, he tells us that, “nothing is ever really 
present with the mind but its perceptions or impressions and ideas” and that it is “impossible for us 
so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically different from ideas and 
impressions.” (T, 67) This passage certainly seems to suggest that Hume must be a phenomenalist: 
that he must regard objects, or at least everything we can know about objects, as perceptual 
phenomena, and not as things in themselves. If we read this passage alone, it might seem obvious 
that Hume must follow Berkeley in thinking that error cannot possibly refer to correspondence 
between perceptions and external material objects, since perceptions are all that there is, or at any 
rate the only things we ever know anything about. But if we do try to read Hume this way, we will 
be puzzled when he goes on to speak of “objects we do not see or feel” (T, 74), of “senses changing 
their objects” (T, 11), and even of our ability to “go towards a conception of external objects” by 
“…forming a relative idea of them”. (T, 68) These latter passages seem to suggest that Hume must 
be a realist of some sort, and that he could quite happily adopt the correspondence theory of error 
after all.  
So how are we to make sense of these apparently conflicting statements? On the one hand, Hume 
seems to affirm that perceptions are all we can know, and on the other, he seems to allow that we 
can talk and know about external objects that are not themselves perceptions.  
PHENOMENALISM 
Traditionally, Hume has most commonly been construed as a phenomenalist. This is how Jean 
Bernard Merian and other members of the Prussian Academy interpreted Hume
120
; the German 
idealists
121
 read him this way; and it seems this is also Russell’s interpretation122. And not without 
reason – the phenomenalist reading really does seem to capture a large part of what Hume himself 
says. In rejecting reason as the guiding principle of human life, Hume is viewed as striving to 
reduce all of our knowledge to its base in experience. And since, for Hume, it is ‘obvious’ that 
‘nothing is ever really present’ (T, 67) in our experience but perceptions, it should follow that he 
cannot have any conception of objects that goes beyond perceptual phenomena. This is why Jean 
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Bernard Merian, in his Sur le phenomenisme de David Hume, claims to coin the term 
‘phenomenalism’ to describe Hume’s position in which “all that we feel, imagine, think, know, is 
reduced to phenomena”123. Merian’s reading of Hume has him arguing that “subject and substance 
…are terms empty of meaning, pure creations of reason …that it pleases us to name improperly 
with these fine names”124. And in support of this reading, we find passages in the Treatise such as 
this one: 
We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular 
qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we talk or reason concerning it. (T, 16) 
Many have followed Merian in reading Hume in this way. Maurice Mandelbaum, for instance, says 
that Hume is the arch subjectivist where ‘subjectivism’ is defined as “the thesis that all we can 
know on the basis of sense perception are our own states of mind.”125 Russell’s History of Western 
Philosophy says that “Hume banished the conception of substance from psychology as Berkeley 
had banished it from physics.”126  
There is, however, a serious difficulty facing the phenomenalist reading. The difficulty is that Hume 
quite frequently, explicitly, and (apparently) deliberately, admits the existence of objects that are 
not themselves perceptions. Indeed, in light of these observations, there has been in recent years an 
increasing tendency in Hume scholarship to think that the phenomenalist reading must be mistaken. 
In order to get to the bottom of this exegetical problem, we need to begin with Hume’s theory of 
mind as laid down in the first parts of his Treatise.  
GROUNDWORK 
Hume groups all the ‘objects of the mind’ – that is, everything that is “ever present to the mind” (T, 
67) – under the banner ‘perceptions’. And perceptions, he says, are of two types: impressions, that 
are lively or ‘vivacious’ perceptions; and Ideas that are less lively copies of impressions. It is worth 
noting here that Hume has borrowed the theory of ideas directly from Locke, but altered his 
terminology. Locke had called all of the ‘objects of the mind’ ‘ideas’ (instead of perceptions), but 
Hume rejected this terminology, and, in so doing, declared that he was “restoring the word, idea, to 
its original sense, from which Mr Locke had perverted it.” (T, 2)  
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It will be useful, for now, to think of Hume’s impressions as being our immediate and vivid 
sensation, passion, or emotion, as it first strikes us; and his ideas, conversely, as being fainter copies 
of these impressions that arise before the mind whenever we recall those impressions and think or 
reason about them. As it turns out, Hume cannot consistently distinguish between impressions and 
ideas in this fashion, since, for reasons that become apparent later, he is forced to maintain that the 
distinction is to be cashed-out solely in terms of properties of the perceptions themselves, and not 
via an appeal to causal explanations such as this one. But we need not dwell on this point at present. 
For now, let us simply note that (i) Hume is grouping ‘everything that is present to the mind’ under 
the banner ‘perceptions’; (ii) that there are two kinds of perceptions – impressions and ideas; and 
that (iii) ideas are less vivid ‘copies’ of impressions.  
Each of the two kinds of perception can be further divided into two sub-categories: those that 
involve sensation (e.g. seeing red, or feeling cold), and those that involve reflection (e.g. having 
desires, passions, or emotions). In this manner four types of perception are derived: (i) impressions 
of sensation; (ii) impressions of reflection; (iii) ideas of sensation; and (iv) ideas of reflection. 
Hume observes that the chronology in which these various perceptions strike the mind is 
(i),(iii),(ii),(iv). It works, he says, like this: a person experiences a particular sensation – say, feeling 
cold. Of this impression a copy is taken in the form of an idea about it, and this idea of sensation 
remains after the lively sensible impression has ceased. Whenever this idea of ‘cold’ is recalled it 
produces, in turn, a new impression of desire or aversion; or hope or fear. This is called an 
impression of reflection. Again, a copy of this impression is taken by the mind in the form of a 
fainter idea; and this idea can be recalled via the memory or imagination and, perhaps, gives rise to 
further ideas, and so on.  
It is obvious why this theory of mind so readily lends itself to a phenomenalist reading. If 
everything that we can possibly know is reducible to sense experience, then our knowledge of 
external objects must also be reducible. We cannot possibly contend that we can know about objects 
that are beyond our ability to experience. And in support of the phenomenalist reading we can find a 
multitude of passages in the Treatise and Enquiry that seem to confirm it: 
Hume speaks, for example, of objects and impressions being equivalent: 
…no object can appear to the senses; or in other words, that no impression can become 
present to the mind, without being determin’d in its degrees both of quantity and quality. (T, 
19 – italics mine) 
62 
 
The phrase, “in other words,’ seems to imply that the terms “objects” and “impressions” are, on 
Hume’s view, the very same thing. To say that an object appears to the senses is the same thing as 
saying that an impression becomes present to the mind. Hume often talks in this way. Take, for 
example, this passage in his treatment of extension: 
…My senses convey to me only the impressions of colour’d points, dispos’d in a certain 
manner. If the eye is sensible of any thing further, I desire it may be pointed out to me. But 
if it be impossible to shew any thing farther, we may conclude with certainty, that the idea 
of extension is nothing but a copy of these colour’d points, and of the manner of their 
appearance. (T, 34) 
Notice the strength of the claim. It is not only that our impressions function as an intermediary 
between ideas and extended objects, but that the idea of extension is nothing but the impressions of 
colour’d points. 
And then there are other passages that would seem to put the case for reading Hume as a 
phenomenalism beyond any doubt: 
…‘Tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or form an idea of any thing specifically 
different from ideas and impressions. (T, 67) 
But however emphatic these passages are, Hume also gives us good reason to question them. He 
talks, for example, about objects that are absent from our senses: 
We readily suppose an object may continue individually the same, tho’ several times absent 
from and present to the senses… (T, 74) 
And he even speaks quite explicitly about external objects influencing external organs: 
Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent 
perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of body, from the animal spirits, or from 
the application of objects to the external organs. (T, 275) 
Indeed, this passage would appear to be a direct reference to Descartes’ division between three 
kinds of ideas in the Meditations: ideas that arise within the mind itself, ideas that arise from within 
the body (appetites, pain), and ideas that arise from external objects.
127
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the difference between an idea that arises “within the soul” and an idea that arises from “external 
objects”, if there are really no such thing as external objects, and all ideas of objects are only 
perceptions in the mind? 
REALISM 
Problems with the phenomenalist reading have been suggested to us by many authors including, for 
example, Norman Kemp Smith
128
, John Passmore
129
, Robert Fendel Anderson
130
, Galen 
Strawson
131
, John P. Wright
132
, and in various ways by all of the advocates of what is now called 
“the New Hume”133. These writers have each sought to demonstrate that the phenomenalist reading 
rightly interprets only one of several themes contained in Hume’s Treatise. It is true, they say, that 
Hume is seeking to reduce all of our inferences to their base in immediate experience. But he is not, 
as has been traditionally thought, thereby doing away with the external world. Indeed, they point 
out that Hume frequently talks about the external world, and often without any apologies or even a 
hint of evidence that he finds himself guilty of contradicting his own perceptual doctrine. In fact, in 
a particularly scrupulous survey, Majorie Grene sets about counting and categorising Hume’s use of 
the word ‘object’ throughout his work, and finds exactly one-hundred-and-twenty-three occasions 
in the Treatise in which “objects” clearly refers to external objects134. The sheer weight of numbers 
leads her to write: 
There is surely [for Hume] a real world we are all living in, and are part of. Only we are 
treating that world here in terms of moral rather than natural philosophy; we are starting 
with our perceptions, not with the anatomy or physiology that would attempt to describe 
their causes.
135
 
This, therefore, is one of the alternative readings of Hume that has recently come into vogue. Hume, 
it is emphasized, is undertaking an investigation into the ‘science of man’ and is beginning not from 
the physiological realm, but from the psychological one. His intention is not to conclude, as the 
phenomenalist would have it, that statements about objects can only ever be statements about 
perceptual phenomena. Rather, Hume’s intention is to undertake an investigation of cognition that 
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begins from the assumption that perceptions are the only objects that can enter into our psychology, 
and then strives to explain all of our inferences and beliefs solely in these psychological terms. 
Within this project, everything physical or physiological has to be constructed from human 
perceptions. But Hume’s project itself does not seek to show that external objects are non-existent. 
Rather, Hume’s work is said to bypass or ignore the concerns of the physical natural sciences.  
Other writers, however, have gone even further. Passmore, for instance, contends not only that 
Hume cannot be a phenomenalist, but that he is, in fact, an anti-phenomenalist since, “he regarded 
phenomenalism as a variety of ‘excessive scepticism’, the sort of scepticism which no one can 
persistently maintain.”136 True, Passmore admits, Hume is a phenomenalist in a narrower sense, in 
which we cannot know anything but perceptions “in that restricted sense of ‘know’ in which it 
means ‘be certain of, without any risk of error’.” But supporting conclusions upon this type of 
reasoned certainty is not Hume’s primary concern. Passages such as this one suggest that Hume is 
too practical for that: 
No man, who reflects, ever doubted that the existences, which we consider, when we say, 
this house and that tree, are nothing but perceptions in the mind and fleeting copies or 
representations of other existences, which remain uniform and independent. (E, 152)  
This leads Passmore and others to contend that Hume “believed in the existence of both material 
objects and of perceptions, and thought that perceptions were ‘appearances of’ material objects.”137 
Proponents of this realist reading happily admit that our belief in material objects cannot be 
defended against scepticism by reason, but this, they contend, says nothing against the belief itself 
and everything against the supposed sovereignty of the reasoned scepticism that is intended to 
refute it. Berkeley’s scepticism can be brought to bear against the Lockean belief in objects; but for 
Hume “something like Lockeanism must be true even though it is not rationally defensible.”138 
Berkeley’s subjectivism, Hume says, “produces no conviction”. (E, 155) 
A NEW READING OF HUME? 
What is certainly right about the realist reading is that Hume allows that some beliefs that cannot be 
justified on rational grounds can nonetheless be recommended on other terms, and the belief in 
external objects is one of these. This is part of his overarching contention that custom, and not 
reason, is the guiding principle of the human mind. He tells us, for instance, that although the 
sceptic cannot defend his beliefs by reason, nature has not left the matter to this choice. 
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Thus the sceptic still continues to reason and believe, even tho' he asserts, 
that he cannot defend his reason by reason; and by the same rule he must 
assent to the principle concerning the existence of body, tho' he cannot 
pretend by any arguments of philosophy to maintain its veracity. Nature has 
not left this to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an affair of too great 
importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. (T, 187) 
There is serious disagreement in the contemporary literature, however, as to how we should 
interpret the sense in which Hume recommends believing in external objects. Richman summarises 
this division in his introduction to The New Hume Debate.
139
 
A puzzle in the interpretation of Hume, perhaps the main puzzle, is the fact 
that Hume appears to do the following: (a) endorse beliefs in objects and 
causes, (b) hold that we should not endorse beliefs that do not have 
appropriate grounding in our impressions (as described in the theory of 
ideas), and (c) hold that the beliefs in objects and causes do not have the 
grounding in our impressions. Defenders of the old reading of Hume reject 
or qualify (a), arguing either that Hume does not endorse these beliefs, or 
that he endorses them in a way that does not commit him to the truths of the 
beliefs. …New Humeans accept (a), and either reject or modify (b) or (c).140 
This debate is very complex, and involves many subtleties. The crux of the whole matter, however, 
in my opinion, can be reduced to the following question: when Hume recommends the natural belief 
in external objects
141
, is this recommendation supposed to be a justification of that belief, or does he 
simply endorse the belief in external objects on pragmatic grounds – that is, in spite of the fact that 
the belief lacks justification – either because it has good consequences, or because we cannot help 
but believe it? This question is important because it will decide whether Hume should be read as 
defending some version of realism. And deciding that question, in turn, will help decide the nature 
of Hume’s Theory of Error. For example, if Hume intends his recommendation of the natural belief 
in external objects as a full-blown philosophical justification of that belief, then we should certainly 
read Hume as a realist. And if we do read Hume as a realist, then we might also read Hume as 
subscribing to the traditional correspondence theory of error that relies on the existence of real 
external objects. In that case, we might say that Hume thought the traditional metaphysicians were 
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right, but for the wrong reasons. That is, They were right to argue that there is an external world 
beyond perception, and right to think that error occurs when our perceptions fail to properly 
represent the external world, but wrong to maintain that any of those truths can be defended by 
reason. On the other hand, if Hume’s recommendation of the natural belief in external objects is 
merely pragmatic, then we might say that Hume only recommends realism in the sense that it is 
sometimes good for us to believe things that aren’t necessarily true. On this reading, we could take 
Hume more seriously when he tells us that perceptions are all that we ever know. We would not 
describe Hume’s position as realism in any proper sense, even though it is happily conceded that 
Hume frequently recommends realism in a pragmatic sense.  
Deciding the question is difficult because the text itself isn’t clear. Indeed, depending which 
passages you emphasise, it is not difficult to make a prima facie case for either side. For example, 
on the one hand, Hume says that we believe in the external existence of objects merely because it 
“sets us at ease” to believe it (T, 215). We believe it, that is, as the result of the natural inclination to 
avoid cognitive dissonance.  
Nature is obstinate, and will not quit the field, however strongly attack’d by reason; and the 
same time reason is so clear in the point that there is no possibility of disguising her. Not 
being able to reconcile these two enemies, we endeavour to set ourselves at ease as much as 
possible, by successively granting to each whatever it demands… (T, 215) 
But on the other hand, there are passages in which Hume appears to offer something closer to full-
blown justification for our natural beliefs. Not least is the famous passage in which Hume tells us 
that reason not only is but ought to be the slave of the passions. (T, 415) Kemp Smith’s reading of 
that passage extends the normative claim about passions to natural beliefs as well. He paraphrases: 
“Reason is, and ought to be, ‘the slave’ of the natural beliefs.”142 If this reading is right, then Hume 
not only thinks that our beliefs must be explained in terms of passions and sentiments (that much is 
uncontentious), but also maintains that beliefs can be justified by natural principles. Beliefs ought to 
result from natural passions, and since our belief in external objects results from natural passions, 
the belief in external objects must be a good and proper belief. Indeed, Kemp Smith says that, for 
Hume, nature acts as the “arbiter” of our belief. 
In the difficulties and complexities of man's life, irrevocably natural, and yet in such large 
part also conventional, he stands in need of a twofold philosophical discipline—a sceptical 
discipline to open his eyes to the deceptiveness of the mistaken endeavours, both moral and 
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speculative, into which his specifically human powers are ever tending to betray him, and a 
positive naturalistic philosophy to mark out the paths upon which he can confidently travel 
without any such attempted violation of his human nature, and in the furtherance of its 
essential needs. In this twofold task it is Nature, through the beliefs to which it gives rise, 
which acts as arbiter. It defines the conditions of health, and the regimen suitable for its 
maintenance. Scepticism serves as an ally, but in due subordination, not as an equal.
143
 
Thus, nature not only provides a justification for belief, but nature is in fact reason’s senior partner 
when it comes to belief justification. Only where “reason is lively, and mixes itself with some 
[natural] propensity,” can we assent to that belief. “Where it does not,” reason can never “have any 
title to operate upon us.” (T, 270) 
But, once again, it is not obvious how Hume intends us to interpret this relationship between 
rational justifications on the one hand and natural propensities on the other. Kemp Smith is right 
that for Hume natural propensities are required for the process of justifying beliefs, and right that 
Hume thinks nature trumps reason in this respect. But the difficult question remains: does Hume 
also intend to assert the truth of the beliefs that result from those natural propensities?  
For my part, I am inclined to side with the Old Humeans who think that Hume’s recommendation 
of the belief in external objects does not commit him to the truth of realism. I think the textual 
evidence falls quite clearly on the side that the belief in external objects is something we simply 
“take for granted”. 
Carelessness and in-attention alone can afford us any remedy. For this reason I rely entirely 
upon them; and take it for granted, whatever may be the reader’s opinion at this present 
moment, that an hour hence he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal 
world…” (T, 218) 
For Hume, the only real recommendation of this natural belief is that it has pleasing pragmatic 
consequences. 
Tis happy…that nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them 
from having any considerable influence on the understanding (T, 187) 
“If I must be a fool,” says Hume, then “my follies shall at least be natural and agreeable.” (T, 270)  
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I think we might compare the sense in which Hume recommends realism to the sense in which a 
doctor recommends a placebo. A placebo may cure a man if he believes it will, and for that reason 
the doctor may be justified in prescribing him a sugar pill. But this is not because the doctor 
believes sugar pills are real medicine; it is because she thinks fostering the false belief in the patient 
will incur a good result. The reason is pragmatic, and so it is with Hume’s position. It would be a 
mistake to think that because Hume recommends believing in the existence of external objects on 
natural terms, that he must therefore think that realism is true or justified in anything but the 
pragmatic sense. Consider, for example, the passage in Book I Section VII, in which Hume 
describes how confounded he becomes when confronted with the “clear” but “sceptical” dictates of 
reason: that there is nothing rational about the belief in external objects. If Hume really believed 
that naturalism or custom offered a proper way out of this dilemma – a full-blown philosophical 
justification of the belief in external objects – then he would have no serious cause to be upset that 
the belief cannot also be justified by reason. And yet we find that Hume is quite upset. Indeed, he 
moans for many pages about the “spleen and indolence” he feels at the hands of the sceptical 
conclusions of reason. Finally, at the end of this tirade, he arrives at a cure for his depraved 
sceptical condition: to expect a victory from “the returns of a serious good-humour’d disposition” 
and not “from the force of reason”. (T, 270) 144 But this is not at all what we should expect if Hume 
were really attempting to justify our belief in terms of nature, in a way that might guarantee or even 
support its truth. Instead, the belief functions as something more like a natural cure for 
“philosophical melancholy”:  
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature 
herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and delirium. 
(T, 279) 
Alternatively, one might argue that Hume regards the belief in external objects as being natural in 
the sense of being literally unavoidable
145
. In that case, the belief in external objects would not be 
like a prescribed placebo, since it’s not something that we could choose to do. R. J. Butler 
apparently took this view: 
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Hume indicates that natural beliefs are non-rational, that they have a certain degree of force, 
and that they are unavoidable.
146
 
This reading might be supported by a passage in which Hume tells us that there are some beliefs 
without which human nature would “immediately perish and go to ruin”. 
I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, 
irresistable, and universal…And the principles, which are changeable, weak, and 
irregular…The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions, so that upon their 
removal human nature must immediately perish and go to ruin. The latter are neither 
unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful in the conduct of life; but on 
the contrary are observ'd only to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other 
principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and 
opposition… (T, 225) 
Later, in the Enquiry, he says that we “always” suppose an external universe. 
It seems evident that men are carried by a natural instinct or pre-possession to repose faith in 
their senses, and that without any reasoning, or even almost before the use of reason, we 
always suppose an external universe which depends not on our perception but would exist 
though we and every sensible creature were absent or annihilated (Enquiry, 151) 
 
But Hume cannot really regard the belief in external objects as literally unavoidable, since he, 
himself, on quite a few occasions, entertains the possibility that it’s not true. In fact, directly after 
that passage from the Enquiry we find: 
But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest 
philosophy, which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image… 
(E, 152)
  
Rather, if we examine the text more carefully we find that the sense in which Hume regards the 
belief in external objects as unavoidable is only the sense in which it is unavoidable in the 
“common operations” of life. Hume admits that “the reader’s opinion at the present moment,” may 
well be that there are no external objects. But “an hour hence,” when he leaves the study, and 
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forgets about philosophy, “he will be persuaded there is both an external and internal world…” (T, 
218) Hume’s position is simply that we cannot maintain the sceptical position for long. 147 
But even if Hume were to regard the natural belief in external objects as literally unavoidable, he 
needn’t consequently think the belief is also true, since an unavoidable belief is not at all the same 
thing as a true belief. Possibly Hume could make that inference if he also believed that the dictates 
of nature are always good. If so, he could argue: (1) nature makes us believe in external objects; (2) 
nature always makes us believe things that are true, (3) therefore, the belief in external objects must 
be true. Wright implies this argument may be open to Hume when he observes that, “Hume appears 
to prefer a sense of the word 'natural' which requires that what is natural to man be both beneficial 
and truth-preserving.”148 And Wright is correct that Hume usually talks of nature in this beneficial 
way. Indeed, as a point of style, Hume often personifies nature as a thoughtful and considerate 
force. 
 Nature has proceeded with caution in this case… (T, 118) 
 Nature has, therefore, chosen a medium… (T, 119) 
Nature is always too strong for principle… (E, 168) 
Nature has not left this [the belief in body] to his choice, and has doubtless esteem'd it an 
affair of too great importance. (T, 187) 
In this sense, Hume aligns not only with the philosophical tradition exemplified by Descartes, but 
also with the normative view of medicine in the 18
th
 C. A close acquaintance of Hume, for instance, 
Dr John Gregory, observed “that nature is good at doing things that are good for human beings, 
maintaining health and correcting its loss.” Gregory regarded health, therefore, as “an example of a 
normative dimension of nature that is directly observable.”149 Similarly, as we have seen, the 
Treatise contains passages in which Hume talks of health as if it were the norm of nature. (T, 270) 
                                                 
147
 Winkler notes that, “There are two ways in which a belief might be inescapable: it might be absolutely irresistible, or 
it might be necessary for life.” Hume denies both of these. Nonetheless, he certainly subscribes to a weaker version of 
the second thesis: viz. that most of the time (i.e. in the common operations of daily life) the belief in external objects is 
necessary for life. 
Winkler, K. P. “The New Hume,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. 11, No. 4, p.562 
148
 Wright, J. P., “The Sceptical Realism of David Hume” (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1983) p.229; See 
also p. 225 – Wright compares Hume’s conception of natural belief to that of Malebranche. “Malebranche and Hume 
hold that in what nature teaches us there is some truth contained.” 
Kemp Smith similarly says that the belief in external objects, because it is motivated by nature, has “all the de facto 
prescriptive rights which Nature, in thus predetermining us to them, has conferred upon them.” p.125 (emphasis added) 
149
 McCullough, L. B., et al. 2008. "Scientific and Medical Concepts of Nature in the Modern Period in Europe and 
North America," Philosophy and Medicine, Vol. 97, 2008, p.164 
71 
 
But although Hume generally regards nature in this beneficial light, he is also quite prepared to 
admit that it gives rise to faulty beliefs as well as veridical ones: 
…one who is tormented he knows not why, with the apprehension of spectres in the dark, 
may, perhaps, be said to reason, and to reason naturally too: But then it must be in the same 
sense, that a malady is said to be natural; as arising from natural causes, tho' it be contrary to 
health, the most agreeable and most natural situation of man. (T, 225) 
And elsewhere, in the Dialogues, Hume makes it quite clear that nature is not always benevolent. 
Rather, on a “more narrow” inspection we find that nature appears to be a contemptuous creature, 
who supplies creatures insufficiently with the means to sustain their own happiness. 
Look round this universe. What an immense profusion of beings, animated and organised, 
sensible and active! You admire this prodigious variety and fecundity. But inspect a little 
more narrowly these living existences, the only beings worth regarding. How hostile and 
destructive to each other! How insufficient all of them for their own happiness! How 
contemptible or odious to the spectator! The whole presents nothing but the idea of a blind 
Nature, impregnated by a great vivifying principle, and pouring forth from her lap, without 
discernment or parental care, her maimed and abortive children!150  
This context of this passage is quite different from the Treatise or the Enquiry. Hume’s intention in 
that passage is to demonstrate a difficulty with the Argument from Design for the existence of 
God.
151
 It is however an evocative example of what I think is fairly obvious anyway – that Hume is 
deeply sceptical of the Cartesian conception of nature as the product of a perfect God, and moreover 
he is quite prepared to entertain the possibility that nature is completely blind. Anyone who reads 
Hume’s account of nature in the Treatise as providing some sort of providential foundation on 
which to justify the truth of our natural belief in external objects, is going to have a tough time 
reconciling that reading with Hume’s more general scepticism about providence. To be sure, Hume 
often speaks of nature as if it were providential, but that is not the same thing as thinking the nature 
really is providential. I think Richmond is right to observe that, 
In describing nature in this way…[Hume] meant merely to point out that certain aspects of 
the natural world are fortuitous enough for us to be as if there were some intentional wisdom 
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behind them, although, the view continues, there is no reason to believe that such wisdom 
actually exists.
152
 
In any case, from a methodological point of view, Hume cannot consistently maintain that natural 
beliefs are always true, since he maintains that all beliefs are natural, and would be committed to 
the absurd conclusion that all beliefs are always true. As we will explore in Chapter 4, Hume’s 
whole theory of belief is decided entirely by natural facts about how an idea feels. (T, 94-95) And 
all beliefs, for Hume, are decided in this naturalistic way. 
For all of those reasons canvassed above, I cannot accept the New Humean reading of Hume as a 
realist, (even a sceptical one). We all agree that Hume thinks that we do believe in external objects 
as a sheer matter of fact, and also that he endorses that belief – at least in the pragmatic sense 
(because it “sets us at ease” to believe it, and because, most of the time, nature simply compels us to 
believe it). But having acknowledged those facts I think it would be a mistake to infer from these 
uncontentious conclusions that Hume must therefore be a realist in anything more than the 
pragmatic sense.  
Nonetheless, I acknowledge that there are many arguments against this position that I cannot 
address here, and to which, by omission, I may have done injustice. In light of that fact, I offer the 
following deflationary consideration for any New Humean who finds herself unable to agree with 
my reading. The outcome of the New Hume debate will not affect the primary conclusion that I 
wish to establish in this chapter, which is simply that Hume’s Theory of Error does not rely on the 
existence of external objects. According to my own reading: 
(a) Hume does not argue for the truth of realism 
(b) Hume does not subscribe to the traditional correspondence theory of error that relies on the 
truth of realism 
(c) Because Hume is sceptical of realism, Hume redrafts traditional concepts in a way that does 
not rely on the truth of realism 
(d) Aligned with this general strategy, Hume’s Theory of Error does not rely on the existence of 
external objects (or correspondence between perceptions and external objects) 
If the New Humeans are right, (a) is false, and consequently (b) is probably false too. If Hume 
really does think that the belief in realism is a true belief, then he might just as well think that the 
correspondence theory is correct as well. As I said, I think that premise is false and Hume has no 
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reason to accept the conclusion. But, even if I’m wrong about that, the only conclusions for which I 
argue in this chapter – the only ones that will be necessary to support the following chapters – are 
(c) and (d). What I claim is that regardless of whether or not Hume is a realist about external 
objects, he certainly attempts to offer a theory of error that does not rely on the truth of realism.  
RELATIVE IDEAS & AGNOSTICISM REGARDING EXTERNAL OBJECTS 
For all Hume’s talk of natural belief, there is one strange passage in which he seems to allow that 
we can form ideas of external objects, even on rational grounds. We will consider that passage here 
for two reasons: firstly, because Hume’s account of relative ideas (of which this section is the 
primary example) provides a useful addendum to the proceeding discussion about Hume’s treatment 
of realism; secondly, and more importantly, because this passage demonstrates that Hume clearly 
allowed that we can speak meaningfully about the possibility of external objects. Relative ideas are 
therefore significant for Hume because they describe the limits of what we can meaningfully say 
about external objects, and also, I contend, the limits of what we might say about the 
correspondence theory of error. 
We find the passage in the section of the Treatise entitled “Of the idea of existence and external 
existence”. It is quite long, but worth quoting in full. I will call the two paragraphs [A] and [B] for 
ease of reference. 
[A:] Now since nothing is ever present to the mind but perceptions and since all ideas are 
deriv’d from something antecedently present to the mind; it follows, that ‘tis impossible for 
us so much as to conceive or form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and 
impressions. Let us fix our attention out of ourselves as much as possible: Let us chase our 
imagination to the Heavens, or to the utmost limits of the universe; we never really advance 
a step beyond ourselves, nor can conceive of any kind of existence, but those perceptions 
which have appear’d in that narrow compass. This is the universe of the imagination, nor 
have we any idea but what is there produc’d. 
[B:] The farthest we can go towards a conception of external objects, when suppos’d 
specifically different from our perceptions, is to form a relative idea of them without 
pretending to comprehend the related objects. Generally speaking we do not suppose them 
specifically different; but only attribute to them different relations, connexions and 
durations. But of this more fully hereafter. (T 67-8, emphasis added) 
This passage should immediately remind us of the difficulty of understanding Hume. In [A] he 
denies that we can ever escape the ‘narrow compass’ of perception (so much the better for a 
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phenomenalist reading). Yet in [B] he says that we can form a ‘relative idea’ of objects even if we 
can’t comprehend them (so much the worse). There is certainly some kind of change or softening 
going on between these two paragraphs. Passmore observes this shift of view between [A] and [B]. 
Speaking of the first paragraph, he writes, 
This is high eloquence; taken at its face value it would mean that ‘existence’ is just another 
word for ‘perception’, and ‘non-existence’ not a word for anything.153 
If that were so, it would be literally meaningless to say that there is anything “existent” that is not a 
“perception”. But, says Passmore, now commenting on the transition between paragraphs, 
…we must ignore the rhetoric and concentrate on the phrase ‘specifically different from 
ideas.’ For Hume goes on to admit that we can form a ‘relative idea’ of objects by 
attributing our perceptions ‘different relations, connexions and durations.’ We cannot think 
of anything except as being a perception of some sort, but we can suppose that certain of our 
perceptions are systematically interconnected.’154 
But if Passmore’s view is that these two paragraphs involve a transitional ‘softening’, Robert 
Fendel Anderson contends that they involve something more like a complete change of view. 
Speaking of the two paragraphs, Anderson writes, 
Passmore is assuming that “them” in the second sentence of the final paragraph, refers to 
perceptions. I observe, however, that in the first sentence “them” refers to external objects. It 
seems more probable, therefore, that “them” in the second sentence refers to external objects 
also. If so, then Hume seems there to be saying that we attribute a variety of relations, 
connections and durations to external objects. Or perhaps “them” in the second sentence refers 
to both external objects and perceptions. If so, then Hume may there be saying that we attribute 
different relations, connections and durations to external objects than we do to perceptions, 
thus apparently allowing that we do have some conception of external objects as distinct from 
perceptions.
155
  
Anderson’s observation – that the word ‘them’ in the second sentence of [B] cannot refer only to 
perceptions – is an important insight. Once we realize that this is so, it seems that when Passmore 
says, “We cannot think of anything except as being a perception of some sort, but we can suppose 
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that certain of our perceptions are systematically interconnected”,156 he isn’t going far enough. 
True, it is the case for Hume that we cannot think without perceptions – indeed, to think, for Hume, 
is just for perceptions to be present – but it does not follow that we cannot think of anything ‘except 
as being a perception’.157 There is a difference between thinking with perceptions, and thinking 
about perceptions.
158
 This is an interesting distinction, since it allows the possibility, as against the 
phenomenalist reading, that we can form ideas about external objects after all. Indeed, despite the 
fact that we cannot “pretend to comprehend the objects themselves” we can nevertheless form an 
idea of external objects as being things that are related to our perceptions, but are not themselves 
perceptions. In other words, everything that is present to the mind is a perception, and the content of 
every perception derives entirely from impressions, but, using these tools, we can perceive that 
there may be other kinds of objects even if we cannot ‘comprehend’ (Hume’s word) those objects 
themselves.
159
 This is the sense in which Winkler explains that for Hume, “The mind's reach 
(though not its grasp) extends beyond our ideas.”160  
This, I think, is a fairly natural way of reading [B]. That is, although we cannot reasonably pretend 
to ‘comprehend’ external objects, we can conceive of their possibility. What we have is an idea of 
external objects as being things (we know not what) that may be related to our perceptions in some 
way. In Hume’s words, “We are oblig’d…to conceive an external object merely as a relation 
without a relative.” (T, 241) How does this work? Flage explains the point nicely: 
…One must have a clear and distinct positive idea of both the relation that provides the 
basis for the relative idea and of the relation that obtains between that idea and the unknown 
relatum. In Hume's parlance, both the idea that provides the basis for the relative idea and 
the idea of the relation must be copies of impressions…But since in many cases the 
presumed relation obtains between a positive idea and a non-ideational entity, the question 
whether the relation in question obtains may remain open, a point Hume stressed.
161
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As for how external objects may be related to our perceptions, Hume doesn’t say in this passage, 
but given other things he says throughout the Treatise, causation seems a likely candidate. He says 
on a few occasions, for example, that we think of perceptions as being occasioned by, or arising 
from, external objects. 
…external objects become known to us only by those perceptions they occasion. (T 67) 
Original impressions or impressions of sensation are such as without any antecedent 
perception arise in the soul, from the constitution of body, from the animal spirits, or from 
the application of objects to the external organs. (T 275) 
Another possibility is that Hume may have thought that external objects could be conceived as 
providing a “support” to perceptions. If so, then Hume would be following Locke who had already 
described relative ideas of substance in exactly those terms. As Flage summarises:  
Locke's discussion makes several points clear. First, substance as such is known solely on 
the basis of a relation, the relation of inhesion or support, which obtains between a positive 
idea conceived as a quality of a thing and the thing of which it is a quality. Second, this 
relation of support is central to one's relative idea of substance in general. Finally, this 
relative idea provides one with no understanding of the intrinsic properties of a 
substratum.
162
 
But Hume does not actually adopt this view, and “support” is not listed in Hume’s seven categories 
of relations. (T, 13-14) Hume’s reasons for this omission are likely to be similar to those of 
Berkeley who had already pointed out a difficulty with Locke’s theory of substances providing a 
support for modes. Simply put, the objection is that Berkeley has no idea what “support” is 
supposed to mean. 
I desire that you would explain what is meant by matter’s supporting extension: say you, I 
have no idea of matter, and therefore cannot explain it. I answer though you have no 
positive, yet if you have any meaning at all, you must at least have a relative idea of matter; 
though you know not what it is, yet you must be supposed to know what relation it bears to 
accident, and what is meant by supporting them. It is evident support cannot here be taken in 
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its usual or literal sense, as when we say that pillars support a building: in what sense 
therefore must it be taken?
163
 
Hume, perhaps, is somewhat more lenient than Berkeley when it comes to allowing the possibility 
of relations we know nothing about. “I am, indeed, ready to allow that there may be several 
qualities both in material and immaterial objects, with which we are utterly unacquainted.” (T, 168) 
But Hume certainly shared Berkeley’s scepticism of Locke’s theory of substance. Hume’s point is 
that, whatever relation we imagine as pertaining between external objects and perceptions, our 
imaginings will “be of little consequence to the world,” since, if external objects do exist and do 
bear relationships to our perceptions, we still know nothing at all about them. (T, 168) The problem 
with relative ideas of external objects is that they contain very little content: 
Bereave matter of all its intelligible qualities, both primary and secondary, you in a manner 
annihilate it, and leave only a certain unknown, inexplicable something…a notion so 
imperfect that no sceptical will think it work while to contend against it. (E, 155) 
Regardless of this scepticism, what is important about Hume’s notion of relative ideas is that he 
allows that we can conceive of external objects, and we can therefore meaningfully discuss them. 
We might, therefore, compare Hume’s idea of external objects to the sense in which an agnostic 
may speak meaningfully about the possibility of a creator. On the agnostic’s view the name 
“Creator” may not necessarily refer to a deity that actually exists, but it can nonetheless be used as a 
meaningful term. For example, the idea of a Creator can be thought about in terms of attributed 
properties – for instance, as an omnipotent being who created the universe.164 In a similar sense, 
Hume thinks that we can meaningfully talk about external objects in terms of their possible effects 
on our perceptions. At one point he appears to deny this when he says, “Tis in vain to ask, Whether 
there be body or not?” (T, 187) But he certainly does not mean that it is impossible to ask the 
question. Hume cannot mean that the question is meaningless, since Hume himself asks it. (T, 67-8) 
Rather, the point is just that the metaphysical question about whether there really are external 
objects cannot be decided by perception, and perceptions are all that we have. It is therefore not 
worth dwelling on this metaphysical question, (i.e. ‘Tis in vain…), because we simply cannot 
answer it.  
However, in terms of providing an account of error, Hume’s agnosticism about external objects 
means that the following position is open to him: if external objects exist, then error may consist in 
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a lack of correspondence between our beliefs and those objects. One way to understand this 
implication is to realise that in a limited sense Hume can meaningfully state the conditions for a 
distinction between appearance and reality. "Appearance", for example, would refer to perceptions; 
"reality" would refer to the object (I know not what) in my relative idea of external objects. Using 
this distinction, Hume could then explain that certain kinds of error involve mistaking the way 
things appear for the way they really are. But, as we have seen, Hume regards this manner of 
thinking in terms of relative ideas as being limited in the extreme. Although we can imagine what 
such a distinction would entail, we have no (rational) reason to suppose that one half of the 
distinction, “reality", exists at all. And even if it does exist, we have no way to compare our 
perceptions to it. It would be a mistake, therefore, to think that Hume’s theory of relative ideas 
allows him any serious recourse to the traditional correspondence theory of error. 
In any case, it is not Hume’s general strategy to rest content with this sort of conditional and highly 
sceptical conclusion. Hume’s primary project in the Treatise is the positive endeavour to explain the 
human mind in natural terms and without reliance on the traditional metaphysics. He thinks that the 
mind can be explained on “a foundation entirely new”, and sets about doing just that. Indeed, Hume 
thinks that the study of the mind (the study of perceptions) is the only foundation on which our 
philosophical system could “stand with any security.” (T, xvi) The argument I am making in this 
chapter is that Hume’s Theory of Error should be understood in accordance with this methodology 
firmly in mind. Hume first gives us reason to be sceptical about the traditional correspondence 
theory of error, and then goes on to provide an alternative theory to take its place. To understand 
exactly how that two-stage methodology works, I propose to compare Hume’s Theory of Error to 
Hume’s treatment of substance. 
HUME’S THEORY OF SUBSTANCE 
According to the traditional account of substance, (found, for example, in Locke via Descartes via 
the Medievals via Aristotle,) substances are objects that can exist independently of anything else. 
What these various historical accounts have in common is that substances are thought of as 
independent substrata for the qualities we perceive, and on which the existence of these qualities 
depend, but which do not themselves depend upon anything else for their existence. The traditional 
account of substance is basically the common sense view that the ordinary objects of the world are 
not merely collections of the qualities that we perceive, but are mind-independent things that have 
these properties.  
Hume, however, thinks that the traditional conception of substance as mistaken, since he argues that 
we never perceive substances construed in this way. 
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If [the idea of substance] be convey’d to us by our senses, I ask, which of them; and after 
what manner? If it be perceiv’d by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by 
the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is 
either a colour, or a sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore be deriv’d from 
an impression of reflection, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflection resolve 
themselves into our passions and emotions; none of which can possibly represent a 
substance. We have, therefore, no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of 
particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we talk or reason concerning it. (p, 
T63)  
Hume thus argues that there is no metaphysical distinction to be drawn between the qualities we 
perceive, and the objects to which the qualities belong. He denies the traditional distinction between 
substances (that are independent existences), and modes
165
 (the existence of which depends upon 
the existence of a substance.) 
But although Hume denies the traditional metaphysical distinction he maintains that there is a 
distinction to be drawn in other terms. His point is that substances cannot be what we thought they 
were, but they are something nevertheless – “substance” and “mode” are meaningful terms. This is 
typical of Hume’s style as Kemp Smith rightly observes: 
It can…be maintained as a general principle that Hume never denies the existence of any 
conception which has been the subject of controversy. …The fact that there has been 
controversy in regard to an idea shows, he holds, that the idea is there to be discussed.
166
 
Hume’s own distinction between substance and mode is expressed as the distinction between two 
kinds of complex idea. The ideas of substances and modes, he says, are both collections of simple 
ideas united by relations, and “have a particular name assigned to them, by which we are able to 
recall …that collection.” (T, 16) But there is a difference in the way that we treat the names167 that 
signify substances and those that signify modes. Whereas the qualities that form our idea of a 
substance are commonly referred to an ‘unknown something’ in which they are supposed to be 
united, the particular qualities that make up modes are not likewise considered as united together. 
For example, our ideas of gold (a substance) and beauty (a mode) are similar in that both ideas can 
be completely reduced to simpler impressions of particular qualities. But the difference is that the 
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complex idea of a substance (gold) is comprised of qualities that are considered as inhering together 
in something, while our idea of a mode (beauty) is comprised of a bundle of qualities that are not 
considered as inhering together in this way. The idea of gold is formed from simpler ideas of 
malleability, solidity, ‘yellowness’, etc., just as our idea of beauty is formed from simpler (though 
perhaps less explicable) ideas of qualities. But the qualities that make-up our idea of gold differ 
from those that make-up our idea of beauty, in that the qualities that comprise our idea of the former 
are thought to inhere together in something – even if it is impossible for us to have an idea of that 
‘something’ itself. 
The important fact for Hume is not that the qualities which make-up a substance actually inhere in 
something, but that they are considered as inhering in something. Ideas of substances, unlike ideas 
of modes, involve unification, “the principle of union being regarded as the chief part of the 
complex idea.” (T, 16) This is a psychological observation about how we consider objects, and not 
a speculative conjecture about their metaphysical status. 
A direct consequence of Hume’s method of demarcation between substances and modes is that 
while our beliefs about substances are open to revision, our beliefs about modes are not. In the case 
of substances it is possible that we may find that they have some previously undiscovered quality, 
but this is impossible in the case of modes. 
…our idea of gold may at first be a yellow colour, weight, malleableness, fusibility; but 
upon the discovery of its dissolubility in aqua regia, we join that to the other qualities and 
suppose it to belong to the substance as much as if its idea had from the beginning made a 
part of the compound one. […] That this cannot take place in modes, is evident from 
considering their nature. The simple ideas of which modes are formed, either represent 
qualities, which are not united by contiguity and causation; …or if they be all united 
together, the uniting principle is not regarded as the foundation of the complex idea. 
Hume concludes, ‘the reason is obvious why [modes] cannot receive any new idea, without 
changing the name, which distinguishes the mode.’ This reason, not as obvious as Hume intends, is 
that the meaning of the name that picks out a mode is identical to the unique set of qualities that 
comprise the complex idea. If we change any of the qualities in any way, we simply have a new 
quality. 
In general, Hume’s strategy is to retain the psychological facts about the ways we consider objects 
without retaining the metaphysics that was traditionally thought to explain these facts. Hume thinks 
that, as a point of methodology, we can’t possibly get beyond perceptions – and so our explanations 
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about objects must be perceptual all the way down. But even on these terms, Hume’s theory of 
substance retains many of the features that the traditional notion of substance was supposed to 
explain: e.g. the ability of objects to persist through change, the ability to take-on or lose qualities, 
the ability to be considered as an external object, etc. 
Consider passages from Locke and Hume side by side: 
Locke: “Ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas as are taken to represent distinct 
particular things, subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, 
such as it is, is always the first and chief.”168  
Hume: “The idea of a substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple 
ideas…the difference betwixt these ideas consists in this, that the particular qualities, which form a 
substance, are commonly refer’d to an unknown something, in which they are supposed to inhere 
…the principle of union being regarded as the chief part of the complex idea.” (T, 16 – emphasis 
added) 
It is remarkable how obviously Hume borrows from Locke here in both style and content. It is not 
because the theories themselves are same. In fact, as we know, they are very different. But what is 
revealing about the similarity of the passages is that Locke and Hume are clearly trying to answer 
the very same problem. The problem is why some of our ideas (which we call modes) seem to rely 
on other of our ideas (which we call substances). 
In this same sense, Hume’s treatment of substance is also consistent with theories dating as far back 
as Aristotle. Take, for example, the Aristotelian theory concerning substance as drawn up in chapter 
4 of his Categories. Aristotle tells us that there are ten headings by which we can categorize an 
object or quality; namely: substance, quality, quantity, relative, place, time, situation, habit, action, 
and passion. His intention here is to examine the “heads under which nouns and adjectives fall.”169 
What Aristotle observes is that the existence of the latter nine (of these categories) are always 
considered as dependent upon the existence of the first. For example, we never find that there is a 
quantity without it being a quantity of something. There is no such thing as redness unless there is 
some object that is red. And the same is true of the other terms of the latter nine categories: actions, 
for example, cannot exist unless they are performed by a substance. It makes no sense to speak of 
there being a “jumping” unless something has jumped; no sense to speak of a “thinking” unless 
someone has thought. Building upon these observations, it seemed natural to the philosophers of the 
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Middle Ages, to come to think of substances as real mind-independent things that underlie the 
qualities we perceive. In order for a quality or an action to exist, there must be a real object (a 
substance) that has that quality or performs that action. But, interestingly, in the Categories, 
Aristotle does not make these additional metaphysical assumptions.
170
 And insofar as Aristotle 
makes only psychological observations about our language and our ideas, Hume can happily agree 
with him. Of course, I am not saying that Aristotle and Hume really are alike in this sense. Certainly 
Aristotle was a metaphysician, and made all sorts of metaphysical assumptions (for example in 
Book Z of the Metaphysics). But the point I am making is that part of the driving impetus behind 
the long tradition concerning the metaphysics of substance was a series of observations about the 
way that we treat language. Aristotle was right that we treat language in this way, and Hume agrees 
with him. Where Hume disagrees is with the metaphysical conception of substance that Aristotle 
and others invoked to explain these facts. But as far as the facts themselves go, Hume admits that 
they are indeed there to be discussed and explained.  
It’s not clear whether Hume really can help himself to the psychological explanations without 
accepting some sort of metaphysics. It is interesting to note, however, that some prominent modern 
philosophers have effectively tried to do the same thing. Take, for example, Saul Kripke’s Naming 
and Necessity, which can be surely be used as something of an exemplar. In that essay, Kripke 
argues that we can speak meaningfully about objects and their properties in the absence of 
metaphysical substrata. Indeed, he writes: 
Philosophers have…asked, are these objects behind the bundle of qualities, or is the object 
nothing but the bundle? Neither is the case; this table is wooden, brown, in the room, etc. It 
has all these properties and is not a thing without properties, behind them; but it should not 
therefore be identified with the set, or ‘bundle’ of its properties…171  
What’s interesting is that this passage is often regarded as a criticism of Hume, since Kripke rejects 
not only the traditional conception of substances, but also the (apparently Humean) conception of 
objects as bundles. But, in reality, Kripke and Hume have a lot in common. Recall that for Hume 
ideas of substances, unlike ideas of modes, are considered as “unions”. These unions can take on 
new properties and yet still be considered ideas of the same object. Although Hume explains objects 
in terms of bundles of perceptions, he insists that we have a natural ability to refer to these bundles 
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as persisting unions, even if the unions themselves are not real metaphysical things. This, perhaps, 
is a very mysterious thing for Hume to say, but virtually the same view is found in Kripke, and it is 
equally mysterious: 
Don’t ask: how can I identify this table in another possible world, except by its properties? I 
have the table in my hands, I can point to it, and when I ask whether it might have been in 
another room, I am talking, by definition, about it.
172
 
In fact, Kripke’s description of how we refer to objects that are neither “bare particulars” nor 
merely “bundles of qualities” is almost exactly the same as Hume’s description of how we refer to 
“unions” that are neither substances nor distinct collections of properties. In both cases what we 
have is the ability to refer to a particular object that acts like a traditional substance but isn’t a 
metaphysical substratum. This is fascinating, I think, since it means that Kripke, (who is often said 
to have “revived metaphysics”) and Hume, (who “rejected all metaphysics”173), in fact share some 
very crucial assumptions.  
Another way of thinking about the positive phase of Hume’s argument regarding substance is to 
realise that Hume offers a theory about how we come to form ideas of objects. By discussing 
perceptions, he attempts to explain the psychological mechanisms which lead us to think of some 
ideas as being unions (substances) and some ideas as being dependent on those unions (modes). 
This theory of objects is important for understanding Hume’s Theory of Error, because it allows 
Hume to retain the straightforward piece of common sense that errors involve objects. In other 
words, if I am wrong about the size of Jupiter, then there must exist a thing called “Jupiter” to be 
mistaken about. But if the existence of Jupiter is not to be explained in terms of an external 
substance, then what on earth is it?  
The answer, for Hume, is that ordinary objects are explained in terms of our experience of bundles 
of different perceptions. For example, our idea of Jupiter may include various ideas and impressions 
such as: being a gaseous sphere, coloured red, orange and white, and moving around the Solar 
System in a particular ellipse. At least, thinking in these simple terms is useful as an example. More 
precisely, we should say that on Hume’s view our idea of Jupiter is to be explained as a drastically 
complex interrelated system of ideas and impressions, all of which are weighted in various degrees 
according to their respective vivacities and the relative strength of their relationships to other ideas 
within the bundle. But regardless of whether we think of bundled objects as very complex or quite 
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simple, the theory is the same: Hume explains ordinary objects as bundles of perceptions connected 
by relations and associations. 
Hume goes into some detail explaining the principles of mind that govern the way our ideas of 
objects are bundled together. Firstly, there’s the fact that I can’t form my idea of Jupiter however I 
like. For the most part, my ideas are bundled together for me, by nature. I don’t, by any deliberate 
mental effort, carve up the world I experience into particular objects. Rather, there is a sense in 
which the world of experience arrives in my mind pre-carved. We don’t often observe Jupiter, so 
let’s take a more familiar example to illustrate the point – the moon. Imagine that one evening I 
have the impression of a crescent-shaped heavenly body and, on a later evening, I observe a disc-
shaped heavenly body. On Hume’s view, it is because of customary principles of association that 
this process leads me to have just one complex idea of a unified object: the moon. Each of the 
impressions I receive are different. For instance, they are separated from one another by time, and 
also differ in respect to certain qualities (e.g. their shape). There may be, therefore, no strictly 
logical reason that I should think of them as being unified – as being the very same thing. But, 
nevertheless, the imagination, by natural principles of association, is “convey’d from one idea to 
another” and ‘connects’ the two ideas into a union. (T, 11)  
These natural associative principles that govern the way we form ideas of objects are, Hume says, 
are just as powerful and instructive as Newton’s laws that govern the physical universe. These 
psychological principles are “…the principles of union or cohesion among our simple ideas” (T, 12) 
and,  
…in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable connexion, by which they are 
united… Here is a kind of attraction, which in the mental world will be found to have as 
extraordinary effects as in the natural, and to shew itself in as many and as various forms. Its 
effects are every where conspicuous; but as to its causes, they are mostly unknown, and 
must be resolv’d into original qualities of human nature, which I pretend not to explain. (T, 
12-3) 
If our ideas of objects were not “guided by some universal principles” our impressions and simple 
ideas would be “loose and unconnected”. “Chance alone wou’d join them; and ‘tis impossible the 
same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do).” (T, 10) 
Hume’s own example of an object formed in this way is his ‘chamber’, and in this case the natural 
principle of association is resemblance. 
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I survey the furniture of my chamber; I shut my eyes, and afterwards open them; and find 
the new perceptions to resemble perfectly those which formerly struck my senses. This 
resemblance is observ’d in a thousand instances, and naturally connects together our ideas of 
these interrupted perceptions… (T, 204) 
The crucial point to note here is that while the perceptions are ‘interrupted’ the object is not. 
Hume’s idea of the chamber is fluid and uniform; it is an idea of a particular object that changes 
over time. And this fact is explained as the result of observable associative principles that govern 
the mind. 
Incidentally, this reading of Hume has him sounding a bit like Kant: the unconsciously “attributed” 
relations that Hume describes as “original qualities of human nature” (T, 13) are quite similar to 
Kant’s transcendental preconditions for experience. In each case we have the world of experience 
being shaped by the mind in the very act of perception. If so, it seems possible that Kant is closer to 
Hume than he is willing to admit. (Perhaps, in ‘waking’ Kant ‘from his dogmatic slumbers,’174 
Hume also dressed him, made him breakfast, and stuck around to buy him lunch.
175
) 
In any case, Hume allows that we experience objects as opposed to loose and unconnected 
perceptions, and it is important to acknowledge this. It will save us from the temptation to infer 
from Hume’s assertion that perceptions are all that we know, that he must also deny the existence of 
ordinary objects. Neither Hume nor Berkeley denies the existence of the things we perceive in 
everyday life – tables, chairs, wine, whatever. They both simply think that the ordinary objects of 
experience are perceptions, or bundles of them. Perceptions are all that we experience, and since we 
evidently experience ordinary objects, it follows (so the argument goes) that ordinary objects must 
be perceptions. Once again, this is not to say that there can’t possibly be external objects to which 
our perceived objects correspond, and it is certainly not to say that we don’t often think about 
objects as if they have an external existence. It is only to say that the ordinary objects of experience 
– the things we perceive – are explained by Hume in terms of bundles of perceptions. 
Having recognised Hume’s theory of objects, we can now see how Hume’s Theory of Error can 
survive one naïve criticism: that without realism, having a conception of error is flat-out impossible 
– that it can’t even get off the ground. Rescher, for example, argues that having a conception of 
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error must necessarily involve “subscribing to some sort of realism” on the grounds that “…the 
oriental mystic who denies reality altogether and sees everything mundane as an illusion,” must 
regard error as “non-existent or, if you prefer, all-pervasive – for lack of an authentic reality to 
contrast it with.”176 But, as we have seen, Hume’s Theory of Error survives this criticism, since his 
scepticism concerning metaphysical realism does not commit him to asserting that the world is 
therefore a “non-existent” “illusion”. Hume’s arguments against the traditional metaphysics are not 
arguments against the existence of ordinary objects. Hume emphatically allows that there are 
objects to be mistaken about. He simply argues that we should not explain these objects in terms of 
a mysterious substratum that we do not perceive. 
HUME’S ALTERNATIVE THEORY OF ERROR 
Having better understood Hume’s theory of substance, we are now in a position to ask more 
precisely what can be deduced regarding Hume’s Theory of Error – the discussion of which will 
occupy the remainder of this dissertation. Let me first quickly summarise the important conclusions 
of the proceeding discussion. 
1. Hume thinks that perceptions are the only things we can possibly experience. 
2. Hume does not deny the possibility that there are things other than perceptions – external 
objects. 
3. Hume does, however, deny that we know anything at all about these external objects, if indeed 
they exist.  
4. Hume rejects the traditional account of substance. He thinks that we never perceive a 
substratum.  
5. Having rejected the traditional metaphysical account, Hume does not rest content with having 
argued for the negative conclusion. He thinks that the traditional problems of philosophy are 
there to be solved. 
6. Indeed, the whole point of the Treatise is that Hume thinks the human mind, and many of the 
problems of philosophy, can be explained in terms of his “science of man”. In other words: he 
wants to redraft the traditional concepts in terms of perceptions and the relationships between 
them, without any reliance on the traditional metaphysics. 
7. Hume’s conception of substance is one such example. Substances are explained in terms of our 
natural tendency to treat some objects as “unions”, and in terms of the conceptual roles those 
ideas play in our system of ideas. Hume explains how we form ideas of objects according to 
natural principles of association that govern our perceptions. 
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What I argue is that we should read Hume’s Theory of Error as explicable according to this same 
general strategy. If that fact is not already obvious, let me state the argument with reference to the 
conclusions above, marking the numbers of those conclusions in brackets as they become relevant.  
Hume points to a difficulty in the correspondence theory of error in the sense that [1]: we cannot 
possibly compare our perceptions with external objects to see whether they correspond to a mind-
independent reality. It is not merely that Hume thinks we cannot possibly know whether or not our 
perceptions correspond to the properties of external objects. Regarding the possible existence of 
mind-independent objects, [2]: Hume remains an agnostic. But because [3]: we cannot possibly 
know anything about external objects, [4]: Hume would refuse to affirm the correspondence theory 
of error in the same sense that he refuses to affirm the traditional conception of substance (and the 
traditional conceptions of necessary connection and the unified self) – we never perceive any such 
thing. But [5]: Hume cannot rest content with the negative sceptical conclusion. Hume never rests 
content with that sort of scepticism. He thinks that [6]: the human mind should be explained 
according to the science of man, and he thinks that error is one facet of the human mind that needs 
explaining. As we saw in the cases of substances and objects, [7&8]: Hume has a general strategy 
of attempting to redraft the traditional metaphysical conceptions in naturalistic terms. Moreover, in 
so doing, Hume takes himself to be explaining what the traditional terms really mean – and even 
what those concepts really are insofar as we can attempt to answer such a question.
177
 
The idea of substance as well as that of a mode, is nothing but a collection of simple ideas. 
(T, 16) 
“What we call a mind,” says Hume, “is nothing but a heap or collection of different 
perceptions.” (T, 207)  
And this methodology provides the context for understanding Hume’s Theory of Error. According 
to that theory, error must be explained by relying only on our perceptions and the relationships 
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between them. How far can Hume take such a theory? How successful could it possibly be? These 
are the issues that I intend to explore throughout the following chapters.  
89 
 
CHAPTER THREE: THE PHYSIOLOGICAL CAUSES OF ERROR 
 
Hume does nothing whatever to solve, why association sometimes operates and sometimes 
fails to operate.” – Passmore178 
When Hume comes to discuss the fact that we make errors of association, he does something quite 
strange: he provides a physiological explanation. This is not historically strange (physiological 
explanations of errors of judgement, particularly those influenced by the passions were popular in 
the 17
th
 and 18
th
 Centuries
179
), nor is it very different from the kinds of explanations we find 
appealing today. It is strange because it seems to oppose the method to which Hume, at all other 
times, officially adheres. Indeed, as we saw in the proceeding chapter, Hume’s general mode of 
operation is to explain the various activities of the human mind by taking perceptions and 
associations as basic. Simple perceptions, and the principles of association that guide them, are 
always the explanans and never the explanandum. They are the tools by which everything else is to 
be explained. Why do we believe in substance? Why do we believe in the self? Why do we uphold 
certain principles of morality? All of these questions are to be decided by pointing to certain 
features of perceptions and the associations that guide them. Even the concepts of space and time 
are explained in the language of ideas. On more than one occasion Hume affirms that perceptual 
explanations are the only proper kind of explanations to be had, (since “nothing is ever really 
present with the mind but its perceptions,” and “external objects become known to us only by those 
perceptions they occasion.”). But even if we set these passages aside, we still find that Hume 
generally wants nothing to do with physiological explanations. 
‘Tis certain, that the mind, in its perceptions must begin somewhere; and that since the 
impressions precede their correspondent ideas, there must be some impressions, which 
without any introduction make their appearance in the soul. As these depend upon natural 
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and physical causes, the examination of them wou’d lead me too far from my present 
subject. (T 275 – emphasis added) 
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, 
perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ’twill always be impossible to decide with 
certainty, whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc’d by the creative 
power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author of our being. Nor is such a question any 
way material to our present purpose.” (T 84 – emphasis added) 
It is surprising, then, that in just
180
 this case – when it comes to explaining errors of association – 
Hume decides that he “must have recourse” to a physiological explanation. We find this case in 
Book I, Part II, Section V. Hume has been discussing several of our ideas concerning the relations 
between objects. 
‘Twould have been easy to have made an imaginary dissection of the brain, and have shewn, 
why upon the conception of any idea, the animal spirits run into all the contiguous traces, 
and rouze up the other ideas, that are related to it. But tho’ I have neglected any advantage, 
which I might have drawn from this topic in explaining the relations of ideas, I am afraid I 
must make recourse to it, in order to account for the mistakes that arise from these relations. 
I shall therefore observe, that as the mind is endow’d with a power of exciting any idea it 
pleases; whenever it dispatches the spirits into that region of the brain, in which the idea is 
plac’d; these spirits always excite the idea, when they run precisely into the proper traces, 
and rummage that cell, which belongs to the idea. But as their motion is seldom direct, and 
naturally turns a little to the one side or the other; for this reason the animal spirits, falling 
into the contiguous traces, present other related ideas in lieu of that which the mind desir’d 
first to survey. This change we are not always sensible of; but continuing still the same train 
of thought, make use of the related idea, which is presented to us, and employ it in our 
reasoning, as if it were the same with what we demanded. This is the cause of many 
mistakes and sophisms in philosophy; as will naturally be imagin’d, and as it wou’d be easy 
to shew, if there was occasion. (T 60-1) 
Why is it that Hume thinks he needs the animal spirits here? Why, specifically, when it comes to 
explaining the causes of faulty associations, does he not just say what he said regarding the causes 
of original impressions – that it is impossible to decide and that it is not his concern anyway?  
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I propose to examine the role that this physiological explanation plays in Hume’s overarching 
explanation of error, and to see whether it can be reconciled with his rejection of metaphysical 
explanations. 
CLOSELY RELATED IDEAS 
We should first observe that Hume wants to establish a “general maxim” – that is, a firm principle 
in his science of human nature – that when two ideas are closely related we are disposed to mistake 
them. (T, 60) The acceptability of this maxim is going to be crucial, since it is later going to explain 
many of the errors that we make. Notably, it will explain the important philosophical error that 
gives rise to our belief in the continued and constant existence of external objects.
181
  
When we gradually follow an object in its successive changes, the smooth progress of the 
thought makes us ascribe an identity to the succession…When we compare its situation after 
a considerable change the progress of the thought is broken; and consequently we are 
presented with the idea of diversity: In order to reconcile which contradictions, the 
imagination is apt to feign something unknown and invisible, which it supposes to continue 
the same under all these variations; and this unintelligible something it calls a substance, or 
original and first matter. (T, 220) 
Our propensity to make these kinds of associative errors is so common, on Hume’s view, that he 
speaks of it as a “malady, which can never be radically cur’d.”  
Philosophers deny our resembling perceptions to be identically the same, and uninterrupted; 
and yet have so great a propensity to believe them such, that they arbitrarily invent a new set 
of perceptions, to which they attribute these qualities. I say, a new set of perceptions: For we 
may well suppose in general, but ’tis impossible for us to distinctly conceive, objects to be 
in their nature any thing but exactly the same with perceptions. …This sceptical doubt, both 
with respect to reason and the senses, is a malady, which can never be radically cur’d, but 
must return upon us every moment, however we may chace it away… (T, 218) 
So when it comes to explaining some of our most fundamental beliefs, associative error is 
important. And this is why when Hume sets up his maxim: 
…We may establish it as a general maxim in this science of human nature, that wherever 
there is a close relation betwixt two ideas, the mind is very apt to mistake them, and in all its 
discourses and reasonings to use the one for the other.  
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He immediately feels he must say more: 
This phenomenon occurs on so many occasions, and is of such consequence, that I cannot 
forbear stopping a moment to examine its causes. (T, 60) 
The fact that Hume is trying to garner support for his maxim is well evidenced by the general 
structure and tone of the passage. He begins by offering a very broad theory about the physiology of 
the brain. He tells us that ideas excite animal spirits to run through ‘proper’ traces and excite other 
ideas that are related to them
182; yet since the motion of these spirits is ‘seldom direct’ and naturally 
swerves a little off course, other related ideas are presented “in lieu of that which the mind at first 
desir’d to survey.” Having provided this theory in brief, Hume seems to expect his readers to find 
the explanation definitive and convincing. That it is true, he tells us, “will naturally be imagin’d,” 
and besides, it “wou’d be easy to shew, if there was occasion.” (T, 61)  
In reality, further discussion is certainly warranted. For one thing, it just isn’t ‘easy to shew’ how 
our neurophysiology operates. But more urgently, we are left wondering what it is that makes a 
‘proper trace’ of the animal spirits proper? It may well be useful to reduce a mental error to a 
physiological one. But it does give rise to another question that remains unsolved: what is it that 
makes a physiological process faulty? How do we decide if the trace of the animal spirits has hit its 
target or “missed its mark”? 
IMPROPER TRACES 
Hume gestures towards an answer. He tells us that the trace of the animals spirits is proper when it 
results in the “excitement” of the idea that “the mind desir’d first to survey.” The trace is improper, 
conversely, when it leads to the excitement of an idea that is different from the idea that the mind 
first desired to survey. In other words, if I meant to think of X, but instead thought of Y, then the 
animal spirits must have swerved. But it is not clear that Hume can really subscribe to this view. For 
one thing, it paints a picture of a mind that is far too intentional – one that smacks of the active 
powers that Hume elsewhere emphatically rejects. He speaks here of our desire to consider a 
particular idea causing that idea to be excited, (or, in the case of an error, causing another similar 
idea to be excited.) But this does not sound like the official Humean brand of associationism. This 
intentional language contrasts with his more precise way of thinking in which association is the 
result of ‘natural principles of the mind’ that ‘cannot be further enumerated’.  
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It is better, if possible, to avoid reading active powers into Hume’s explanation of error. Instead, we 
could attribute to him a physical account that places the animal spirits as the root cause of all of our 
perceptions. Such an account could go something like this: when it comes to error, the mind finds 
itself with a desire to attend in thought to X but instead is prompted by the animal spirits to have an 
idea of Y, and in this way confuses X and Y. The animal spirits are the root cause of both of these 
ideas, and the diversion of the animal spirits is the root cause of error. The mind’s desire to attend 
to X is not the cause of the idea X or the cause of the idea Y, but certain movements of the animal 
spirits are the causes of all ideas. 
If this is Hume’s view, then it would have appealed to many philosophers of the 20th Century. It is 
the kind of thing an epiphenomenalist might say about qualia: that the appearance of casual 
relationships between qualia is illusory and should really be attributed to common physical causes 
in the brain.
183
 It is also the kind of explanation a reductionist might provide when it comes to folk 
psychology: that desires, beliefs, fears, and hopes all seem to cause effects in the body and the 
mind, but in reality the causes of all effects and all propositional attitudes lie deeper in the chain of 
supervenience. It may seem that my desire to move my arm is what causes me to move my arm, but 
it would be more accurate to say that certain brain processes caused both the desire and the 
movement. 
But how can Hume have this view? After all, “‘Tis impossible for us so much as to conceive or 
form an idea of anything specifically different from ideas and impressions.” (T 67-8) This apparent 
inconsistency is, I think, the reason why Passmore ignores Hume’s physiological explanation and 
says simply that, 
We are not to ask…why association operates as it does; but we can describe how it works – 
by means of resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect. Just as Newton put aside the 
search for the causes of attraction, so we must refuse to be led into any discussion of the 
causes of association.
184
 
Kemp Smith, on the other hand, acknowledges that Hume offers the explanation – in fact, he quotes 
the relevant passage in full. But, interestingly, Kemp Smith entitles his chapter: “The Association of 
Ideas may be physiologically or otherwise conditioned, but is for us an Ultimate”185. He is reluctant 
to take Hume’s appeal to physiology seriously, and this reluctance is accompanied by a typical 
quote – one that more obviously harmonises with Hume’s general strategy: 
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Nothing is more requisite for a true philosopher, than to restrain the intemperate desire of 
searching into causes, and having establish’d any doctrine upon a sufficient number of 
experiments, rest contented with that, when he sees a farther examination would lead him 
into obscure and uncertain speculations. (T, 13)  
Kemp Smith is right to be reluctant. But Hume does offer the strange physiological explanation, 
even if he shouldn’t have. This is worth noticing. Perhaps it is a sign that the present case is in some 
way special or more difficult. Hume wants there to be a difference between good association and 
bad, and since the principle of association is itself the key explanatory principle in his science of 
human nature, divisions within that principle appear inexplicable in the typical Humean argot. The 
difficulty is one of explaining the very mechanism of explanation.  
Yet, inexplicable though they may be, the passages that follow Hume’s account of the animal spirits 
make it clear that associative error is something that Hume wants to allow. All of the examples that 
follow his account of physiology are cases in which the natural principle of association goes wrong. 
The most straightforward example is the fact that we often confuse ideas with the words that are 
‘assigned’ to them, because they are so “closely connected” in our minds. But we are also given 
examples from poetry, mechanics, and the belief in the possibility of a vacuum. In fact, says Hume, 
“we shall see many instances” of these kinds of errors “in the progress of this Treatise.” (T 61) 
The specifics of these examples are not very important for the moment. What is important is that 
errors of association are supposed to be the result of a “close connection” between ideas, and that 
this close connection is portrayed as not merely conceptual or mental, but physical. Error, we are 
told, occurs when the animal spirits miss their mark.  
HUME, ANIMAL SPIRITS, AND NEUROSCIENCE 
We have already objected that the physiological facts involved here are really much more 
complicated than Hume allows, but we should also admit that Hume isn’t talking outright nonsense 
either. For one thing, Hume’s account is in line with the science of his day. Descartes, for example, 
had already offered a very similar account of association as being the result of traces in the brain: 
These traces consist simply in the fact that the pores of the brain through which the spirits 
previously made their way owing to the presence of this object have thereby become more 
apt than the others to be opened in the same way when the spirits again flow towards them. 
And so the spirits enter into these pores more easily when they come upon them.
186
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Descartes compared the process of association to a needle passing through a linen cloth. Here 
paraphrased by Sutton: 
Descartes gives an analogy with a linen cloth (une toile) which has had ‘several needles of 
engravers’ points’ repeatedly passed through it. Some holes in the cloth will remain open 
after the needles have been withdrawn, but even if they close, physical ‘traces’ left in the 
cloth will enable them to open again easily.
187
 
This explains why we more easily associate ideas that we have associated in the past. And there are 
elements of this theory that we still find appealing today. Although we have obviously come much 
further in studying the particulars of brain processes, our modern neurological theory – that 
associations in the brain are caused by the decreasing resistance levels of synapses in a neural 
network – is essentially Cartesian in this respect. As Lashly puts it: if we substitute the word ‘nerve 
impulse’ with ‘animal spirit’, and ‘synapse’ with ‘brain pore’, we can easily read into Descartes the 
“the doctrine of learning as change in resistance of synapses.”188 Similarly, Patricia Churchland 
wrote in Scientific American that modern neuroscience is just modernizing and expanding upon 
Descartes’ doctrine of reflex action in neural nets.189  
Hume’s account of the brain is also appealing as compared directly to contemporary explanations. 
For example, it is said today that similar kinds of ideas are sometimes correlated with adjacent 
regions of the brain. Of course, we don’t think that ideas are located in “cells” that can be 
“rummaged” by “animal spirits”. But we do think that the respective neurological pathways of 
similar ideas often share some sort of spatial relationship. Moreover, we do evoke such explanations 
to explain error. Consider, for example, some contemporary work conducted by the neurologist 
Vilayanur Ramachandran on Synesthesia. Synesthesia is the fascinating condition in which patients 
confuse the information from one sensory medium with information from another. For example, a 
Synesthesic person may see the colour blue whenever they experience the number 3 or hear the 
sound C#. In this way, colours and numbers (or colours and sounds – whatever the case may be), 
are inextricably associated in the patient’s mind in such a way that they actually experience the one 
with the other. Interestingly, Ramachandran says that such cases involve ‘confusion’ and his 
explanation for the confusion is that it results from a defective trimming between two (or more) 
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adjacent modules of the brain. “We were struck,” he says “by the fact that, if you look at the 
fusiform gyrus, the color area of the brain is right next to the area that deals with visual graphics 
and numbers, almost touching it.”  
Now, what I’m arguing is that these people have more cross-wired brains, so they can more 
easily relate seemingly unrelated concepts.
190
 
In other words, the basic idea behind Hume’s account of the animal spirits – that conceptually 
associated ideas are correlated with physically associated events – is believed today. So too is 
Hume’s idea that this might explain error. 
Using this explanation, Hume could also draw the distinction between mistakes that arise from 
(statistically) normal brain states, and mistakes that arise from (statistically) abnormal brain states 
or brain legions. For example, it is one kind of error to be fooled by an optical illusion (as all of us 
sometimes are as a result of the way that our brains work) but it is another kind of error to lose 
one’s memory entirely, or to suffer a stroke and mistake one’s wife for a hat, as Oliver Sacks 
recounted in a famous case.
191
 Certainly, Hume did not draw this distinction explicitly, but I think 
he could have helped himself to it. The examples we find in the Treatise are generally of the first, 
more common, kind: Hume discusses the fact that we mistake ideas for other ideas that are similar 
as a result of normally occurring brain processes. The animal spirits, says Hume, “naturally” turn a 
little “to one side or the other” and thus “present other related ideas in lieu of that which the mind 
desir’d first to survey.” (T, 61) The motion of the animal spirits is “seldom direct”, and we are thus 
“very apt” (T, 60) to make mistakes. But in his Early Memoranda, Hume provides an example of 
the other kind – an error arising from serious brain damage:  
There is a remarkable Story to confirm the Cartesian philosophy of the Brain. A man hurt by 
the fall of a Horse forgot about twenty years of his Life, and remember’d what went before 
in a much more lively manner than usual.
192
 
Clearly this accident is a statistical abnormality and Hume needn’t explain it as a result of “normal” 
brain processes of the kind he is describing in the passage we have been considering. But, for 
Hume, the distinction between errors caused by normal brain processes and errors caused by 
abnormal ones is only a difference of degree rather than kind. And this, I think, may be the right 
view, since the difference between “normal” and “abnormal” brain processes is not clear-cut. Very 
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few of us suffer severe brain damage of the kind Hume describes in the case of the equestrian 
accident. But all of us, or at any rate almost all, are fooled by optical illusions. Many sorts of human 
error fall somewhere in-between on the scale of normality and abnormality; they affect a certain 
proportion of us. For example, according to one estimate, one in every twenty-three of us has some 
form of Synaesthesia,
193
 and according to another: about eight in every hundred males has some 
form of colour-blindness.
194
 These in-between cases of commonality are especially interesting, 
since we are sometimes unsure whether to regard them as errors at all. When it comes to 
Synaesthesia, for example, Ramachandran sometimes describes the condition as involving 
“confusion” which implies he thinks of it as an error. But he also contends that the confusion exists 
in all of us to some degree or other, and that these “confusions” may in fact be the neurological 
causes of human creativity. In other words: he contends that an “error” – a cross wiring between 
adjacent sensory modules in the brain – is also the origin of the creative ability that we covert and 
treasure so much. Indeed, this is the ambitious conclusion of the fourth of Ramachandran’s 2003 
Reith Lectures: that by understanding the “error” called synaesthesia, it may take us, 
…all the way to understanding abstract thought and how it might have emerged. Metaphor, 
Shakespeare, even the evolution of language: all of this in this one little quirk...
195
 
Kathryn Schulz provides another interesting example of the relationship between error and right-
thinking when she discusses an optical illusion, commonly experienced by travellers to the Arctic: 
…you find yourself on a ship in the Arctic looking at very large mountains, which you 
therefore conclude are very nearby [although they aren’t really].196 
The illusion, she points out, results from a quirk in the brain’s natural ability to “recalibrate scale 
according to distance” when it is placed in abnormal situations (in this case, a situation in which 
there is no common reference point by which to judge scale). She goes on: our ability to recalibrate 
scale according to distance is “a handy trick 99.99 percent of the time.” It is, for instance, what 
allows us to effortlessly make sense of the fact that a person walking towards us is not literally 
growing in stature or that a soccer ball does not shrink as we kick it towards the goal. Concerning 
the arctic quirk, Schulz’ conclusion is that “being wrong is often a side effect of a system that is 
functioning exactly right.” 
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That’s part of what makes optical illusions, and errors more generally, so unforeseeable and 
surprising: not only do they arise from processes we can’t feel, they arise from processes 
that, under normal circumstances, work to our advantage.
197
 
Hume himself anticipated a weaker version of this same line of thought two and half centuries 
earlier. Hume maintained that the very same kind of brain process (in this case, animal spirits 
missing their mark) may be the cause of good consequences on the one hand, but also error on the 
other. Hume certainly says that when the animal spirits miss their mark this involves a kind of fault: 
his language – “missing the mark” – makes that clear, and he says explicitly that it is the cause of 
“many mistakes and sophisms in philosophy.” (T, 61) But he also contends that these same 
associative processes of the animal spirits are what give rise to some very fortunate consequences 
that we could not do without: for example, it is this same natural mechanism of faulty association 
that Hume thinks leads us to believe in substance (though it is fictitious), and to ascribe an identity 
to objects through time (although they are not strictly identical). (T, 218) “’Tis happy,” Hume adds, 
that nature leads us to these beliefs, since if it did not, we would be left in a state of utterly 
unsatisfying scepticism. As we have already discussed in Chapter 2, if it were not for the fact that 
we mistakenly attribute an identity to closely resembling ideas, we could not think of objects as 
persisting through time, or indeed as being objects at all.
198
 The point, then, is that on Hume’s view, 
(as with Ramachandran’s) a certain kind of brain structure which is conducive to the kinds of 
associative principles upon which we depend, also makes us prone to certain kinds of associative 
errors.  
This means that Hume cannot possibly maintain that the question of what makes an error an error 
could be wholly decided by facts about the neurological causes of brain processes, since, (at least 
sometimes,) the ideas we think of as veridical, and the ideas we think of as faulty, are caused (on his 
view) by the same kind of neurological mechanism. What then is the difference between the two 
cases? There are a couple of possibilities. One possibility is that the difference between good 
association and bad might be decided by the degree of the physiological process in question. For 
example, perhaps a wild swerving of the animal spirits might lead one to mistake his wife for a hat. 
A milder swerving of the animal spirits, on the other hand, might work to one’s advantage. Indeed, 
perhaps it was a case of mildly swerving animal spirits that gave Shakespeare the creativity to write 
Hamlet, as Ramachandran (almost) suggested above.  
                                                 
197
 Ibid. 
198
 See Chapter 2 in which I discuss Hume’s conception of objects. 
99 
 
Another possibility is that the difference between good associations and errors of association is 
dependent on the environment one finds one’s self in. This explanation harmonises nicely with 
some of views of the period that we have already discussed in the first chapter. We saw that 
Descartes, for instance, maintained that the general laws that govern optics are those that allow us to 
see, but they are the same laws that, under different conditions, make the submerged stick appear 
bent. 
…a thing that seems imperfect when viewed alone may seem completely perfect when 
regarded as a part of the world.
199
 
The difference between the veridical mechanism and the faulty mechanism is explained by the 
peculiar scenario. This is also the basic lesson of Schulz’ example above – that our brains are not 
suited (i.e. not adapted) to strange Artic environments, but they do fine in more familiar situations. 
Hume could simply borrow from Berkeley a way to explain this sort of phenomenon in the 
language of association. Berkeley had already argued that distance is learned by association. Indeed, 
in his New Theory of Vision, Berkeley set out to “shew the manner, wherein we perceive by Sight 
the Distance, Magnitude, and Situation of Objects."
200
 He concludes that we learn to judge distance 
by frequently associating certain visual sensations with the sensations of the muscles controlling the 
eyes. If this is right, then he could argue that when we find ourselves in peculiar situations (for 
example, the Artic), the reason we’re often fooled is simply that the visual environment is novel. 
We haven’t had any practise of associating our muscular sensations with those particular visual 
cues.  
 
In any case, as we will see, Hume’s more considered position is that there is nothing intrinsically 
faulty about any perception, or any brain process. It is only by discussing how we come to regard 
our perceptions in our system of ideas, that we can understand what an error is.  
While we are comparing Hume’s account of the animal spirits to contemporary accounts of 
neurology, however, we should admit that we are often quite prepared to accept neurological facts 
as good explanations of mental phenomena. If the question is raised in psychology: “Why do we 
sometimes mistake certain ideas for others that are similar?” an answer cashed-out in terms of the 
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physical properties of brain states may well satisfy us. Ramachandran and Hubbard certainly expect 
such an explanation to be convincing.
201
 
The problem for Hume is that physiological explanations aren’t supposed to be admissible in his 
system. But we need to be very careful about that conclusion, for it is true in one sense, and not in 
another. It is true that Hume maintains that original impressions and associative principles are not 
the kinds of things that could be explained by appealing to anything more basic. This is what we 
learnt in the previous chapter; this is the sense in which Hume rejects the traditional metaphysics, 
and maintains, as a point of epistemology, that we cannot possibly trace our knowledge further back 
than impressions. We do not know if impressions are caused by our material physiology, or by 
some other corporeal or spiritual event, or by God. (T, 7) Nonetheless, Hume in no way denies the 
usefulness of science. Far from it. Hume very happily and consistently allows the existence of 
brains and bodies even if he denies these objects an independent metaphysical status. The following 
scientific claim, for example, is not at all out of bounds for Hume: 
There is a correlation between a certain kind of brain wiring and a propensity to have certain 
kinds of associative ideas that we think of as mistakes. 
He can even say quite consistently that our impressions are caused by physiological processes. He 
only needs to be careful that he is using the term “causation” in his reinterpreted sense, and that he 
is discussing science rather than what he calls the “secret nature” of things. What Hume can’t do is 
treat physiological claims as if they were about something prior to impressions and the principles of 
association – as if they provided a more ultimate explanation than perceptions. For Hume, 
impressions are the beginning of all knowledge and all belief. And they, 
 …arise…in the soul originally, from unknown causes. (T, 7) 
From these impressions our entire edifice of knowledge, including our scientific knowledge, is 
born. But once this epistemological point is granted, Hume can then go on to make all sorts of 
scientific claims in harmony with his epistemology. He says, for example, that: 
…all our perceptions are dependent on our organs, and the disposition of our nerves and 
animal spirits… (T, 211) 
He talks about pains and pleasures, 
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…that arise naturally from the applications of objects to our bodies, as by the cutting of our 
flesh with steel… (T, 192) 
And he discusses how our nervous system conveys sensations to our mind: 
The nerves of the nose and palate are so dispos’d, as in certain circumstances to convey such 
peculiar sensations to the mind. (T, 287) 
The important philosophical point is that none of these passages is an attempt to get at the real 
causes of our perceptions. They aren’t an attempt to ground our perceptions, metaphysically 
speaking, in anything more fundamental. Indeed, for Hume, no kind of explanation could be more 
fundamental than an explanation cashed-out in terms of perceptions and the relations between them. 
Instead, these physiological claims are only observations and inferences based on the correlations 
and contiguities that we discover by means of perception. 
WHY DOES HUME PROVIDE THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ACCOUNT? 
So what, then, is the role of Hume’s physiological account if not to provide a more fundamental 
explanation of error? One unsatisfying answer is that the account doesn’t play any important 
explanatory role at all. In other words: it may just be a tangent. Hume’s language sometimes 
suggests that this is the case. He says, for instance, that because associative error, “occurs on so 
many occasions, and is of such consequence,” he just, “cannot forbear stopping a moment to 
examine its causes.” (T, 60) On this reading, we imagine Hume pausing, out of sheer interest 
perhaps, to discuss the scientific accounts of association that were common in the period. He is 
dabbling in experimental biology rather than expounding his naturalistic philosophy. He is not 
rejecting what he says elsewhere about our inability to go inquiring after real causes. He is only 
discussing a scientific account that is compatible with his epistemology – compatible because 
science, for Hume, is a body of knowledge built out of our perceptions and the laws of associations. 
This would be a consistent reading, but I am not sure that it can be the correct one. Why, for 
example, if it were only a tangent, would Hume insist that he “must make recourse” to physiology 
in order to account for associative error? Why would he say that although he has “neglected” any 
“advantage” of physiological accounts in other lines of inquiry, that it is necessary to make use of 
them now? (T, 60 – emphasis added) Surely this language implies that Hume regards his 
physiological account as providing an explanation of serious philosophical importance. And indeed, 
if one reads the passage at T, 60 in full, it is clear that Hume is not merely dabbling in popular 
science; he really is attempting to justify a distinction between good and bad association by 
grounding association in physiology. He is attempting “to account for the mistakes that arise from 
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these relations”– to reduce associative errors to the natural consequences of certain contiguous 
brain processes in an effort to provide a more fundamental explanation of error. As I have argued, 
Hume cannot consistently do this. This is why Passmore rightly concludes that Hume can do 
“nothing whatever” to explain “…why association sometimes operates and sometimes fails to 
operate.”202  
The inconsistency is made all the more puzzling by the fact that even if we were to allow Hume his 
reductive physiological account, it isn’t clear how it could provide him with an adequate 
explanation of error, anyway. For one thing, it leaves him open to the problematic question that I 
asked towards the beginning of this chapter: how are we to decide what it is that makes an 
associative error an error? If his answer to this question is only that an error of association is really 
an error in our brain processes, then he has only created a new problem: namely, what is it that 
makes the faulty brain processes faulty? What grounds, for instance, does he have to say that a 
certain wiring in the brain is “a miswiring” rather than just “another sort of wiring”?  
If he wanted to meet this challenge he could go in a variety of different ways. On the one hand, he 
could try to explain how brain processes really can be described, in and of themselves, in normative 
terms. But this, I think, is bound to fail. It is pretty obvious that the brute physical processes of the 
brain do not themselves involve errors in any normative sense, (even though we often talk about 
them as if they do). There is no meaningful question as to whether massive bodies ought to tend 
towards each other, or whether an electron ought to describe a particular path through space. 
Neither do we have any good reason to suppose that neurons, synapses, dendrites, or animal spirits, 
should be different in this respect.  
Another alternative is that we could say that because errors are reducible to brain processes (and 
because there aren’t normative facts about these processes), then this means that there aren’t 
normative facts about error after all. In this way, the whole concept of error is lost in the reduction. 
If it turns out that there isn’t anything normative to say about error, then it is difficult to see how 
there could be anything to say about error. Unless error is in some sense a bad thing – a faulty thing 
– then we have surely deprived the term “error” of all sensible meaning.203 In any case, Hume 
certainly regards error as a normative concept. Indeed, Hume frequently explains our aversion to 
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error in the same way he explains our aversion to the moral vices: in terms of the sentiments of 
disapprobation we feel toward them. This is not to say that Hume thinks cognitive errors and errors 
of morality are the same thing. It is only to say that he thinks they are of the same kind
204
; they are 
both ideas to be explained in a similar fashion – that is, in terms of the natural inclinations that arise 
in us against them. When, for example, it comes to immorality, Hume argues: 
…when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that 
from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment or blame from the 
contemplation of it.  (T, 469) 
And similarly when it comes to cognitive error, he describes our aversion to the error in terms of a 
sensible displeasure. In describing our aversion to a contradiction, for example, he says that: 
Nothing is more certain from experience, than that any contradiction either to the sentiments 
or passions gives a sensible uneasiness. (T, 205) 
Later Hume explains that our approbation and blame are only “fainter” versions of the passions love 
and hatred. 
The pain or pleasure which arises from the general survey or view of any action of quality of 
the mind, constitutes its vice or virtue, and gives rise to our approbation or blame, which is 
nothing but a fainter and more imperceptible love or hatred. (T, 614) 
We will discuss this sentimental view of error further in the following chapters. But the point I am 
trying to make for now is that Hume can avoid the problems of reduction entirely if he simply 
avoids attempting to explain the normativity of error in terms of physiology. And all throughout the 
rest of his work this is exactly what he does. Rather than striving to explain error in terms of 
anything more fundamental than perceptions, Hume explains error in terms of the features of 
perceptions themselves and their effects they have across the system of ideas that we call the mind. 
Of course, this naturalistic account is not without its own problems, and these are issues that we will 
discuss. The suggestion is simply that it is especially strange that Hume should try to help himself 
to an inconsistent physiological reduction of error, since even if we grant him that explanation it 
won’t do him much good. 
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More often in the Treatise Hume addresses the normative question about error in the argot of his 
science of man. In line with his usual methodology (that we will explore in the following chapter), 
Hume deliberately conflates the philosophical question, “what makes an idea faulty?” with the 
psychological question: “how do we come to regard an idea as faulty?” This substitution of 
psychological questions for philosophical questions is part of Hume’s more general view that as for 
“all the sciences, and all the arts”. 
None of them can go beyond experience or establish any principles which are not founded 
on that authority. (T, xviii) 
As Stroud puts it, this belief leads Hume to attempt to answer the problems: 
…in the only way possible – by observation and inference from what is observed. Hume saw 
them as empirical questions.
205
 
Hume makes his intentions clear: 
…by confessing that my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or 
explain the secret causes of their operations. For besides that this belongs not to my present 
purpose, I am afraid that such an enterprize is beyond the reach of human understanding… 
(T, 64) 
Hume’s discussion of physiology is instructive, because it reveals that Hume allows that the natural 
sciences are an entirely permissible method to help us help decide questions about error. Problems 
with such explanations arise only if we attempt to think of physiological explanations, for example, 
as getting at the “secret nature” (i.e. fundamental causes) of error, and as we have seen, I think that 
Hume occasionally strays in this problematic direction. More often, Hume explains error by 
discussing perceptions more directly. In the next chapter we will get to the bottom of Hume’s 
naturalistic account of error by discussing some specific examples. We will see that Hume’s more 
considered view of error is that it is not to be explained in terms of physiology, but rather, in terms 
of the fact that “an idea assented to feels different” from an idea that we reject. (T, 629)  
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CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDIES IN HUMEAN ERROR:  
MEMORY, ILLUSION, AND EVALUATION 
 
There are many kinds of errors, and we should not suppose that Hume has one explanation to fit 
them all. I do not hope to provide an exhaustive account of all the things we call “error”, but I will 
strive to provide a framework by which various kinds of common errors, on Hume’s view, can be 
explained. In so doing, I take as a general premise that all of Hume’s explanations must be 
compatible with the theory of mind that we have been discussing in the previous chapters. In this 
way, Hume’s explanations of various specific errors will be systematically related. In this chapter I 
will examine three specific types of errors – involving memory, illusion, and evaluation – and by 
discussing these individual cases, arrive at a better understanding of how Hume can explain error 
more generally. 
ERRORS INVOLVING MEMORY 
Sometimes we mistake an imagination for a memory. We think we remember something that didn’t 
really happen, or else, conversely, we think we are only imagining something that really did take 
place. Hume allows both of these errors: 
…an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate to such a degree, 
as to be taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other hand an idea of the imagination 
may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass for an idea of the memory, and counterfeit 
its effects on the belief and judgment. [T, 86] 
Let’s take an example and think through it in Humean terms. I happen to have an example that is 
close to home. My sisters, as children, were each given a toy push-chair of their own– one blue, one 
red. Now, as adults, they can’t agree about who owned which one, and for whatever reason they 
seem to think it is very important. Each of them insists that she vividly remembers the blue push-
chair being hers. Of course, they can’t both be right, so at least one of them must just be imagining 
having owned the blue push-chair. I say “at least one of them” because it is possible that neither of 
my sisters properly remembers who owned which, and they are both just imagining – confabulating 
as the psychologists say. In that case, one of my sisters would happen to be right about the colour of 
the push-chair she owned, but not because she actually remembers having owned it.
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 But, for the 
                                                 
206
 In this case, the sister who is correct (but for the wrong reasons) would still be making an error of a different kind. 
Natika Newton makes the following point about belief, which I think is true also of memory: “There are two sorts of 
belief error, and both are problematic. One kind occurs…when the belief is false. The other kind occurs when the belief 
has been wrongly formed or is unjustified.”  
106 
 
sake of example, let’s suppose that one of my sisters really is remembering accurately while the 
other is not. I suspect this sort of disagreement is common. 
How does one decide this sort of question? Naturally, we go looking for external evidence. We ask 
the parents (who refuse to comment) or we look through the photographs (which haven’t helped). 
More generally, where there is a disagreement about memory we look to the wider evidence to 
settle it.  
Hume, however, draws the distinction between the memory and the imagination in terms of the 
liveliness or “vivacity” of the perceptions themselves.207 In other words, he draws the distinction 
between what it is to remember and what it is to imagine, in terms of the way that those perceptions 
feel. According to Hume, a memory is a more lively kind of idea than an imagination, and “this 
alone” distinguishes them.  
Thus it appears, that the belief or assent, which always attends the memory and senses, is 
nothing but the vivacity of the perceptions they present; and that this alone distinguishes 
them from the imagination. To believe is in this case to feel an immediate impression of the 
senses, or a repetition of that impression in the memory. [T, 86] 
This may seem a strange view. It implies that the only person who is in a position to know whether 
or not they are really remembering is the person whose perception it is. As Passmore puts it:  
If [on Hume’s view] someone tells us he is ‘remembering’, there is no way of disputing his 
assertion: he knows, and he alone can know, whether he is having a vivid idea – and that is 
the decisive fact.
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If this is true, then it means that if my sisters really do both vividly recall having owned the blue 
push-chair, then they are both remembering having owned it, even though we know for a fact that it 
was owned by only one of them. Indeed, on this reading of Hume, as long as my sisters’ ideas 
remain sufficiently vivacious, then the external evidence won’t help settle the matter at all: even if 
tomorrow we find a whole album of unambiguous photographs, and even if a host of childhood 
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witnesses come forward to offer their unanimous testimony, still this will not change the fact that 
they were both remembering having owned the blue push-chair. 
Hume has often been criticized for this view, and it is easy to see why. Passmore, for instance, 
thinks that Hume is just plain wrong: 
We may assert with any degree of vigour and no intention of lying that we are remembering 
a particular event, but if it can be shown that we were not in a position to observe it (were 
not alive or were not there) this settles the matter. It will immediately follow that we were 
not remembering but only imagining.
209
  
Oliver Johnson is willing to entertain Hume’s strange conception of memory, but emphasises that it 
is indeed very strange:  
If the person has a lively idea of the event as being of a certain nature, then he remembers it 
in that way; if, later, he has a lively idea of its having been of a different nature, then he 
remembers it in that way. Both are equally cases of remembering, and that is the end of the 
matter. This may not be what we ordinarily mean by memory but then Hume's is no ordinary 
theory.
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But if these criticisms are right, then Hume makes a grave contradiction when he goes on to tell us 
that the memory is prone to error. For, as we have seen, Hume allows that “…an idea of the 
memory, by losing its force and vivacity,” might be “taken for an idea of the imagination.” But if 
liveliness is the only criterion by which to distinguish something remembered from something 
imagined, then a lively imagination would not merely be “taken for” a memory; it would actually be 
a memory. If being an idea with a sufficient amount of vivacity is a sufficient condition for being a 
memory, then any idea that comes to have that vivacity will, of course, be a memory. 
Hume’s own example is the case of a liar: 
This is noted in the case of liars; who by the frequent repetition of their lies come at last to 
believe and remember them… [T, 86] 
But if being a particularly vivacious idea is the only quality that separates a truth from a lie, then the 
liar who vividly believes his lies would not really be a liar at all. 
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A similar puzzle for this reading can be found in 2.1 of the Enquiry. There Hume tells us that 
imaginations can never quite reach the vivacity of sense perception, with the following important 
exception: when the “mind be disordered by disease or madness”. The problem with this exception 
is that if vivacity is really the only criterion by which a memory can be distinguished from an 
imagination, then the madman who imagines sufficiently vividly, is not really imagining, and in fact 
may not be mad at all – since (on the reading of Hume we are considering) we should really say that 
he is having a memory rather than a wild imagination. 
Happily, Hume can be saved from these criticisms, and the absurd implications do not really follow 
from what he says. This becomes obvious, I think, once we appreciate an important distinction 
between two senses in which we can remember something. I will call this distinction the difference 
between remembering and remembering truly. It is a fairly straightforward distinction, and one that 
I think Hume recognized, even if he did not spell it out explicitly. It explains, I will argue, how 
Hume can consistently allow that our memory is prone to error while also maintaining that there is a 
difference between the memory and imagination that should be explained solely in terms of vivacity 
– in terms of the way that ideas feel. 
E. J. Furlong once concluded an article about memory (and, in part, about Hume) with the following 
rhetorical question: 
For what is it to remember but to remember correctly?
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But this question is not at all rhetorical. There just is a sense in which we can remember without 
remembering correctly. This will be more obvious once we reflect that we can see things that aren’t 
there, and believe things that aren’t true. In both cases we are still seeing and believing; it is only 
that we aren’t seeing or believing truly. We do not deny that the mad man perceives a tiger in the 
room. Indeed, it is precisely because he perceives the tiger that we think he is mad; he perceives 
something that isn’t there. Could it also be argued that it is possible to remember something that 
didn’t happen? After all, if we accept that there could be a false memory, shouldn’t we accept that 
not all the things we remember are remembered correctly? Saying that a man is remembering, and 
saying that a man is remembering truly, could be two different things. 
If you like, you can think of merely remembering something as having what J. Smith calls a quasi-
memory:  
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A quasi-memory being a state subjectively indistinguishable from a memory but which need 
not derive from the past history of the subject him or herself.
212
 
 Except, for Hume, this definition applies not to “quasi-memories” but to memories proper. 
Anything that is subjectively indistinguishable from a memory is a memory, regardless of any 
relations it does or does not bear to past events. Indeed, Hume tells us that his “intention” in 
discussing the vivacity of the perceptions is only to express the manner in which memories feel 
more real to us than mere imaginations, and tend to have different (and more pronounced) effects in 
the mind: 
And this different feeling I endeavour to explain by calling it a superior force, or vivacity, or 
solidity, or firmness, or steadiness. This variety of terms, which may seem so 
unphilosophical, is intended only to express that act of the mind, which renders realities 
more present to us than fictions, causes them to weigh more in the thought, and gives them a 
superior influence on the passions and imagination. (T, 629) 
To remember is just to have a vivacious (forceful, solid, firm, steady) idea. 
On the other hand, to remember truly is to have a veridical memory – a reliable memory. What it 
means for a memory to be “veridical” or “reliable” must itself be explained, and we will get to that 
shortly. But for now suffice to say that when someone is remembering truly, what we mean is that 
they are both remembering and remembering well. 
Perhaps this distinction seems precious or obvious, but it is important since, once acknowledged, it 
saves Hume from the criticisms discussed above. Passmore objected that, 
We may assert with any degree of vigour and no intention of lying that we are remembering 
a particular event, but if it can be shown that we were not in a position to observe it (were 
not alive or were not there) this settles the matter. 
But what is settled? Certainly it has been settled that the memory was faulty; we were not 
remembering truly. But this in no way implies that we were not in the psychological state called 
remembering. Just the opposite – surely we were in such a state since we were having a false 
memory. And this psychological sense, I think, is the only sense in which Hume claims that 
vivacity alone distinguishes the memory from the imagination. Moreover, because this is all Hume 
claims his theory of memory and imagination is not objectionable in the way that Passmore and 
others have implied.  
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Indeed, in light of the distinction we can better understand what Hume means when he says that an 
idea of the imagination, by being imbued with a greater liveliness, could be “taken for” an idea of 
the memory. He is simply describing the process by which we can come to remember something 
that is false.
213
 This might occur, says Hume, by the constant repetition of an imagined idea, (since 
he observes that a constant repetition tends to be accompanied by an increase in liveliness.) And 
this is plausible enough; we know that repeating a lie, or repeating a memory, really is the sort of 
thing that can lead one to believe it. Of course, there are other ways in which we can come to 
believe a lie, and there is a vast body of psychological literature given to explaining the various 
conditions that tend to foster false memories. Particularly relevant are what the psychologists call 
“flashbulb memories” – very vivid recollections, often formed by some sort of important event. 
These are the kinds of memories that come to mind when one is asked, “Where were you on 9/11?” 
or “Where were you when Kennedy was shot?” An interesting result of research about these 
flashbulb memories is that despite the fact they are very vivid, they are also very prone to error. 
Neisser, for example, one of the leading researchers in this field, discusses a flashbulb memory of 
his own about the bombing of Pearl Harbour: he recalls how, as a child, he was watching a baseball 
game when the news interrupted the broadcast to announce the tragedy. But, writes Neisser: 
This memory has been so clear for so long that I never confronted its inherent absurdity until 
last year: no one broadcasts baseball games in December! (It can't have been a football game 
either; professional football barely existed in 1941, and the college season ended by 
Thanksgiving.) Apparently flashbulbs can be just as wrong as other kinds of memories; they 
are not produced by a special quasi-photographic mechanism.
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Neisser went on to confirm his suspicions that flashbulb memories are often false in a series of 
studies
215
, and this conclusion is now widely recognised. But for my purpose, the relevant point is 
that this psychological literature acknowledges this distinction that I have been attributing to Hume: 
that it is one thing to say that someone is having a vivid (flashbulb) memory and another thing to 
decide whether they are actually remembering truly.  
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At any rate, Hume explicitly allows that we can have false memories. I think it would be unusually 
uncharitable to read him as having a theory of memory that, although laid out in the very same 
section, obviously precludes this possibility. My reading, on the other hand, allows it. Hume’s 
distinction in terms of vivacity is not supposed to decide the manner by which we judge the 
reliability of our memories, but only the manner by which we distinguish between two kinds of 
mental states. Thus, my reading can allow everything that Hume says about the memory without 
accusing him of any obvious contradiction.  
But apart from making good sense of what Hume says, there is further evidence: the fact that Hume, 
having spelled out the distinction between the memory and the imagination in terms of vivacity, 
then goes on to provide an additional theory about the ways in which we can evaluate our beliefs. 
One such method involves considering the testimony of others. Hume discusses this when he talks 
about historical beliefs:  
Thus we believe that CAESAR was kill'd in the senate-house on the ides of March', and that 
because this fact is establish'd on the unanimous testimony of historians, who agree to assign 
this precise time and place to that event. (T, 83)
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Naturally this same criterion could also be used to evaluate a memory – not least because memories 
are beliefs about history, albeit very modern history.  
For what is memory but a faculty, by which we raise up the images of past perceptions? (T, 
260-1) 
So, let’s apply this method of testing by testimony to my example. Suppose that a large group of 
reliable witnesses
217
 now testify that one of my siblings is wrong. They all say that she owned the 
red push-chair and not the blue one as she had thought. Naturally, if those witnesses really were 
numerous and reliable, then this would lead that sister to doubt her memory and probably to reject it 
entirely.
218
 Of course, this does not necessarily mean that she will cease to remember having owned 
it in the sense of having a vivid recollection of having owned it. It only means that she will now 
come to regard her recollection as being faulty.  
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This process of evaluation by testimony is analogous to the case of being shown an optical illusion. 
We might be told by reliable witnesses that a certain effect is illusory and believe them. But 
although we believe them, we may still be fooled by the illusion. It is quite possible to disbelieve 
what one sees, and yet continue to see it nonetheless. For my part, this is exactly what happens 
when I stare, for example, at Escher’s Waterfall: a lithograph that depicts the impossible scenario of 
a closed circular stream in which the water always appears to flow downhill. A similar thing 
happens when I go snorkelling on holidays – I know that underwater objects, when viewed through 
my snorkel mask appear large or closer than they really are, but nonetheless I continue to misjudge 
the distances as if I didn’t know it at all. And as with optical illusions, so with memory: it is quite 
possible to doubt the veracity of a memory on the grounds of testimony, and yet continue to 
remember it vividly. 
Another method by which Hume allows that we can evaluate our beliefs is in terms of their 
coherence with one another. He says: 
We may draw inferences from the coherence of our perceptions, whether they be true of 
false; whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses.  
(T, 84) 
Applied to the memory, this would mean that we can doubt or reject one of our memories if it 
doesn’t cohere with the wider body of things we know or believe or remember. As we remember 
from our discussion of Hume’s epistemology, Hume’s version of coherence can’t involve 
comparing our memories with some real external reality since we never perceive any mind-
independent objects. All of our comparisons must be comparisons between perceptions. So, when 
we compare our memories in terms of coherence, the memory that wins out will be something like a 
net weighted outcome of a psychological process. If we find that two beliefs do not cohere with one 
another, the reason for rejecting one (rather than another) will always be explained in terms of the 
relationships between perceptions. And these natural processes may result in any number of 
outcomes. It could be that a certain testimony is sufficiently convincing to make us doubt a 
memory. Or else, it could be that the memory is so vivacious that it will lead us to doubt the 
testimony.
219
 Either way, the process will transpire in accordance with natural principles of mind.  
This explanation will seem unsatisfying to anyone who wants to know how these psychological 
processes involving belief map to a mind-independent external reality. We object, perhaps, that the 
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dispute about the blue push-chair is about a real external thing and not just a subjective bundle of 
perceptions in my sisters’ minds. But any dissatisfaction of this kind should be mitigated by the 
fact, as we have earlier discussed
220
, that Hume does not deny the existence of the objects of 
ordinary experience. For Hume, there are very plainly tables, chairs, people, and push-chairs. All 
that Hume denies is that our explanation of such objects should rely on any mysterious underlying 
substrata that we never perceive. Nonetheless, as we saw in Chapter 2, he certainly allows that 
memories involve objects, and he does not deny that a dispute about a pushchair really is about a 
pushchair. The novelty of Hume’s account is just that the truth makers for memories are explained 
in terms of perceptions rather than facts about external objects. Knowledge, for Hume, is the 
“assurance arising from the comparison of ideas.” (T, 124) It does not involve comparing an idea 
with an external reality.  
It is instructive to note, however, that Hume’s “comparison of ideas” casts a very wide net: it 
includes many, if not all, of the methods by which we normally decide a question of the memory: 
we go looking for evidence, we compare our ideas in terms of coherence, we consider the testimony 
of others, and so on. Having engaged in these activities, one idea, rather than another, strikes us as 
more convincing – more lively; more vivacious. This is the idea we will believe, and we will 
continue to believe it unless a further “comparing of ideas”, or some other natural process, reduces 
its vivacity. If, upon further reflection, this does occur – if we do find reason to reject the idea – we 
will call that belief an error.  
Hume’s account of the memory has often been criticized – not least because he observes that our 
memories are prone to error, and yet puts forward a theory of memory that has been interpreted as 
being straightforwardly incompatible with that observation. I have argued that this reading of Hume 
is wrong: it fails to acknowledge that it is one thing to explain what it is to have a memory, and 
another thing to explain what it is for a memory to be veridical. On the one hand he describes what 
it is to have a memory rather than an imagination in terms of vivacity alone, but on the other hand, 
he provides a more complex theory about how we decide questions concerning the reliability of 
memories. The first question as to whether an idea is an imagination can be decided quickly by 
asking simply: how does this idea feel? The latter question as to whether an idea is veridical is 
rather more difficult to decide (as indeed we would expect). Hume attempts to explain what it is to 
have a reliable memory in terms of the “comparing of ideas” and his explanation includes many of 
the ordinary ways by which we assess the reliability of an idea: by hearing testimonies, by 
examining whether the idea coheres with other things we know, and so on. 
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OPTICAL ILLUSIONS 
Let’s take an example of a different kind of error – optical illusions. Hume certainly allows that 
these can fool us. Indeed, he gives an example: 
If you wheel about a burning coal with rapidity, it will present to the senses an image of a 
circle of fire; nor will there seem to be any interval of time betwixt its revolutions [T, 35] 
The sort of error is particularly challenging because it appears to be a case of a faulty impression 
rather than a faulty idea and, if so, will be more difficult for Hume to explain. As we have seen, 
Hume thinks we can judge the faultiness of an idea by comparing it with other ideas. And the same, 
he says, is true of impressions: 
As to those impressions, which arise from the senses, their ultimate cause is, in my opinion, 
perfectly inexplicable by human reason, and ‘twill always be impossible to decide with 
certainty whether they arise immediately from the object, or are produc’d by the creative 
power of the mind, or are deriv’d from the author of our being. Nor is such a question any 
way material to our present purpose. We may draw inferences from the coherence of our 
perceptions…whether they represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses. (T, 84) 
But the problem with thinking that impressions are prone to error is that they are supposed to be the 
standard by which all other knowledge can be evaluated. As Hume puts it, it will “always be 
impossible to decide” where our impressions come from. We cannot trace our knowledge any 
further back than impressions because they are “our sensations, passions and emotions as they make 
their first appearance in the soul.” (T, 1 – emphasis added) This is why Hume says impressions 
“must necessarily appear in every particular what they are, and be what they appear.” (T, 190) They 
are the atoms of Hume’s mechanistic psychology – the most basic elements of experience.  
Unlike Hume, a realist could explain an illusion of the senses in terms of a lack of correspondence 
between the impression and the external world. Importantly, this sort of explanation refers to things 
that are antecedent to impressions: it compares the impression to the thing that caused it, or the 
thing that it is supposed to represent. But Hume cannot make this sort of comparison because he 
thinks we know nothing of anything that is antecedent to our impressions. As such, his explanation 
of what it means to have a faulty impression must go in the other direction: it must be cashed-out in 
terms of facts that are subsequent to the impression in question. In other words, Hume must explain 
what it means to have a faulty impression by referring to a wider body of perceptions. And this is 
precisely what he does when he says that “we may draw inferences from the coherence of our 
perceptions” whether our impressions “represent nature justly, or be mere illusions of the senses.” 
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(T, 84) A faulty impression is not faulty because it fails to represent an external reality, but faulty 
because it fails to cohere with our larger body of experience.  
Importantly, this means that there is nothing intrinsically defective about any impression on Hume’s 
view. Let’s look at his example. If we wheel about a burning coal we see a circle of fire and can no 
longer make-out the coal as being a distinct object. Now, certainly it would be an error to take this 
appearance at face value and believe it. In other words, it would be an error to believe that when the 
coal is spun it literally ceases to be a distinct object and becomes instead an indistinct circle of 
flame. And Hume can explain the faultiness of this belief by pointing out that it does not cohere 
with other things we believe. But what isn’t an error is to see the coal as if it were a circle of fire. 
This fact about mere appearances is perfectly compatible with the other things we believe – the laws 
of physics and optics, for example. Indeed, given our wider body of experience, a circle of fire is 
precisely how we should expect a distinct piece of coal to look if it is wheeled about at a sufficient 
rate. 
A more commonly discussed example of this same phenomenon is the stick protruding out of water. 
We have already found this example in Descartes, but Hume himself also mentions it briefly in the 
first Enquiry. (E, 151)
 
As we recall, the straight stick may appear bent when it is protruding out of 
water at the right kind of angle, and we often call this an optical illusion. But in what sense does the 
illusion actually involve an error? Certainly it would be an error to believe that the straight stick is 
actually bent when it is submerged in water. But seeing the stick as if it were bent is no mistake at 
all. Indeed, as J. L. Austin said, the fact that the protruding stick seems bent is precisely what we 
should expect given the way our world is
221
 – given our wider body of experience involving light 
and refraction. Indeed, knowing what we do about refraction, what would really be strange is if the 
protruding stick didn’t appear bent. 
Hume doesn’t really discuss the distinction between an object being such-and-such and appearing 
such-and-such, but he does allow its possibility, since he says that our evaluation of an impression 
is subsequent to our experience of the impressions themselves. He tells us, for instance, that 
although impressions themselves always seem what they are, and are what they seem, we may, 
nonetheless, “draw inferences” from the coherence of our perceptions which allow us to make 
evaluations of these impressions in hindsight. (T, 84) When we see a stick submerged in water and 
appearing to be bent, there is nothing intrinsically faulty about this appearance. But in hindsight, 
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when we come to believe that the stick was not really bent as it appeared, we can call the 
appearance “an illusion’ on those terms.  
For these reasons, I think the most straightforward way to read Hume is to say that he denies that 
our impressions are prone to error at all, but allows that we sometimes talk of them loosely as if 
they involve error. In other words, it is true that Hume allowed that we can reject certain 
impressions after having weighed them against our wider body of perceptions. In this sense, we can 
call them “errors” or think of them as errors, but we are reluctant to think of them as errors proper. 
The situation is worth comparing to Descartes’ reluctance to describe material falsity as “proper 
falsity” as we discussed in the first chapter.  
Although falsity properly speaking, or “formal” falsity, cannot be found except in judgments 
(as I noted a little while ago), still there is, surely, another “material” falsity in ideas…222 
For Hume, similarly, we can think of impressions as being faulty insofar as they relate to other 
ideas (i.e. provide material for false judgment), but they do not involve any evaluation or judgment 
in and of themselves. There are several notable differences, however, between the two accounts. For 
one thing, Descartes argues that sensory experiences (i.e. Hume’s impressions) can be are 
materially false when they purport to represent a quality of objects that doesn’t exist. Hume can’t 
have this appearance/reality gap in his impressions right since they are his most fundamental 
mechanism of explanation. Another difference is that Descartes’ distinction between material falsity 
and formal falsity is more clear-cut (or at least purports to be more clear cut) than Hume’s treatment 
of error. Descartes thinks there are two distinct categories of error: (1) errors that involve judgment 
on our part (formal falsity), and errors that occur at a pre-judgmental sensory level (material 
falsity). For the sake of explaining optical illusions we could attempt to attribute a similar 
distinction to Hume – between errors that occur at the level of ideas, and errors that occur at the 
level of impressions. But for Hume the distinction between these two categories cannot be a neat 
distinction, since, as we will see, he doesn’t allow any distinct active faculty of the mind called 
“judgment” or “belief” that exists set apart from the regular flow of sensory experience. Rather, on 
Hume’s account, belief and judgment are themselves explained entirely in terms of the manner in 
which certain perceptions strike the mind – that is, in terms of the intrinsic features of perceptions. 
As he says: 
[T]here is a great difference betwixt the simple conception of the existence of an object, and 
the belief of it, and this difference…lies in the manner, in which we conceive it. (T 94-5) 
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[A]n opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fiction…in the manner 
of its being conceived. (T, 628) 
We must understand, then, how this works, and what means, for Hume, to make an error of 
judgment or evaluation. 
ERRORS OF EVALUATION 
“A wise man,” says Hume, “proportions his belief to the evidence.” (E, 110) This is a normative 
claim, and it is a refreshing piece of common-sense in a body of work that is sceptical and very 
often merely descriptive. If Hume is right, then it is obvious what an error of evaluation involves: 
failing to be wise; failing to proportion one’s belief to the evidence. But it is not clear that Hume’s 
methodology will allow him to explain this normative claim with any consistency. 
Just one section earlier, for instance, Hume provides a descriptive account of human reasoning. 
All our reasonings concerning matters of fact are founded on a species of Analogy, which 
leads us to expect from any cause the same events, which we have observed to result from 
similar causes. (E, 104) 
In this sense Hume compares our reason to that of animals: 
A horse, that has been accustomed to the field, becomes acquainted with the proper height 
which he can leap, and will never attempt what exceeds his force and ability. An old 
greyhound will trust the more fatiguing part of the chase to the younger, and will place 
himself so as to meet the hare in her doubles; nor are the conjectures, which he forms on this 
occasion, founded in any thing but his observation and experience. (E, 105) 
In fact, he says our reasoning is of just the same kind: 
Animals, therefore, are not guided in these inferences by reasoning: Neither are children: 
Neither are the generality of mankind, in their ordinary actions and conclusions: Neither are 
philosophers themselves, who, in all the active parts of life are, in the main, the same with 
the vulgar, and are governed by the same maxims.  
(E, 106) 
If this is true, we should ask why it is humans tend to surpass animals in reasoning, and why some 
humans surpass others. Hume considers the question in a lengthy footnote, and lists a variety of 
factors: (i) the capacity for attention; (ii) the ability to comprehend “a whole system”; (iii) the 
ability to consider a lengthy chain of consequences; (iv) the capacity to avoid confusing similar 
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ideas; (v) the degree of subtlety; (vi) the haste and narrowness of judgment; (vii) the extent of 
experience; (viii) the degree of prejudice; (ix) the confidence in testimony and written accounts; 
and, Hume tells us, the list could go on. (E, 107)  
All of these factors are descriptive, and according to this explanation if your reason surpasses mine 
it is only because you have a more pronounced natural capacity in one or another of those listed 
ways.
223
 
But if this is our explanation of the wise man, then our account of wisdom seems to lack 
normativity. We do not yet know if someone should be wise – if someone ought to proportion their 
belief to the evidence. All we can say is that some people are wiser than others insofar as they have 
different natural propensities. If you like, we could also add to this conclusion the observation that 
people, in general, want to be wise, and that the wise are often highly regarded. But these facts are 
also just descriptive facts, and they won’t, at least not by themselves, tell us if people should want 
to be wise, or if the wise ought to be highly regarded. This is a worry for our purposes in 
considering error, since normative facts are surely the facts we need to know if we want to say that 
someone has made an error of evaluation by failing to evaluate wisely. If Hume’s explanations are 
limited only to descriptions, then a pressing question arises: how can Hume recommend anything at 
all? As Miriam McCormick puts it: 
…On what basis can he recommend reason over superstition or even over following your 
gut when reason is just one of the many causes of belief?
224
 
To begin with, one fact is certainly clear. Given Hume’s naturalistic methodology, he is unable to 
explain the normativity of evaluation in any absolute sense. Hume portrays the wise man as 
someone who reasons well, but, for Hume, reason itself is only the slave of the natural passions. (T, 
415) When Hume carefully considers the “most exact” of his own evaluations, he finds that he can 
ultimately “give no reason” why he should assent to them, except that he feels a “strong propensity 
to consider objects strongly in that view, under which they appear.” (T, 265) Hume thinks that 
normative claims are just expressions of sentiments.  
…when you pronounce any action or character to be vicious, you mean nothing, but that 
from the constitution of your nature you have a feeling or sentiment or blame from the 
contemplation of it. (T, 469) 
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And this sentimental view of normativity is surely not an adequate foundation on which to support 
an absolute distinction between good reasoning and bad. Ultimately, for Hume, bad reasoning is 
just reasoning that conflicts with our passionate inclinations that naturally seek beliefs that are more 
“steady” and “constant”, and as our inclinations differ so too will our view of good reason. If we 
want to know what constitutes the difference between good reasoning and bad, there is nothing 
more fundamental, or more absolute, than perceptions to which we can appeal. As we have seen in 
Chapter 2, Hume’s conception of nature is not a conception of a benevolent force, or a belief about 
the perfect design of a loving God (as contemporaries of Hume believed
225
). Rather, for Hume, 
nature is a “blind” instinct. (E, 151). Hume seems to allow that there is a possible world in which all 
humans quite happily reason in ways that we would think of as being terribly unreasonable, and that 
in such a world, as long as the inhabitants carry on reasoning in this way without any cognitive 
dissonance, then that manner of reasoning would in fact be a good one.
226
 At least, that world’s 
inhabitants would regard it as being good, and there are no other facts to which we could appeal in 
an attempt to settle the matter more absolutely. 
We should therefore be somewhat cautions when Hume recommends one method of evaluation 
over another. For instance, in the Essay on Miracles, Hume argues that if someone testifies that a 
miracle has occurred we ought to do our best to doubt the testimony rather than be caught up by the 
agreeable emotions of surprise and wonder that tend to accompany hearing a good story. (E, 417) 
Hume may well be right about this normative claim, but, as he admits elsewhere, he cannot anchor 
this recommendation in anything absolute. Owen offers an instructive analogy: 
Consider Roman augury by the inspection of a sacrificed sheep's entrails. There is clearly a 
right and wrong way of performing such actions, and the practice is clearly normative.... But 
we might still wonder whether the practice was warranted.
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Similarly, as we will see in the examples that follow, Hume describes right and wrong ways of 
reasoning, and he does so in terms of natural principles – in terms of the effects these different 
methods of reason have in our body of perceptions, but he leaves open the question as to whether 
there is anything normative to say about the natural principles themselves. 
Another interesting example in which Hume recommends one manner of judgment over another 
involves the fear of heights. Hume describes: 
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…a man who, who being hung from a high tower in a cage of iron cannot forbear trembling, 
when he surveys the precipice below him, tho’ he knows himself to be perfectly secure from 
falling. (T, 148)  
The man trembles because “his imagination runs away with its object” – in other words, because he 
obsesses about the possibility of danger – and Hume says we should strive to “correct this 
propensity” where we can. But, once again, Hume’s methodology will only really allow us to say 
that the trembling man is making an error of evaluation insofar as we feel a “strong propensity” to 
feel that way. 
Hume’s position is obviously sceptical. Despite the scepticism, however, Hume has a good deal to 
say about the difference between a good evaluation and an error of evaluation, and that is what I 
want to discuss in what remains of this chapter. In fact, he provides quite a rich descriptive account 
of how it is we come to regard some evaluative processes as more warranted than others.  
David Pears once pointed out that one of the things a theory of belief should be able to do is explain 
how it is we form beliefs about which other of our beliefs are warranted.
228
 Part of this reflection is 
the observation that we have meta-beliefs: beliefs about beliefs. And this is something Hume 
allows. For example, Hume discusses a meta-belief at the conclusion of Book I at T, 265 when he 
asks of his own system: “How can I be sure that in leaving all establish’d opinions that I am 
following truth?” In other words, having argued for a series of conclusions, he now steps back to 
ask whether the whole system that has supported the justification of those beliefs is itself really 
warranted. Am I justified in believing the beliefs I have expressed? In any case, as a more general 
point we might observe that Hume’s explanation of the mind readily allows the possibility of meta-
beliefs, since Hume describes the mind as a radically complicated system of perceptions that double 
back on each other and influence each other in countless ways.  
…perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and mingle in 
an infinite variety of postures and situations. (T, 253) 
Part of Hume’s project is to explain how some of our very complex ideas emerge from simpler ones 
as a result of this multifarious “mingling”, and this, I think, includes the possibility of forming 
beliefs about beliefs. Indeed, I argue that for Hume our ideas about errors of evaluation are to be 
explained in precisely this way. As we have seen, Hume cannot give any absolute explanation of 
methods of evaluation; but I think he can explain why it is we tend to agree that some modes of 
evaluation are better than others. 
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Lome Falkenstein has done much to explain how this is possible by showing how, on Hume’s view, 
a complex idea about an error of evaluation could arise naturally from a series of beliefs and meta-
beliefs. I propose to draw on some of Falkenstein’s ideas, and apply them directly to the case of 
error.  
Suppose that…someone who had been (i) induced by one set of natural causes to adopt a 
particular lower level belief, and (ii) induced by another set of causes to adopt a meta-level 
belief about the illegitimacy of the first belief, would be led by further causes to either, (i) 
abandon the lower level belief as a result, or (ii) be less convinced of its truth, or (iii) at least 
feel embarrassed or unjustified in continuing to assent to it as strongly as previously.  
Now, if we apply this to the case of miracles, for example: we can say that it is because someone 
has a complex meta-belief – that the frequently observed laws of nature are more reliable than the 
testimony of a few witnesses – that they might come to doubt their belief in what they thought had 
been a miraculous event. 
Or, returning to Hume’s case of the trembling man suspended in his iron cage – suppose that the 
trembling man manages to reason himself out of this fear. We might explain that it is because he 
forms the meta-belief – that one’s beliefs tend to be skewed by irrational fear in this sort of 
predicament – that he may manage to mitigate his trembling. 
Stated more generally, Hume’s process of belief revision works like this: Why is a lower-level 
belief faulty? Because it is trumped by a stronger belief, which may be a meta-belief. Why is it 
trumped? Because it does not cohere, or because it is not as vivacious.  
This is a process of evaluation. But this process may itself be evaluated in the same kind of way. If, 
for example, someone does not reject an incoherent lower-level belief (imagine, for instance, the 
trembling man continues to be afraid despite knowing all the relevant facts about his safety) then we 
could say that he has made an error of evaluation. But when we say that his evaluation is faulty we 
cannot mean that it is faulty in any absolute sense; rather, it is only faulty in accordance with 
another belief that may be of an even higher order: for example, it might fail to cohere with 
Hume’s broad theory that “the wise man proportions his belief to the evidence”. 
In principle, this series of meta-beliefs may have no limit.
229
 For any belief it should make sense to 
evaluate it in terms of others. Certainly, for example, it should make sense to ask the question: “why 
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should we be wise?” And several authors have attempted to answer just this question on Hume’s 
behalf. Among these authors there is a general consensus that Hume recommends wisdom on the 
grounds that it tends to have good consequences, although there is some disagreement about 
whether the good consequences are to be explained in terms of the fulfilment of our own desires, or 
more generally in terms of the flourishing of society. Garratt, for example, explains the Humean 
justification in terms of our own desires and felt needs: 
Reason is ultimately a kind of natural activity, one that leads us to approve of most of its 
own operations when we reflect on them in light of our desires and felt needs.
230
 
McCormick, alternatively, explains it more broadly in terms of the world being a better place: 
I think Hume’s preference and recommendation for following reason is politically 
motivated. The point is that the world will be a better place if more people choose reason as 
their guide.
231
  
It is an interesting dispute, but I think the correct answer is simply “all of the above”: Hume 
approves of wisdom for a variety of reasons, and these reasons vary as the circumstances vary. 
Sometimes, he recommends wisdom on personal grounds (T, 271); sometimes he recommends it on 
political grounds (T, 219). The important point is just that Hume recommends wisdom because he 
has natural inclinations to assent to meta-beliefs about it. It may be that I have the meta-belief: 
“Proportioning my belief to the evidence tends to bring me pleasure.” Or else I may reason more 
abstractly: “When humans proportion their belief to the evidence it tends to increase their 
flourishing as a group.” Either way, the general principle of justification is the same, and I think 
Hume would be happy to allow both or either. David Owen seems to share this view since he lists 
the whole variety of justifications: 
 …[the wise] are happier and better off and more useful to society.232 
                                                                                                                                                                  
impossible, to evaluate all of our beliefs. There is no sense, therefore, in which an infinite regress must be carried out in 
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It will also prove instructive to notice that in some rare circumstances Hume does not recommend 
philosophical wisdom at all. He speaks, for example, of “honest gentlemen, who being always 
employ’d in their domestic affairs…do not engage often in abstract reasoning.”  
And indeed, of such as these I pretend not to make philosophers… They do well to keep 
themselves in their present situation; and instead of refining them into philosophers, I wish 
we cou’d communicate to our founders of systems, a share of this gross earthy mixture. (T, 
272) 
This is an exception to Hume’s general recommendation of wisdom for mankind, but it only serves 
to confirm his general strategy for discussing the warrant of beleifs and belief-forming strategies: 
that the justification for an evaluative process is to be found by comparing it to other beliefs 
(perhaps beliefs of a higher order), and by having a natural inclination to assent to that way of 
thinking. It is quite clear that when Hume says that the “honest gentlemen” ought to remain in their 
state of “earthy” naivety, he does so because he believes that naivety is for such men a more 
beneficial way to be. “They do well”, perhaps, because for those “employ’d in their domestic 
affairs,” ignorance is bliss.  
Note that Hume’s recommendations are thus always relative to circumstances. As Ainslie puts it: 
…philosophical self-knowledge is a route to a contented life for those who have a taste for 
it.
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For those without such a taste, philosophy is not recommended by Hume – at least, not in the same 
way. And this observation confirms our earlier speculation that Hume must think there is a possible 
world in which good reasoning involves what philosophers, in this world, would think of as bad 
reasoning. Indeed, in order to conceive of such a world, one needs only to imagine that all of its 
inhabitants are Hume’s “honest gentlemen” and that no one has ever heard (and would care to hear) 
of a philosopher. 
Anyway, to summarise what we’ve been discussing, Hume’s view is that all of our beliefs are just 
lively ideas. (T, 86) We believe one thing or another in accordance with describable natural laws 
that govern the interactions between our perceptions. Simple beliefs work this way and so do our 
most complex meta-beliefs. Evaluation involves the comparing of one or more of our beliefs, and 
this too is a natural process. Whichever idea emerges from the comparison with the most vivacity 
will be the idea to which we assent. As for the rules themselves – the ones that govern which idea 
will emerge victorious – they are too complex to provide an exhaustive account. No more could we 
                                                 
233
 Ainslie, D. “Hume a Scottish Socrates?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 33 (2003) p. 153 (Emphasis added) 
124 
 
expect an exhaustive account of the interactions of atoms than we could expect an exhaustive 
account of the interactions of perceptions. Nonetheless, Hume endeavours to discuss their 
interactions in broad strokes. For example, speaking of education Hume explains why the beliefs we 
learn “from our infancy” very often trump others. Education, he says, is a very common source of 
belief: indeed, he is persuaded that “more than one half of those opinions, that prevail among 
mankind, to be owning to education.” (T, 117) And the reason, he says, that these beliefs are so firm 
is that they are taught to us for a long period of time and by a very frequent repetition. In this way 
they, 
…take such deep root, that ‘tis impossible for us, by all the powers of reason and 
experience, to eradicate them; and this habit not only approaches in its influence, but even 
on many occasions prevails over that which arises from the constant and inseparable unions 
of causes and effects. (T, 116)  
But Hume also allows exceptions to this rule. At one point, for example, he admits that the 
“maxims” of education are “frequently contrary to reason”. This is a nice piece of common sense; it 
means that Hume thinks education imbues us with some deep-rooted falsities, and he can thus make 
sense of the quip attributed to Thomas Wolsey that we should be “very careful what we put into our 
heads, because we will never, ever get it out.” But if Hume really wants to allow this exception, he 
needs there to be naturally occurring circumstances in which we form the meta-belief that some of 
our other strongest beliefs are unwarranted, despite the fact that they are vivacious. He does not 
explain specifically how this occurs in the case of education, but more broadly he does explain that 
vivacious ideas can come to be disbelieved in accordance with more “general rules”.  
Shou’d it be demanded why men form general rules, and allow them to influence their 
judgment, even contrary to present observation and experience, I shou’d reply that in my 
opinion it proceeds from those very principles, on which all judgments causes and effects 
depends.(T, 147) 
…We fix on some steady and general points of view; and always in our thoughts, place 
ourselves in them, whatever may be our present situation. (T, 582) 
So, how does Hume explain these general rules? 
According to my system, all reasonings are nothing but the effects of custom; and custom 
has no influence, but by enlivening the imagination, and giving us a strong conception of 
any object. (T, 149) 
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Therefore, if it happens that we revise belief in light of a general rule, it must be that: 
The general rule is attributed to our judgment; as being more extensive and constant. (T, 
149) 
This theory of belief revision is somewhat implausible when it is expressed in the language of 
“vivacity”. Hume is right that we are sometimes more certain of “general rules” than we are of more 
specific beliefs – even lively ones. But this surely isn’t because general rules are more vivacious. 
For example, consider again the trembling man who is suspended at a height in the iron cage. It is 
quite possible that this man could come to believe that he is safe on the basis of general rules he has 
formed from repeated experience. (He knows about the strength of iron, perhaps). But if he does 
overcome his fear, it is certainly not because the general rules are more lively than his present fear. 
We all know what it is like to attempt to overcome these sorts of emotions – to steady our 
composure in the face of a very lively fear. And on the rare occasions that we do manage to 
overcome the fear, it is seldom because our reason shouts louder than the fear itself. Rather, it is 
because, somehow, we manage to listen to the calm whisper of reason amidst the flurry of emotion, 
and this is what Hume must explain in the case of general rules. 
Another example of a general rule overcoming a lively passion can be found in Hume’s theory of 
justice. According to Hume, our whole system of justice is founded upon general rules, and these 
general rules are justified because they have good consequences in society. 
…'tis certain, that the whole plan or scheme is highly conducive, or indeed absolutely 
requisite both to the support of society, and the well-being of every individual… Property 
must be stable, and must be fix'd by general rules. (T, 497) 
But Hume also observes that our feelings about a “single [act] of justice may be contrary” to those 
general rules, and our feelings may be very lively. He provides an example of someone lawfully, 
but distastefully, “restores a great fortune to a miser, or a seditious bigot.” Now, in response to this 
act, lawful or not, we may feel within ourselves a strong sentiment of repulsion. The bigot, we may 
think, is a fool and does not deserve the money. “It should not have been returned to him,” we may 
think, “the law be damned!” But for Hume, we are wrong to think in this way, and the general rules 
that underlie justice can help us overcome our strong feeling in this instance. We realise that, 
…this momentary ill is amply compensated by the steady prosecution of the rule, and by the 
peace and order, which it establishes in society... When therefore [we] have had experience 
enough to observe, that whatever may be the consequence of any single act of justice, 
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perform’d by a single person, yet the whole system of actions, concurr’d in by the whole 
society, is infinitely advantageous to the whole, and to every part… (T, 497-8) 
Once again, Hume’s example involves a case wherein the calm dictates of reflection help us to 
revise our immediate and lively reaction. 
It is in light of these sorts of examples, I think, that Hume, in the Appendix, feels obliged to revise 
his theory of “vivacity” and explain mechanisms underlying belief more broadly in terms of a 
certain “feeling”. He realises, that “vivacity” cannot do the job he needs it to do, because general 
rules (which are calm) often trump emotions (which are lively). Therefore, in order to save his 
broader theory of natural belief, Hume explains that he only employed the term “vivacity” to 
capture a certain feeling that could just as well have been explained by other terms such as 
“solidity,” “firmness,” or “steadiness”.  
This variety of terms which may seem so unphilosophical, is intended only to express that 
act of the mind, which renders realities more present to us than fictions, causes them to 
weigh more in the thought, and gives them a superior influence on the passions and the 
imaginations. (T, 629) 
Even in light of the revision, Hume’s explanation remains mysterious. But we should also admit 
that it is no easy task to explain why it is, on introspection, that some general rules feel more certain 
– less open to revision – than other of our beliefs. I think that if we accept Hume’s naturalistic 
project, then we should probably also accept that he is right to conclude that “in philosophy we can 
go no further, than assert, that it is something felt by the mind,” that explains why some beliefs are 
more sure than others, and thus trump others if ever we compare them. General rules may not feel 
more “lively”, but they really do feel more “firm” and “steady”. And, on Hume’s view, “Provided 
we agree about the thing, 'tis needless to dispute about the terms.” (T, 629) 
CONCLUSIONS OF THIS CHAPTER 
Broadly, in conclusion, we can say that on Hume’s view error is always a comparative concept. If 
we regard some memory, or impression, or processes of evaluation as faulty, what we mean is that 
we have rejected that perception in light of others. No perception is faulty simpliciter. If it is faulty, 
it is faulty because it does not cohere with some other set of perceptions. More fundamentally, when 
we reject an idea it is because it no longer strikes us with sufficient vivacity or, as Hume says in the 
appendix, it is because “an idea assented to feels different” from one that we reject. (T, 629)  
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On first appearance this theory seems to preclude the possibility that we could regard any of our 
lively perceptions as an error. If, for example, a memory is a lively idea, and liveliness is the 
sufficient condition for an idea being a belief, then how could we possibly disbelieve a lively 
memory? But, as we have seen, Hume offers a solution to that problem by allowing that we have 
meta-beliefs: beliefs about beliefs. The reason that we can come to regard a memory as faulty, is 
that we can have a meta-belief about it, and this meta-belief can be believed more strongly still. 
Any belief can be trumped by more general rules if those rules are “more extensive and constant”.  
Once again, we should acknowledge this is a subjective and sceptical conception of error. It seems 
unsatisfying because it does not allow that we can separate our veridical perceptions from our faulty 
ones with reference to absolute facts about an external reality. But in light of Hume’s very sceptical 
epistemology, we should also admit that he provides a rich and instructive account of the ways in 
which we revise our beliefs, even on those sceptical terms. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: ERROR, ACTIVITY, AND AGENCY 
 
“Mistakes were made.” – Ronald Reagan 
Many of the things we call “errors” involve activity. If I make an error, then I have done 
something.
234
 I have made a mistake: I have spoken falsely, acted irrationally, or believed without 
justification. Along these lines Aristotle distinguished “mistakes” (hamartêma) from “misfortunes” 
(atuchêma)
235
 – on the grounds that mistakes and not misfortunes are the products of human 
agency.
236
 Reagan’s admission of error is unsatisfying because it fails to acknowledge this 
distinction. It is phrased in the passive tense and thus seems to imply that Reagan’s mistakes were 
only misfortunes. At any rate, he attempts to dodge the question of blame because the subject of the 
sentence is the mistake itself, rather than the person who made it. We scoff because we know that 
error is a normative notion. Mistakes
237
 are not merely made; they are made by someone – someone 
who we tend to think could or should have done otherwise and for the better.
238
 
Error doesn’t make any sense without activity. But it is not obvious how the facts about activity can 
be explained in Humean terms. Hume rejects the traditional conception of the self as a unified 
substantial thing. He rejects also the traditional conception of active powers — the voluntary 
powers to will and to reason and to act. And so, it may seem, Hume has no framework with which 
to explain error as involving the voluntary activity of agents.  
But Hume does have an account of activity even if it is not the traditional account. Indeed, in recent 
scholarship it has been increasingly acknowledged
239
 that although Hume thinks we have no idea of 
the substantial self, he nonetheless allows that we have an idea of the self as an active agent. This is 
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not the idea of an independent metaphysical substance that exists prior to our perceptions, but it is a 
complex idea that is created along with the passions and interactions of everyday life. 
When it comes to explaining error, Hume’s account of activity has interesting consequences. His 
rejection of the substantial self means that we cannot draw any deep metaphysical distinction 
between our voluntary and involuntary mistakes. Hume’s own explanation of activity and error 
must be explained in terms of his science of man. He allows that we act voluntarily and that 
sometimes we err, but both concepts – voluntary action and error – must ultimately be explained-
away in descriptive terms: in terms of observable features of our perceptions and the relations 
between them.  
It is worth worrying whether a descriptive explanation like Hume’s could ever be up to the task of 
accounting for something like voluntary activity. For example, it seems to many of us that a man 
may willingly and stubbornly choose to make an error (believe something false, for instance) even 
in the face of overwhelming contrary evidence. If so, how can this error be explained in merely 
descriptive terms and without reference to that man’s irreducible freedom? We might list and 
describe all of the various psychological and physical conditions that attend his false belief, but still 
not have adequately explained the voluntary nature of his error. At least, that is the worry. 
In order to decide definitively if the worry is warranted – that is: whether active powers could ever 
be reduced to non-intentional elements in a scientific psychology – we would first need to address 
the larger topic of whether the metaphysical notion of freewill is coherent, and I cannot do that here. 
What I will argue, however, is that Hume’s system which attempts to somewhat bypass this 
metaphysical problem nonetheless allows for a very rich and complex account of human activity – 
one that is far more fruitful than his critics allow. At the very least I contend that there is no prima 
facie case against Hume’s ability to account for the activity implicit in human error. There is no 
straightforward inference from the fact that Hume denies the metaphysical self and its active 
powers, to the fact that Hume cannot explain how human error involves activity.  
In order to establish this conclusion, I hope to show that Hume can describe, in his own terms, 
many of the experiences that the traditional metaphysical conception of agency was itself supposed 
to explain: the appearance of a unified self, the idea of the self as an agent, the voluntary orienting 
of attention, the experience of free will, and the feeling that one has certain powers, or a lack 
thereof. The extent to which Hume’s account of the self is successful will, in large part, decide the 
success of his theory of error. Mistakes are made by people who think, and deliberate, and act, and 
we must account for these facts. It won’t do to say only that “Mistakes were made.” I will argue that 
Hume can make sense of all this by explaining that some ideas – the ones we think of as voluntary – 
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are closely related to complex ideas of the self as an agent. In order to arrive at this conclusion we 
will have to take a somewhat circuitous route via Hume’s discussions of the self and the passions. 
Only by understanding how the passions – pride and humility, in particular – foster an idea of the 
self as an agent, can we begin to understand how Hume explains the observable facts about the 
activity implicit in error without presupposing the traditional metaphysics. 
 THE SELF  
As every student knows, Hume said there is no such thing as the self. Indeed, both of the two great 
traditions of contemporary Western philosophy – logical analysis, and continental phenomenology 
– have taken this Humean scepticism very seriously.240 Russell, for example, often claimed that the 
subject itself is not “empirically discoverable”241, and Sartre similarly maintained that although we 
can perceive the things that are presented to the self (the pour-soi) we cannot apprehend the subject 
itself – the thing to whom they are presented (the en-soi)242. But Hume’s own rejection of the self, 
insofar as he did indeed reject it, must be qualified very carefully. What Hume rejects is the 
traditional metaphysical conception of the self as a substance – the view that the self is an 
independently existent thing: a substance that may have different thoughts at different times, and yet 
literally persist as the very same thing through those changes. Against this substantial view of the 
self, Hume offers the same arguments that he offers elsewhere against the metaphysics of substance 
more generally: that we have no impression, (and so no idea,) of substances thus conceived, and 
that therefore the theory of substance must be meaningless. As we have already seen, Hume thinks 
that:  
We have…no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor 
have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it. (T, 16) 
Similarly, when it comes to the self, Hume says that he has no idea of a metaphysical substance 
beyond or behind his perceptions.  
For my part, when I enter most intimately into what I call myself, I always stumble on some 
particular perception or other, of hear of cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or 
pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never can observe 
anything but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for any time, as by sound 
sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said not to exist. (T, 252) 
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His conclusion, in Book I of the Treatise, is that the self is nothing but a bundle of perceptions.  
…what we call a mind, is nothing but a heap or collection of different perceptions, united 
together by certain relations, and suppos’d, tho’ falsely, to be endow’d with a perfect 
simplicity and identity. (T, 207) 
But Hume describes the bundle as “united”, “connected”, and “linked” by relations – particularly 
that of cause and effect. In light of these connections, he later describes the bundle as a system: 
…we may observe, that the true idea of the human mind, is to consider it as a system of 
different perceptions or different existences, which are link’d together by the relation of 
cause and effect, and mutually produce, destroy, influence, and modify each other. (T, 261) 
Later still, in what is possibly an allusion to Hobbes, Hume compares the self to a commonwealth: 
…I cannot compare the soul more properly to any thing than to a republic or 
commonwealth, in which the several members are united by the reciprocal ties of 
government and subordination, and give rise to other persons, who propagate the same 
republic in the incessant changes of its parts. And as the same individual republic may not 
only change its members but also its laws and constitutions; in like manner the same person 
may vary his character and disposition, as well as his impressions and ideas, without losing 
his identity. Whatever changes he endures, his several parts are still connected by the 
relations of causation. (T, 261) 
The point in all of these cases is just that the self is not literally an unchanging independent thing 
that underlies our perceptions, but is instead a group of perceptions that are considered as unified 
because certain associative principles of mind connect them by relations of cause and effect. This 
should remind us of our previous discussion
243
 regarding Hume’s reinterpreted distinction between 
substances and modes wherein he denies the traditional metaphysics but accepts that there is a 
distinction between substances and modes in other terms. (T, 16) Now, in a similar fashion, Hume 
happily admits that there is an object of experience that we call the ‘self’; he simply denies that the 
metaphysicians were right to think that it is an independent and unified existence. 
Some commentators, Nathan Brett
244
 for example, have rightly emphasized the latter passages 
quoted above in which Hume insists that the mind is not merely a bundle, but a system or a 
commonwealth. “Bundle theory” is the common name for Hume’s theory of mind, but the term 
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“bundle” tends to conjure up an image of a group of loose and unconnected perceptions, and this is 
not Hume’s view. Although Hume thinks that there are no (discoverable) metaphysical connections 
between the perceptions, Hume nevertheless maintains that the perceptions that make-up a mind are 
strongly and closely connected by the natural principles of association – “…the principles of union 
or cohesion among our simple ideas” that “in the imagination supply the place of that inseparable 
connexion, by which they are united…” (T, 12) Hume’s term “commonwealth” thus provides for 
the better metaphor. One might think of a Commonwealth as being only a group of people – a 
‘bundle’, if you like. In that sense, if you examine a commonwealth you won’t find any independent 
substance that somehow underlies the group. Yet there is more to say about the concept. A 
Commonwealth is not merely a bundle of people; it is a bundle of people who are systematically 
interconnected. Indeed the ways in which the members are connected – by laws, by customs, by a 
head of state, etc. – are surely part of what makes the commonwealth the thing it is, and what 
constitutes the identity of the aggregation as it changes over time. And so it is with Hume’s 
conception of the mind. There is no independent thing that lies behind the perceptions which are its 
parts, but the parts are massively and systematically interconnected in ways that help make the mind 
the thing it is. Moreover, as we will see, the metaphor goes even deeper, since the perceptions that 
make-up the mind are related in terms of a natural “hierarchy” which explains why some 
perceptions trump others. 
It is important to stress Hume’s view concerning the connectivity of perceptions in the mind 
because part of what fails to appeal about Hume’s so-called bundle theory is that a “bundle” seems 
a very inert sort of thing. Mere “bundles” of thoughts, we think, are not the sorts of things that make 
choices and, (consequently,) not the sort of things that make errors. Choices and errors seem to be 
the domain of an active soul that sits behind the bundle. Of course, that intuition may turn out to be 
true, but the intuition alone will not refute Hume. He has at his disposal the rejoinder that we are 
simply failing to grasp the complexity of the complex object that is the bundled mind. A 
commonwealth, after all, is only a bundle of people – there is no thing that exists “behind” the 
bundle – and yet it is a bundle that wages wars, stages revolutions, and stands for certain ideals. 
Perhaps someone will insist that this is because each of a commonwealth’s parts – its subjects – has 
a freewill of his or her own. If so, the analogy is a bad one. But the alternative suggestion is that 
human activity may itself be explained as an emergent property of connected but fundamentally 
independent parts.  
Stated more generally, a common worry about Hume’s concept of the mind which avoids inquiring 
after “real causes”, is that it seems to fail to account for what we often think of as the “mysterious” 
or “irreducible” features of the mind – the ones that Stephen Pinker, for example, calls 
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“imponderable”245. But a closer reading of Hume reveals that Hume offers an argument, or at least 
the beginning of an argument, that the apparently irreducible powers of the human mind (e.g. 
voluntary activity) are in fact reducible. Indeed, Hume should be read as one of the earliest attempts 
to help demystify the human mind by appreciating the complexity of the interactions between 
perceptions. Forests and oceans are very mysterious sorts of places, and they are no less mysterious 
for our knowing that they are, essentially, very large bundles of atoms. And for Hume, perceptions 
are just the atoms of the mind. Natural philosophy is a sort of introspective attempt at chemistry. 
SHOULD WE EXTEND NATURALISM TO THE HUMAN MIND? 
One difficulty concerns whether or not it is right to compare the inanimate objects of the natural 
world with the human mind. Many of the early modern philosophers balked at this comparison. 
Thomas Reid, for example, was one who, like Hume, rejected the Scholastic attribution of active 
powers to inanimate things, and yet nonetheless maintained that we must continue to attribute active 
powers to the human soul. In general, Reid was a mechanist who accepted the idea, attributed to 
Newton, that philosophy can only strive to explain the general laws that regulate nature, and cannot 
pretend to understand real causes.
246
 And yet concerning the human soul Reid writes: 
It is evidently the intention of our Maker, that man should be an active and not merely 
speculative being. For this purpose, certain active powers have been given him, limited 
indeed in many respects, but suited to his rank and place in the creation.
247
 
Following Descartes, Reid argued that we are plainly conscious of our own abilities to produce 
motion in the body, and to direct the will.
248
 And indeed, even on Hume’s strictly observational 
terms, Reid is surely right. We certainly are aware that we have these abilities, or at least that we 
seem to have them. We can, for example orient our attention at will, overcome a passion, or choose 
between several available options. What separates Reid from Hume is the question as to whether or 
not these abilities defy a naturalistic explanation.  
It would be a mistake, I think, to attribute any considerable naivety to either side of this debate. 
Reid and Hume should each be read as responding, in different ways, to one of the most difficult 
and important questions of Eighteenth Century philosophy, and both parties are quite aware of the 
growing tension between the new mechanical philosophy and the traditional metaphysics. 
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Reid, for instance, maintained that the soul was a simple spiritual substance, but he was nonetheless 
quite prepared to glory in the progress of the new naturalistic Newtonian psychology. As Martin 
and Barresi put it: 
Reid was, if anything, more enthused and expansive about the empirical parts of his account 
[of the mind] than about its metaphysically spiritual underpinnings.
249
 
Others too felt the tension between the science and the metaphysics. Shaftesbury, for example, 
endorsed Newtonian mechanics in that he thought the “life” of animate matter should be explained 
in terms of the “sympathizing of parts”250, and yet he remained a believer in the substantial self: 
Therefore if there be that thing you call substance, I take for granted I am one. But for 
anything further relating to this question…I am determined neither way’251 
Berkeley was more resolute about affirming the existence of the substantial mind. Indeed, in his 
Three Dialogues he first has Hylas anticipate Hume’s criticism of substance: 
…it seems that, according to your own way of thinking…it should follow that you are only a 
system of floating ideas without any substance to support them. Words are not to be used 
without a meaning. And as there is no more meaning in spiritual substance than in material 
substance, the one is to be exploded as well as the other.
252
 
And then has Philonous outright reject it: 
How often must I repeat that I know or am conscious of my own being, and that I myself am 
not my ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle that perceives, knows, wills, 
and operates about ideas.
253
 
Nonetheless, Berkeley made much use of the empirical psychology. It was his weapon against 
Locke’s account of primary qualities.  
Indeed, so common was this felt tension that even the 18
th
 century poets weigh in. Concerning the 
“Nature and State of Man”, Alexander Pope seems unsure whether a human is something spiritual 
that “acts” or something natural that “rests”: 
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He hangs between, in doubt to act or rest;  
In doubt to deem himself a God or Beast
254
 
The point I am trying to make is only that Hume’s rejection of the substantial self may well be the 
logical conclusion of an 18
th
 century trend towards providing a wholly naturalistic explanation of 
the mind, but it is not obvious that the naturalistic attitude should be taken so far. Just because many 
of the features of the world and the mind can be explained in mechanistic terms, doesn’t mean that 
every feature must be explainable in these terms. As Reid put it: 
A traveller of good judgment may mistake his way, and be unawares led into a wrong track; 
and while the road is fair before him, he may go on without suspicion and be followed by 
others; but when it ends in a coal-pit, it requires no great judgment to know that he hath 
gone wrong, nor perhaps to find out what misled him.
255
 
It is somewhat tempting, I think, for some of us to read Hume’s naturalistic science of the mind as if 
he were presenting the straightforward implications of empiricism to a group of stubborn and 
dogmatic metaphysicians who have simply refused to extend the plain implications of empiricism to 
the human mind. Hume’s ironic tone when he discusses the self makes this reading all the more 
tempting: 
If anyone upon serious and unprejudic’d reflexion, thinks he has a different notion of 
himself, I must confess I can reason no longer with him… But setting aside some 
metaphysicians of this kind, I may venture to affirm of the rest of mankind, that they are 
nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions... (T, 252) 
But, of course, we should avoid the temptation to read Hume this way. Hume’s contemporaries 
were quite familiar with the naturalistic principles that Hume emphasises. The resistance we find 
from those in the period must not be understood in terms of any petty dogmatism, but in terms of 
the commonly held view in the period that a naturalistic account of the mind, such as Hume’s could 
not possibly explain all the facts that needs explaining. As Berkeley put it: “How often must I 
repeat” that I am not only a collection of my ideas, but I am a thing that “thinks” and “perceives” 
and “knows” and “wills”?256  
What the philosophers of the Eighteenth Century well understood is that a theory should be judged 
in accordance with how well it explains the observable phenomena. It is on these terms, therefore, 
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that I want to consider how adequately Hume can explain agency – the activity of the mind without 
which error is impossible to explain. In other words, how can Hume’s naturalistic account of the 
mind explain the fact that we are active creatures that make mistakes rather than passive creatures 
who merely suffer misfortunes? 
THE PASSIONS 
The overriding project of Hume’s Treatise, as we have already remarked, is to “explain the 
principles of human nature” by placing them “on a foundation almost entirely new.” (T, xx) In 
Book I Hume lays out this “new” foundation – the science of the mind – and treats of the topic in 
atomistic terms: replacing the traditional metaphysics with a discussion of individual perceptions 
and the relations between them. By the end of Book III, Hume hopes to have completed a grand 
summation of human nature at large including all of our abilities to think, act, and moralise. It is in 
Book II, on the passions, that the gap between the atomistic world of individual perceptions, and the 
familiar world of social interaction, is bridged. So, as it is now widely acknowledged
257
, it is in 
Book II that we find Hume’s explanation of the self insofar as it concerns activity.  
Hume begins his account of the passions with a discussion of pride and humility. This is unusual, 
perhaps, since these passions hardly seem as important or as common place as other passions – love 
and hate, for example. But, along with sympathy, pride and humility do the most philosophical 
work, for Hume, and it is on these passions that I will focus. Indeed, it is these passions that Hume 
uses to explain how we come to have ideas of ourselves as active agents rather than mere bundled 
unities.  
Hume begins his analysis of pride and humility by observing that they are simple impressions. 
What he means is that we cannot adequately explain what these passions feel like with “a multitude 
of words.” Everyone, he thinks, knows what it is like to be proud or humble, and “everyone, of 
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himself, will be able to form a just idea of them, without any danger of mistake.” But although we 
cannot describe them further with a multitude of words, Hume says that we can explain pride and 
humility in terms of the “circumstances” that “attend them.” (T, 277) In other words, we can 
explain them in terms of their functional role in the mind. As Hume tells us later, 
…‘tis not the present sensation or momentary pain or pleasure, which determines the 
character of any passion, but the general bent or tendency of it from the beginning to the 
end. (T, 384-5)
258
 
And Hume sets about explaining the “general bent” of pride. In order for us to feel pride, Hume lists 
three prerequisites that must be met. Firstly, we must have an idea of some desirable thing – the 
thing we are proud of. Secondly, we must have an idea of a particular quality (or set of qualities) by 
virtue of which the thing we are proud of is worth taking pride in. Thirdly, we must have an idea of 
the self to whom the object is related in a relevant manner. So, to take an example, we might have 
an idea of a house that we considered desirable in light of its fine architecture or spacious interior, 
and is related to the self by ownership or craftsmanship. It is only when these three conditions are 
satisfied that we feel the passion we call ‘pride’. Humility is the opposite of pride, but the process is 
essentially the same. Humility involves having an idea of the self as related to some object with 
undesirable qualities – for example, being the owner of a termite-ridden cottage. 
Of course, it’s a relative matter whether any particular object is worthy of pride – a termite-ridden 
cottage is better than a leaky tent, and both are better than sleeping outside in the rain. I may show-
off my tiny flat to friends with some measure of pride, but I would not be similarly proud if the 
Queen came to stay. The objects of pride are thus relative to one’s history, one’s preferences, and 
one’s peers – and Hume acknowledges this.  
Hence we form a notion of different ranks of men, suitable to the power or riches they are 
possest of. (T, 293) 
It is our customs that inform our ideas about which objects are desirable. Indeed, Hume says that if 
an alien, “full-grown, and of the same nature with ourselves, were on a sudden transported into our 
world,” he would not feel pride in the same objects that we do. (T, 293) True enough.  
But the most philosophically interesting feature of Hume’s conception of pride, at least for our 
purposes, is that pride orients attention on the self as being an agent.  
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‘Pride and humility, being once rais’d, immediately turn our attention to ourself, and regard 
that as their ultimate and final object…’ (T, 279) 
Indeed, says Hume, no one can doubt that pride and humility have this effect, for we frequently 
observe “the constancy and steadiness of [their] operations.” 
‘Tis always self, which is the object of pride and humility; and whenever the passions look 
beyond, ‘tis still with a view to ourselves, nor can any person or object otherwise have any 
influence on upon us. (T, 280) 
“Here at last the view always rests, when we are actuated by either of these passions; nor 
can we, in that situation of mind, ever lose sight of this object”. (T, 286) 
This orienting of attention on the self is the effect of pride, and Hume distinguishes it from the 
cause of pride (that is: the object of which we are proud.) It is this distinction that Hume has in 
mind when he says that Pride is,  
…a passion plac’d betwixt two ideas, of which one produces it, and the other is produc’d by 
it,” (T, 278) 
But, in fact, as Hume also acknowledges, both the cause and the effect of pride involve an idea of 
the self. Beauty, for example, is a quality that may be the cause of pride, but it can only have this 
effect if the beauty is already conceived as being related to the self.  
Beauty, consider’d merely as such, unless plac’d upon something related to us, never 
produces any pride or vanity…(T, 279)  
What we have, then, in pride, is a passion that requires an idea of the self, but also gives rise to an 
idea of the self. How can we explain this? What are these ideas and what is their relationship? 
DO WE HAVE DIFFERENT KINDS OF IDEAS OF THE SELF? 
One possibility is that the idea of the self that appears in Hume’s discussion of the passions is 
different from the idea of the bundle that Hume proposed in Book I.
259
 After all, Hume does say 
that: 
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…we must distinguish betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, 
and as it regards our passions or the concern we take in ourselves.  
(T, 253) 
Some commentators have taken this as evidence that Hume intends the bundle theory of Book I to 
explain only the former of these two conceptions, and that what we find in Book II is a completely 
different idea of ourselves.
260
 One virtue of this reading is that it avoids what might otherwise 
appear to be a contradiction. We remember that In Book I Hume rejected the view of those 
philosophers: 
…who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious of what we call our self; that we 
feel its existence and its continuance in existence; and are certain, beyond the evidence of a 
demonstration, both of its perfect identity and simplicity… (T, 251) 
And yet in Book II he tells us: 
’Tis evident, that the idea, or rather impression of ourselves, is always intimately present 
with us, and that our consciousness gives us so lively a conception of our own person, that 
’tis not possible to imagine, that any thing can in this particular go beyond it. (T, 17-18) 
If the idea of the self in this second passage is different from the idea of the self in the first passage, 
then there is no problem with this view. But if they are the same idea, then it appears we may have a 
contradiction, and some commentators have accused Hume of just that. Kemp Smith, for example, 
describes Hume’s “uneasy awareness of the contradiction,” and Passmore says:  
There are…difficulties…in Hume’s theory of pride and humility. He is certainly not 
entitled, for example, to talk of an ‘idea of ourselves’…261 
But I do not think there is any such contradiction, nor do I think that Hume’s conception of the self 
in the passions is different in kind from the self that appears in Book I. In fact, far from rejecting the 
bundle theory of the self in Book II, I think it contains the largest part of Hume’s explanation about 
how our idea of the bundle works.  
To begin with, the charge against Hume of outright contradiction is easily dismissed. When, in 
Book I, Hume derides the metaphysicians “who imagine we are every moment intimately conscious 
of what we call our self”, it is plain from the context that Hume is rejecting specifically the 
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substantial theory of the self. The metaphysicians had supposed that we are always conscious of an 
underlying substantial unity ‘behind’ our perceptions; Hume denies that we are ever conscious of 
any such thing. Then, in Book II, Hume goes on to say that we nonetheless have an “idea, or rather 
impression of ourselves,” and that it “is always intimately present with us.” But there is no good 
reason to read Hume as now accepting what he earlier rejected. That would be very uncharitable. It 
is more charitable, and indeed more natural, to suppose that Hume held all of the following 
doctrines, which are not contradictory. 
(1) We have no of idea of the self as a substance 
(2) A fortiori, we are not “always conscious” of the presence of a substantial self 
(3) Nonetheless, we have an idea of the self (to be defined in other terms) 
(4) We are always (or at least very often) conscious of this idea of the self 
 
What about the passage in which Hume says we must distinguish between two ideas of the self? 
Here it is in context: 
What then gives us so great a propension to ascribe an identity to these successive 
perceptions, and to suppose ourselves possest of an invariable and uninterrupted existence 
throu’ the whole course of our lives? In order to answer this question, we must distinguish 
betwixt personal identity, as it regards our thought or imagination, and as it regards our 
passions or the concern we take in ourselves. The first is our present subject. (T, 253) 
Hume is not proposing two radically different conceptions of the self. He is instead making a point 
about our having two different reasons for ascribing identity to the bundled self as it changes over 
time. There is one reason that involves the understanding (discussed in Book I), and another that 
involves the passions (discussed in Book II). In the first case, we ascribe the identity because certain 
relations – resemblance and causation262 – make us mistake the sequence of distinct perceptions for 
a unity. In the second case, we ascribe the identity because, for reasons we will discuss in a 
moment, the passions cause us to do so – they cause us to have a concern for that bundled unity. In 
an excellent paper on Hume’s conception of the self, Asa Carlson makes exactly this point about 
Hume having the two explanations. Carlson writes:  
In Book 1, Hume explains how thought or imagination makes us believe in a continuous 
self, and in Book 2, he explains how the passions do the same thing. The words “The first is 
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our present subject...” signals Hume’s intention to discuss the second topic later on, as we 
know he did. 
Carlson then goes on to say that this second topic is addressed by Hume in the following passage in 
which reiterates Hume’s doctrine of associationism in the argot of the passions:  
All resembling impressions are connected together and no sooner one arises than the rest 
immediately follow. Grief and disappointment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to 
malice, and malice to grief again, till the whole circle be compleated. In like manner our 
temper, when elevated with joy, naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courage, 
pride, and the other resembling affections. (T, 283) 
 
Carlson is right that these associative principles are part of what causes us to ascribe a unity to the 
bundled mind, but there is more to say. I think that Hume’s discussion of the passions explain the 
important part of how we form an idea of the self: they explain how it is we come to think of 
ourselves as active agents. This explanation involves, as Hume says, “the concern we take in 
ourselves.” (T, 253)  
I should add, before I go on, that in what follows I may ascribe to Hume a view that is not explicitly 
stated in his own text. What I do claim is that the following reading is consistent with what Hume 
said. My primary concern is to decide whether Hume could have defended a naturalistic conception 
of human agency. For my purpose, this is more important than the question of whether or not Hume 
did in fact defend it.  
HOW THE IDEA OF THE AGENT IS CREATED BY A PASSIONATE SPIRAL 
According to Hume, having a concern for one’s self somehow gives rise to the idea of one’s self. 
How is this possible? Is that not putting the cart before the horse? Surely having a concern for one’s 
self is possible only on the condition that we already have an idea of ourselves. This would appear 
objectionably circular. 
The correct reply is that the Humean process by which we come to think of ourselves as agents is 
not really a circle, but a spiral. It is true that having a concern for one’s self presupposes that we 
already have some idea of what it is to be a self. But this presupposed idea is less complex than the 
idea of the self that emerges after the passions have done their work. 
This is how I read Hume’s account of the self as it spans two books: the associative principles of 
Book I explain how it is we come to imagine a bundled unity out of many distinct perceptions. A 
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close relation is taken for an identity because the associative principles of the mind are apt to do 
such things. Later, in Book II, Hume observes, (still on empirical grounds,) that many of our 
passions tend to have certain effects on the way the bundle is considered. They orient attention to 
some perceptions rather than others. They cause us to draw a psychological distinction between 
perceptions that appear to be tightly within the bundle and those that seem to be outside it or only 
loosely connected to it. The passions also connect the bundle in terms of feelings – desire, pride, 
and sympathy, for example. These feelings have certain functional effects and one of these effects is 
that they give rise to notions of power, activity, and voluntary action.  
I am conscious that this is a long and winding road to the conclusion I want to draw from this 
chapter: that on Humean terms we can make sense of the normativity of error. But I think it is the 
only road home. The philosophical problem under discussion is this: how can a descriptive account 
of a bundled self possibly account for the agency implicit in error. In order to answer this problem, 
it is necessary to explain just how complicated the bundle becomes after we have considered the 
effects of the passions. Deborah Brown once suggested to me the metaphor of a tornado, and I think 
it is a good one. We should not picture Hume’s bundled self as a small collection of inactive 
perceptions. The mind, for Hume, is a radically complicated whirlwind of perceptions that double-
back on each other and influence each other in countless ways. We should take seriously Hume’s 
insistence that the mind is extremely convoluted:  
… [The perceptions] succeed one another with an inconceivable rapidity and are in 
perpetual flux and movement. (T, 252) 
 
…[S]everal perceptions successively make their appearance; pass, re-pass, glide away, and 
mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. (T, 253) 
With these thoughts in mind, we are in a position to better understand Hume’s claim that the 
passions foster our idea of the self as agent. Recall that pride is caused by having an idea of a 
desirable object that is related to the self, and that it has the effect of focusing our attention on the 
self. I think this is an example of a relatively simple idea of the self being converted into a richer, 
more complex idea of the self via a passion. It is an example of an associative process in which 
pride gives rise to thought of the self as an active agent, rather than a mere unity.  
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How does this work? Note that the first idea of the self that is involved in pride – the idea that is the 
cause – need only be a relatively simple idea263. The cause of pride requires only that we think of a 
desirable object as being closely related to the bundle that we mistake for a unity. All of this can be 
explained in terms of the principles of association outlined in Book I. But then Hume goes on to 
observe that having this (relatively simple) idea not only causes us to experience a certain feeling 
(called “pride”), but also tends to have the functional effect of focusing attention on the nexus of 
perceptions that comprise the self. It makes us “think of our own qualities and circumstances.” (T, 
287) What results is not merely an idea of the self as a unity, but an idea of a unity considered in 
light of its ability to feel emotions and to be related, emotionally, to other objects. As Ainsley puts 
it, the idea of the self that is caused by pride is “specially characterised” by the thing to which it is 
related. 
…we think of ourselves as specially characterized by whatever it is that causes that pride; 
pride in our house leads us to think of ourselves as homeowners, pride in our virtue leads us 
to think of ourselves as virtuous.
264
  
Pride not only focuses our attention on the self, but “…carries with it the structure and train of 
perceptions accompanying the occurrence of the passion.”265 Indeed, for these reasons Amy 
Schmitter argues that once the passions have done their work, the Humean conception of the self is 
no longer simply an “I” that thinks, but is instead a “full-blooded self”: 
…a self outfitted with its qualities, possessions, relations, likes and dislikes – it is a 
character, or personality.
266
  
This is right, I think. And as Brown and I have argued elsewhere
267, Hume’s pride can therefore be 
understood as an essentially unifying experience of “mineness”. Pride presupposes a certain 
conception of the self, but it does not presuppose a conception of the self as agent. Rather, pride 
constitutes our conception of agency. It is the network of perceptions associated with pride that 
gives rise to the idea of the self as being the kind of thing that can take pride.  
                                                 
263
 Of course, it is still what Hume would call a “complex idea”; I am only saying that it is less complex than the idea 
that results. 
264
 Ainslie, Donald. “Scepticism About Persons in Book II of Hume’s Treatise,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 37 
(1999) p.482 
265
 Schmitter, Amy. “Making an Object of Yourself: On the Intentionality of the Passions in Hume,” Studies in the 
History of the Philosophy of Mind, 9 (2009) p. 232 
266
 Ibid. p. 236 
267
 Brown, D. & Hooper, M. “Hume’s Pride: Agency, Attention, and Individuation” (Paper presented to the 35 th Annual 
Hume Conference, Reykjavik, August 2008) 
144 
 
This, I hasten to add, is not as crazy as it may sound. As a point about the order in which we 
humans acquire concepts, I think it is probably right. When you and I come to think of ourselves as 
agents this really does require a more abstract level of thinking than we ordinarily engage in. In 
day-to-day life we do not tend to think of ourselves this obtusely: we desire, act, take pride, love, 
and hate: we just do these things rather than think of ourselves as the agents that do them. This is 
also the order in which children acquire concepts and abilities: children are plainly capable of 
emotional experiences and actions before they are capable of thinking about themselves, abstractly, 
as agents of those actions.
268
  
Now, it is true that once we have the idea of the agent, we often regard it as something prior to the 
passions. Hume can allow this. Although the idea of the agent was originally the effect of pride, it 
can, once in place, also give rise to pride. This fact harmonizes with the spiral-shaped process I 
have been describing. Once we have the richer idea of the self as agent, the cause of pride need no 
longer involve a simple idea of the self as a mere “I” that is related to a desirable object. Pride can 
now take as its cause the idea of an agent being closely related to a desirable object. Perhaps, when 
this happens, the effect on attention is even stronger. If the cause of pride is already the idea of a 
complex agent being related to something desirable, then possibly the resulting fixation on the self 
will be even stronger than it would be otherwise. This is plausible, I think, since the perceived 
relationship of ownership or craftsmanship that causes pride is likely to be more vivacious in such a 
case. Regardless, what is clear is that Hume can happily allow that we do often think of agents as 
being prior to their passions and actions. He will only insist that, metaphysically speaking, this 
belief is ultimately a fiction. (T, 259) 
To be more accurate, I should say that pride only has the self-synthesizing effects I have been 
describing in collaboration with other passions. For example, Hume says that it is desire, rather than 
pride, that leads directly to action. In fact, all of our emotions are linked together in a very complex 
relationship. 
…[A] suit of fine cloaths produces pleasure from their beauty; and this pleasure produces 
the direct passions, or the impressions of volition and desire. Again when these cloaths are 
consider’d as belonging to ourself, the double relation conveys to the us the sentiment of 
pride, which is an indirect passion; and the pleasure , which attends that passion, returns 
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back to the direct affections, and gives new force to our desire or volition, joy or hope. (T, 
439)
269
 
What makes pride so important – the reason I have emphasised it – is not that it gives rise to action, 
but that it accounts for our having an idea of the self as the kind of thing that can act. It gives rise 
to, and focuses our attention on, the self as agent. It also sustains this idea of the agent (T, 286), and 
thus redirects the attention from desirable things themselves to the nexus of impulses that desire 
them. In this way, pride is the original cause of a process that makes us think of ourselves as 
different from mere wantons, for it ensures that our actions are not just direct reactions to 
pleasurable or painful stimuli, but are instead the product of a complicated and conscious internal 
process – a process we might think of as deliberation.  
For Hume, there is only a fairly short step from thinking of ourselves as agents, to thinking of 
others as agents as well. This occurs, he explains, through the mechanism of sympathy by which we 
are led to experience the passions of others. 
No quality of human nature is more remarkable…than that propensity we have to 
sympathize with others, and to receive by communication their inclinations and 
sentiments… (T, 316) 
He describes this sympathetic “communication” of passions as a two stage process. At first, the 
feelings of others are known only by their effects, 
…and by those external signs in the countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of 
it. (T, 317) 
But having observed these effects, the idea gives rise to an impression of reflection, and by 
acquiring vivacity, produces an “equal” emotion in ourselves. 
The idea is presently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of force and 
vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce and equal emotion, as any 
original affection. (T, 317) 
Just what it means for “communication” to occur between two bundles of perceptions is somewhat 
mysterious. By this stage in the Treatise Hume has given up talking about selves as “bundles” and 
                                                 
269
 In fact, Hume says that the passions often merge and mingle together. He compares complex mixtures of passions in 
the mind to the way that colours can be blended together: “…impressions and passions are susceptible of an entire 
union; and, like colours, may be blended so perfectly together, that each of them may lose itself.” (T, 366)  
146 
 
adopted a more common and convenient mode of speaking
270
, so we can only speculate about what 
Hume might have said. Perhaps he could have provided an account that goes something like this: 
I begin by having an idea of certain bodily effects, and I think of these bodily effects as belonging 
to someone else. (That is: the effects are not conceived as being tightly connected to my own 
bundle, but they are tightly connected to my complex idea of another object – a person.) This idea is 
then followed by an impression of reflection – some passion or other. I think of the two perceptions 
as being related, because I have observed similar successions (of ideas and impressions) in the past. 
By custom, my present impression is naturally associated with the preceding idea of the other 
person’s observable qualities. And because I associate it in this way, I come to think of the passion 
(that I am experiencing) as somehow belonging to the person whose bodily effects I observe. 
This is a complicated account of sympathy, but I worry that it is not yet complicated enough. It is 
extremely difficult to cash-out the passionate activities of the mind in the language of “bundles”, 
and this, perhaps, is why Hume, in Book II, gave up trying. But I see no obvious reason to suppose 
that Hume’s account of sympathy must be inconsistent with his rejection of the substantial mind. 
Hume only needs it to be possible that by some natural process we come to experience an emotion 
that we think of as being caused by the observable properties of another person – a person who we 
then come to think of as experiencing that very same emotion. I do not see any reason why this 
shouldn’t, in principle, be explainable in Hume’s naturalistic terms. 
If that is right, and Hume can have his account of sympathy as I think, then he can certainly use it to 
explain how we come to think of other people as agents. As Hume says, sympathy naturally leads 
us to think of humans as being fundamentally the same. 
Now ‘tis obvious, that nature has preserved a great resemblance among all human creatures, 
and that we never remark and passion or principle in others, of which, of some degree or 
other, we find a parallel in ourselves. The case is the same with the fabric of the mind, as 
with that of the body. (T, 318) 
 
Once the idea of the self as agent is produced by the passionate spiral, sympathy will naturally lead 
us to think of others in just the same way.
271
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MISTAKES, MISFORTUNES & AGENCY 
Finally, we are in a position to return to the question of how Hume can make sense of the activity 
implicit in error. In line with what we have observed, it is obvious that Hume cannot help himself to 
a sharp metaphysical difference between actions that involve agency and actions that do not. He 
will instead have a spectrum, and it will be a spectrum that ranks actions in terms of how deliberate 
we think they are.
272
 “Deliberation” itself requires an explanation in Humean terms, and I think it 
must be explained in terms of the extent to which the causal history of an action is related to ideas 
of the self as an agent. And this, in turn, will be determined by the extent to which the ideas are 
related to feelings of pride and humility. For Hume, to deliberately pursue one course of action 
rather than another is just to be aware of an internal process which leads us to procure for ourselves 
objects that are (or have been in the past) the sources of pride. When we deliberately act against a 
strong impulse, or overcome a strong desire, Hume need not explain this in terms of the heroic 
effort
273
 of an irreducible faculty of the will. Instead, he can explain it as the result of an even 
stronger passion – pride – one which often trumps the others, grips the attention on the self, and 
makes the bundle focus on itself as an enduring and interested thing: as the kind of thing that can 
procure for itself lasting sources of pleasure that will sustain the pleasurable feeling longer than any 
fleeting object of desire. As Pall Ardal observes, “Hume does not deny that the word “will” has a 
meaning: there certainly is such an idea.”274 And indeed, Hume explains the will in terms of how 
we feel when we are consciously aware of our own endogenous processes: 
  
I desire it may be observed, that, by the will, I mean nothing but the internal impression we 
feel, and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or 
new perception of our mind. (T, 399)
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One of the criticisms of Hume’s rejection of active powers is that it must mean that the mind is a 
purely responsive system – a deterministic system. But, as we have discussed, this criticism should 
be mitigated by the fact that a passive system is not necessarily dispassionate. Hume allows that 
                                                                                                                                                                  
countrymen, than with foreigners.” (T, 581) He therefore allows that we can think of some people as having more 
agency than others. This may also allow him a natural explanation, (though, of course, not a justification) of racism in 
those are who unable to feel sympathy for others who exhibit (superficially) different “external signs” of their passions.  
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there is a complex internal and emotional process that underlies decision-making. Our actions are 
not always just brute reactions to strong desires. They are instead, in cases of pride, the outcome of 
a complicated and passionate endogenous process. 
For these reasons, I think that Hume must maintain that the extent to which we think of someone as 
having made a mistake (rather than suffered a misfortune) will be determined by the extent to which 
we think of them as an agent in respect to their error – that is, to the extent that we think of them as 
having engaged in a certain kind of endogenous process of conscious deliberation. This criterion 
will be vague, but vagueness may well be desirable in this case. Indeed, precisely because Hume’s 
account of agency is vague, it may for that reason better capture our intuitions about what it is to 
make an error. In law, for example, we often think of culpability as involving a scale or continuum: 
one who stands accused is considered less or more blameworthy in proportion to how we think of 
them as an agent in respect to their crime. Perhaps the accused man’s agency, for instance, was 
inhibited by a disability, or else by alcohol or temporary insanity. Hume’ account of agency allows 
us to see these blurry lines as blurry. Recall, for example, Hume’s illustration of the man, 
“…who being hung from a high tower in a cage of iron cannot forbear trembling, when he 
surveys the precipice below him, tho’ he knows himself to be perfectly secure from falling.” 
(T, 148) 
There is an obvious sense in which we can think of this man’s fear as involving a kind of error. 
After all, the man “knows himself” to be safe, and yet he trembles. We have no reason to suppose he 
is not an agent like the rest of us, and to this extent we might think of him as being responsible for 
that error. And yet there are clearly mitigating circumstances: after all, he is suspended high above 
the ground, and Hume rightly allows that in these predicaments it is common that the “imagination 
runs away with its objects”. The man loses sight of his own agency because his attention is focused 
directly on the objects of the passions themselves. “The circumstances of depth and descent strike 
strongly upon him.” (T, 148) The man experiences a lack of pride (in Hume’s sense of the word); he 
experiences himself as the subject of things and not as the agent of things. 
By combining these explanations, Hume can make sense of what is surely our intuitive response to 
the imagined scenario of the man in the cage. The man is making an error in one sense, since he is 
an agent who “knows” that he is safe. But his error is very understandable given what we know 
about the force of the direct passions that overcome us in that sort of scenario.   
As we noted earlier, we cannot definitively decide the adequacy of Hume’s descriptive account of 
agency and error without deciding the question of freewill. But perhaps it is point in favour of the 
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Humean account that it can remain agnostic about this metaphysical question. On Hume’s view, it 
may be the case that for every agent there is a substance with active powers that underlies it. But 
Hume’s project concerning the mind can be read an attempt show how we might explain the 
concept of agency, without presupposing the mysterious metaphysics.  
It is still unclear how far Hume, or anyone, could take this naturalistic explanation of mental 
activity. Contemporary psychologists often write as if a naturalistic account must be the correct 
account. Julian Baggini, for example, in a passage typical of some popular literature, says of own 
view and (what he takes to be) Hume’s view: 
The trick is to create something which has a strong sense of unity and singleness from what 
is actually a messy, fragmented sequence of experiences and memories… The point is that 
the trick works. It’s like a mechanic’s trick and not a magician’s trick.276 
I am not so certain. What is true is that if the naturalistic account is the correct one, then it must be 
true that the “trick” somehow works: it is a brute fact that we think of ourselves as unified agents, 
and if there is no metaphysical basis for this fact, then a naturalistic explanation must be along the 
right lines. But without begging that crucial question, can we really be so sure that Hume and his 
followers are not just contriving to pull a metaphysical rabbit from a naturalistic hat? The traditional 
conception of the self as an active substance may be mysterious, but it is a lot to give up. Hume’s 
meagre box of explanatory tools includes only what can be observed about naturally occurring 
perceptions. Somehow, from this impassive set, he must be able to explain, at least in principle, 
everything there is to say about activity, agency, normativity, and error. He must explain why it is 
we blame people for their errors, and why we feel right to do so. He must explain, or explain away, 
the appearance of a free will. I have no problem believing that marvellously complex emergent 
effects can result from simple and non-intentional processes. My computer, for instance, is a 
wondrously complex thing, and often appears to have a mind of its own, but I do not really find it 
difficult to believe that its complexity is only the emergent effect of binary coding, circuitry and 
electricity, plastics and metals. But it is certainly more difficult to believe that the plainly 
observable facts about human agency – facts that appear so irreducibly active and voluntary – could 
be wholly explained by describing the operation of impassive perceptions.  
The reason I list all those doubts is to avoid overstating my case. What I have argued is that Hume’s 
naturalistic account of error as it involves activity is rich and fruitful – more so than is commonly 
acknowledged. We saw that Berkeley argued against rejection of the traditional self by insisting that 
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we are creatures who act and will and operate.
277
 But if we think this is a criticism of Hume, then 
the criticism falls somewhat flat, because Hume simply agrees. He agrees, that is, that we think of 
ourselves as agents who are active and voluntary, agrees that those facts are there to be explained, 
and indeed sets about trying to explain them. The trouble, for Hume, is that beyond the 
psychological facts about perceptions there is nothing more we can say about the mind. But what I 
have tried to demonstrate is that this does not pose a fatal limitation. On Hume’s view the 
psychological explanation can explain a good deal. Even on his sceptical terms, Hume can account 
for many of the ways in which our conception of error is inextricably tied to a conception of activity 
because he provides an account of how it is we come to think of people as agents rather than merely 
as passive bundles of perceptions. 
 
  
                                                 
277
 Berkeley, G. Principles, Dialogues, and Philosophical Correspondence (Indianapolis: Bobbs- 
Merrill Company, 1734 / 1965) p.178 
151 
 
CHAPTER SIX: CERTAINTY AND ERROR 
 
On Hume’s view, how pervasive is the possibility of error? I propose to tackle this question by 
discussing Hume’s conception of certainty, for where there is certainty there can be no error. Of 
course, certainty only precludes error as long as the phrase “to be certain” requires not merely a 
very strong belief, but also a belief that is indubitably true. There is another familiar sense of 
“certainty” in which it’s quite possible to be certain and yet mistaken. Wittgenstein said: 
‘I know’ seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it 
as a fact. One always forgets the expression ‘I thought I knew.’278 
And we could say the same about certainty. Being certain and yet wrong is a grievous but familiar 
sort of error. We sympathise with the quip attributed to Moliere: that “It infuriates me to be wrong 
when I know I’m right.” Surely all of us have found ourselves convinced of something that turned 
out to be false. What “certainty” refers to in these latter cases is just a kind of psychological state – 
conviction, we might call it. 
But the kind of certainty I want to consider here is not that psychological sense of certainty 
discussed above, but another sense of certainty – an epistemological sense in which certainty is 
inextricably tied to truth. The question I want to ask is: does Hume think that there are any beliefs 
about which we could not possibly be mistaken? It is in this sense of certainty that I want to ask if 
there are any beliefs that are immune to error: are there any beliefs that are utterly indubitable?  
RELATIONS OF IDEAS AND MATTERS OF FACT 
If looking for certainty in Hume’s epistemology, a likely place to start is with the class of 
perceptions Hume calls “Relations of Ideas”.  
All the objects of human reason or enquiry may naturally be divided into two kinds, to wit, 
Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. Of the first kind are the sciences of Geometry, 
Algebra, and Arithmetic; and in short, every affirmation, which is either intuitively or 
demonstratively certain. (E, 25) 
Relations of Ideas are supposed to be known by the “mere operation of thought, without 
dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.” The examples Hume lists are what Kant 
later called a priori knowledge: the kind of facts that can be known without reference to experience. 
“That three times five is equal to the half of thirty,” Hume explains, is a truth that does not depend 
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on the way the world is. Its truth is self-evident and eternal; such statements “forever retain their 
certainty and evidence.”  
Distinct from Relations of Ideas, are what Hume calls “Matters of Fact”. These are ideas that 
express facts about the objects of experience. Hume gives an example of our belief that the sun will 
rise tomorrow. Whether or not this belief is true depends on the world being a particular way. If the 
sun rises tomorrow, it will turn out to be true; if not, it will turn out to be false. But our belief about 
the sun is not the kind of thing that could be true by definition. We cannot decide the matter by the 
“mere operation of thought”. Rather, as Hume says, Matters of Fact are “not ascertained in the same 
manner” as Relations of Ideas, “nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature 
with the forgoing. The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible.” The belief that the sun will 
not rise tomorrow “implies no contradiction.” (E, 26) 
Having noted this distinction it may seem a straightforward matter to decide what Hume thinks 
about certainty. After all, he has said explicitly that Relations of Ideas are “intuitively or 
demonstratively certain” and that Matters of Fact are never certain (in the strictest sense) since the 
opposite of a Matter of Fact is always possible. But, in fact, Hume’s considered treatment of 
certainty is far more complicated than this. To see why, we need to examine his more extensive 
treatment of the topic as it appears in the Treatise. 
KNOWLEDGE AND RELATIONS 
In Part iii, Section I of the first book of the Treatise, Hume sets about explaining the limits of 
knowledge. He uses “knowledge” in a variety of senses, but sometimes, when it is used in a narrow 
sense, it is synonymous with “certainty”. Hume first explains that a conception of knowledge relies 
on a conception of relations, and says that there are seven kinds of philosophical relation: 
resemblance, contrariety, proportions in quantity or number, degrees in any quality, relations of 
time and space, identity, and causation. (T, 14-15) This list, he then divides into two groups. The 
first four are said to “depend entirely on the ideas which we compare together”. The latter three are 
“such as may be changed without any change in the ideas.” So, for example:  
‘Tis from the idea of a triangle that we discover the relation of equality, which its three 
angles bear to two right ones; and this relation is invariable as long as our idea remains the 
same. (T, 69) 
But, by contrast, the 
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...contiguity and distance betwixt two objects may be changed without any change on the 
objects themselves or on their ideas... (T, 69) 
For Hume, only relations of the first kind, “can be the objects of knowledge and certainty.” (T, 70) 
Of the four relations that involve certainty, three of them – resemblance, contrariety, and degrees in 
quality – are said to fall “more properly under the province of intuition than demonstration.” (T, 70) 
What Hume means is that these three relations are immediately evident. He admits that it is 
sometimes “impossible to judge exactly of the degrees of any quality...when the difference between 
them is very small.” But, nonetheless, “when the difference is considerable” it is “easy to decide.” 
“And this decision we always pronounce at first sight, without any enquiry or reasoning.” (T, 70 
Emphasis added)  
 It is strange that Hume admits that we sometimes make errors about these relations when the 
difference in question is very small. Of course, he’s right to say that we do make these mistakes. 
But how can he concede this given that, in the very same paragraph, he has said that these relations 
involve a certainty that is immediate and intuitive? Probably the answer is that these relations only 
sometimes involve certainty. Hume does after all qualify his claim about these relations by saying 
that they “can be the objects of knowledge.” (T, 70 emphasis added) Perhaps certainty is only to be 
had if the relation is sufficiently obvious. But in that case it should be fair to ask: how obvious does 
an intuition need to be to constitute certainty? The question is a bit petty, perhaps – “how obvious is 
obvious?” – but the fact that there is a question at all reveals that certainty must be, for Hume, a 
matter of degree. There must be some threshold, vague or otherwise, after which a “fairly sure” 
belief becomes a “certain” one.279 As it happens, this is Hume’s more fully worked-out final 
position, as we will see shortly: that all knowledge, even “certainty”, resolves into probability. But 
this is a far cry from the neat distinction, earlier proposed, between Relations of Ideas that are 
certain, and Matters of Fact that are not. It is also a far cry from all usual philosophical usage of the 
word “certainty”. When Descartes, for example, is searching for something certain in his 
Meditations, nobody supposes that he is only looking for something “fairly obvious”. Even 
“extremely obvious” wouldn’t do. Strictly, something that is only “quite certain” isn’t really 
“certain” at all.  
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The problem gets even more complicated when Hume comes to discuss the relation he calls 
proportion in quantity or number. This too can be the object of knowledge or certainty. But unlike 
the former three relations of the same kind, this one isn’t always intuitive. Sometimes, Hume 
allows, we can “proceed after the same manner...and might at one view observe a superiority or 
inferiority betwixt any numbers, or figures...” But in other cases, if the proportion of quantity is not 
obvious, we must “proceed in a more artificial manner” (T, 70) – namely, mathematics.  
GEOMETRY AND CERTAINTY 
Within mathematics, another distinction is drawn. Algebra and arithmetic are said to involve 
certainty in a way that geometry cannot. Again, this is an odd thing for Hume to say, since his chief 
example at the beginning of the section which was supposed to exemplify a relation that involves 
certainty, is a geometrical one: 
‘Tis from the idea of a triangle, that we discover the relation of equality, which its three 
angles bear to two right ones; and this relation is invariable, as long as our idea remains the 
same. (T, 69) 
Now, however, just a page later, we find that geometry – “the art by which we fix the proportions of 
figures” – concerns only “the general appearance of the objects” and cannot capture their 
“prodigious minuteness”. (T, 70-1)  
Our ideas seem to give a perfect assurance, that no two right lines can have a common 
segment; but if we consider these ideas, we shall find, that they always suppose a sensible 
inclination of the two lines, and that where the angle they form is extremely small, we have 
no standard of right line so precise, as to assure us of the truth of this proposition. (T, 71) 
Our knowledge about geometry, then, is once again a matter of degree. At one end of the spectrum: 
it is “impossible for the eye280 to determine the angles of a chiliagon281 to be equal to 1996 right 
angles, or make any conjecture, that approaches this proportion.” At the other end of the spectrum: 
when the eye “determines that...we cannot draw more than one right line between two given points; 
its mistakes can never be any of any consequence.” In general, although geometry “falls short of 
that perfect precision and certainty, which are peculiar to arithmetic and algebra,” it nonetheless 
“excels the imperfect judgments of our sense and imagination.” The goal of geometry, Hume says, 
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is to converge on certainty, by striving to always deal with sufficiently simple appearances that “by 
reason of their simplicity, cannot lead us into any considerable error.” (T, 72) 
IMPRECISION 
It is worth asking why a complex idea should involve any more error than a simple one. What 
seems obviously true is that if shapes belong to external objects, and if we try to form a precise 
image of these shapes in our mind, we are bound to fail more often with a chiliagon than a square. 
But this is not the kind of relationship that Hume can have in mind in the present section. The 
relationships he is now considering are supposed to pertain between ideas, and not between ideas 
and external objects. They are, after all, specifically named “Relations of Ideas” and, as we have 
seen, Hume denies that we have any mechanism to usefully compare perceptions with mind-
independent objects. What Hume must mean, therefore, is that the ideas themselves involve 
imprecision. But how is this possible? If we are not allowed to compare our ideas with the external 
objects, what does it mean to have an imprecise idea? Compared to what is an idea imprecise? 
Perhaps an idea can be imprecise as compared to an impression of what which it is supposed to be a 
copy. This would harmonize nicely with Hume’s earlier concession in the very first section of the 
Treatise that “many of our complex impressions never are exactly copied in ideas.” For example, 
Hume asks: “I have seen Paris; but shall I affirm I can form such an idea of that city, as will 
perfectly represent all its streets and houses in their real and just proportions?” (T, 3) He concludes 
that he has no such idea. Why not? He does not say. Possibly complex impressions are too complex 
to be remembered.  
In any case, it is interesting that Hume suggests that we can help remove the precision in our ideas 
by “proceeding in a more artificial manner” (T, 70). Hume doesn’t explain exactly what he intends 
by the word “artificial”, but we can speculate. One option is that Hume is referring to measuring, or 
any similar mathematical practise that increases accuracy. If so, the suggestion seems plausible, 
since we know from experience that using a ruler or a protractor really does increase our faith in 
geometrical ideas. But, once again, it is important to remember that Hume is discussing relations 
between ideas, and not relationships between our ideas an external world. Hume cannot really have 
it that using a ruler provides us with a way to compare our vague ideas with the precise objects of 
the external world. Certainly a ruler provides a way to measure objects, but objects themselves, 
insofar as we experience them, are collections of ideas rather than external substances.  How, then, 
could “proceeding in a more artificial manner” can help us form clearer ideas? 
Recall that for Hume the relations that involve intuitive certainty have in common the fact that they 
are immediately self-evident. But geometry, by contrast, is imprecise because in geometry we are 
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dealing only with the “general appearances” of mental images. “[Geometry’s] original and 
fundamental principles are deriv’d merely from appearances,” and if, for example, an angle is 
“extremely small” “we have no standard of a right line so precise as to assure us of the truth” of any 
proposition. (T, 71) Imprecision, therefore, involves a lack of clarity in our ideas. It is easier to form 
a clear mental image of a triangle than a chiliagon, and it is in this sense that Hume thinks that our 
idea of a triangle is more precise (and thus more certain) than our idea of a chiliagon. But Hume 
thinks that imprecision can be somewhat alleviated by paying deliberate and careful attention to the 
idea in question.  
If its weakness render it obscure, ‘tis our business to remedy that defect as much as possible, 
by keeping the idea steady and precise.” (T, 73) 
This idea is not without merit. Let’s take an example. I have some difficulty forming a clear mental 
image of a dodecagon. I can imagine the general sort of figure that a regular twelve-sided shape 
might form, but it is not nearly so clear as the crisp mental image I can form of a square. Yet, the 
more I try, the better I get. Thinking about symmetry helps, and so does comparing a dodecagon to 
an octagon (which I can more easily imagine.) What helps most of all, is if I try to picture an 
everyday object such as an Australian fifty-cent coin that actually has 12 sides. Having engaged in 
this sort of deliberate mental effort, I find that the precision of my present idea of a dodecagon, as 
compared to my previous idea, is certainly improved. It is now seems more obvious to me – more 
intuitive – what kinds of angles the sides form. It is not only that I can now infer certain facts about 
dodecagons from the proceeding considerations, but that I can actually form a better image of one 
in my mind. This, I think, is the sense in which Hume says that we can render our ideas more 
precise (and ‘more certain’) by proceeding in an artificial manner. 
Nonetheless, Hume thinks that in some cases – the chiliagon, for example – the imprecision of my 
ideas will never be eradicated entirely, and so, for Hume, these geometrical ideas can never be the 
object of absolute certainty. 
ALGEBRA AND ARITHMETIC 
Perhaps, then, Hume might find certainty in other areas of mathematics. This idea looks hopeful 
since Hume says: 
There remain, therefore, algebra and arithmetic as the only sciences, in which we can carry 
on a chain or reasoning to any degree of intricacy, and yet preserve a perfect exactness and 
certainty. We are possest of a precise standard, by which we can judge of the equality and 
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proportion of numbers; and according as they correspond or not to that standard, we 
determine their relations without any possibility of error. (T 71) 
And as far as the present section goes, this is Hume’s conclusion: that algebra and arithmetic are 
absolutely certain. Later, however, when Hume discusses scepticism, he wavers considerably.  
There is no algebraist nor Mathematician so expert in his science, as to place entire 
confidence in any truth immediately upon his discovery of it or regard it as any thing, but a 
mere probability. (T, 180) 
Now as none will maintain, that our assurance in a long numeration exceeds probability, I 
may safely affirm, that there scarce is any proposition concerning numbers, of which we can 
have a fuller security. (T, 181) 
The inconsistency here arises as a result of Hume’s conception of the way in which knowledge 
about the relations of ideas is grasped. In the earlier section
282
 he had maintained that the difference 
between relations of ideas and matters of fact is to be found in the manner of their apprehension. 
There is something “immediate” and “intuitive” about relations of ideas – especially mathematical 
ones – that renders them certain. But Hume does not (and cannot) think of intuition as the 
Rationalists did: as a special and separate way of knowing. He cannot think of intuition as a faculty 
distinct in kind from ordinary empirical experience. Even in the early section, Hume makes this 
clear: 
‘Tis usual with mathematicians, to pretend, that those ideas, which are their objects, are of 
so refin’d and spiritual a nature, that they fall not under the conception of the fancy but must 
be comprehended by a pure and intellectual view, of which the superior faculties of the soul 
are alone capable. (T, 72) 
Indeed, Hume insists that philosophers are only fond of the “notion of some spiritual and refin’d 
perceptions; since by that means they cover many of their absurdities...” In rejecting it, Hume 
repeats again his mantra “that all our ideas are copy’d from our impressions” and insists that all 
knowledge is grounded in experience. 
Later, in Part IV, Hume shows just how far he is willing to take this conception of intuition as being 
grounded in empirical experience when he discusses the process by which a mathematician arrives 
at his conclusions: 
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Every time he runs over his proofs, his confidence encreases; but still more from the 
approbation of his friends; and is rais’d to its utmost perfection by the universal assent and 
applauses of the learned world. Now ‘tis evident that this gradual encrease of assurance is 
nothing but the addition of new probabilities, and is deriv’d from the constant union of 
causes and effects, according to past experience and observation. (T, 180-1) 
This is quite staggering. Recall that the distinguishing feature of Relations of Ideas was supposed to 
be that that they are “intuitively or demonstrably certain” and can be comprehended by the “mere 
operation of thought”. Moreover, mathematics is supposed to be the prime example of a relation 
between ideas – the most certain of Hume’s certainties. But now we find that our knowledge of 
mathematics rests, at least in some cases, upon probabilistic inferences from cause and effect, and it 
too is prone to error: 
Our reason must be consider’d as a kind of cause, of which truth is the natural effect; but 
such-a-one as by the irruption of other causes, and by the inconstancy of our mental powers, 
may frequently be prevented. By this means all knowledge degenerates into probability... (T, 
180, emphasis added) 
Incidentally, these passages are sufficient reason to reject a certain popular conception of 
philosophical history
283
 in which Hume is supposed to have suggested a neat distinction between 
analytic-necessary-a priori-truths and synthetic-contingent-a posteriori-truths, and other 
philosophers, Kant, Quine, & Kripke for example, who denied this neat distinction, are supposed to 
have refuted Hume. But from what we’ve considered, I hope it is obvious that this is wrong. Unless 
we ignore entirely the larger body of Hume’s analysis concerning belief and certainty and the 
natural principles of mind, we cannot possibly ascribe to Hume such a neat distinction. Indeed, the 
whole idea that Hume has two distinct epistemological categories is faulty. This is not to say that 
Hume has no epistemological distinctions at all; certainly he maintains that there is a useful 
distinction to be drawn between Relations of Ideas and Matters of Fact. But Hume’s distinction is a 
messy one – ultimately one of degree rather than kind. And the conception of history which paints 
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Kant, Quine, and Kripke (among others) as rejecting neat “Humean” metaphysical and 
epistemological categories is not right.
284
  
Possibly Kant is to blame for the confusion. In the Prolegomena, for example, Kant says that Hume 
cannot possibly have thought that knowledge is grounded only in experience, for then Hume would 
have been compelled to think also that the mathematical truths are “equally synthetical”.  
...[Hume] could not have based his metaphysical judgements on mere experience without 
subjecting the axioms of mathematics equally to experience, a thing which he was far too 
acute to do.
285
  
In reality, Hume did “subject” the mathematical truths to experience when he insisted that the 
mathematician’s “gradual encrease of assurance” in principles “is nothing but the addition of new 
probabilities…according to past experience and observation. (T, 180-1). Kant’s criticism is misled. 
Quine too obscures Hume’s view. In the very first section of Two Dogmas, he tells us: 
Kant’s Cleavage between analytic and synthetic truths was foreshadowed in Hume’s 
distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact, and in Leibniz’s distinction 
between truths of reason and truths of fact.
286
 
It is true that Kant’s distinction is “foreshadowed” in Hume. But when Quine then goes on to argue 
for Holism, it is obvious that he takes himself to be rejecting en bloc a distinction believed 
unanimously by Hume, Kant and Leibniz.
287
 In reality, Hume, like Quine, was deeply sceptical of 
the distinction: 
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...the necessity, which makes two times two equal to four, or three angles of a triangle equal 
to two right ones, lies only in the act of the understanding, by which we consider and 
compare these ideas. (T, 166 – emphasis added) 
Some have thought that Hume’s anticipation of Quine in this sense was merely accidental. For 
example, in an essay comparing “the psychologism of Hume and Quine”, Morton White says that, 
Hume’s psychologism leads him unwittingly to undermine his sharp distinction between 
statements about relations of ideas and statements about matters of fact whereas his 
psychologistic successors have knowingly treated so-called analytic statements in such a 
way as to undermine that distinction.
288
 
 
But I think it is uncharitable to think of Hume as ignorant on this point, given the care with which 
he treats the topic of certainty. Nonetheless, I concede that it is quite true that Hume remains uneasy 
with his conclusion that all knowledge resolves into probability, and is reluctant to adopt it 
wholeheartedly. Passmore is right to observe that “the general tenor of [Hume’s] argument” is that 
mathematical truths have a kind of “objective necessity, which can be contrasted with the merely 
subjective, or ‘internal’, necessity of causal relations.”289 The reasons for Hume’s discomfort and 
inconsistency are understandable. He is confronted by a difficult dilemma, common to many 
philosophers, that goes something like this. On the one hand, mathematicians make mistakes. If 
mathematical errors were impossible, then there would be no such thing as math-class, or at least it 
would be an inane formality in which every student would ace every exam every time. On the other 
hand, some mathematical truths are so obvious that we are often prepared to admit that they are 
completely immune to doubt. There’s also the fact that simple mathematical truths feel a particular 
way. The equation “that two plus two equals four” seems not only true, but certain, and indeed so 
certain that it appears to belong to an entirely different and exclusive sort of knowledge – one in 
which error is literally impossible. And together these truths present a prima facie tension: 
mathematicians make mistakes, and yet mathematics is an infallible science. A good theory of 
knowledge should explain how to resolve that tension.  
Wittgenstein, for example, later grappled with this problem in his essay On Certainty, when he said, 
on the one hand, that we know that we… 
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…cannot be making a mistake that 12 X 12 = 144.290 
But on the other hand he acknowledges that mistakes can be made in the process of calculation. Our 
actions are: 
 …liable to forgetfulness, oversight and illusion.291 
Besides,  
` The question 'But mightn't you be in the grip of a delusion now and perhaps later find this 
out?' might also be raised as an objection to any proposition of the multiplication tables.
292
 
Of course, (as Wittgenstein acknowledges,) no one really need accept that mathematicians are 
infallible in order to hold that mathematical truths are necessary, so one way out of the dilemma is 
to distinguish mathematical truths themselves from the use to which we put them. Mathematical 
truths are all necessary, we might think, but error can occur when we try to apply the rules: we can 
make errors in our working or our calculation. It is in this same way that Descartes contrasts 
intuition with demonstration
293
, and Hume (sometimes) contrasts rules with their application.
294
 As 
Hume puts it: 
In all demonstrative sciences the rules are certain and infallible; but when we apply them, 
our fallible and uncertain faculties are very apt to depart from them, and fall into error. (T, 
180) 
This sort of explanation will work as long as there really is a distinction to be drawn between the 
application of mathematical rules and the rules themselves. On this view mathematics is always a 
process of discovery: we attempt to find out empirically what is true by necessity. In these cases our 
mathematical knowledge will never be infallibly certain since empirical processes – calculation and 
working-memory, for example – are prone to error.  
But is it not possible that we sometimes know mathematical truths in a more direct fashion? The 
Rationalists certainly believed we can. For example, consider how it is we come to know that two 
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small groups of things are equal. Suppose, for instance, that we see two objects on our left, and we 
see two objects on our right. We can immediately pronounce the piles equal in number, and this 
does not seem to require any calculation or counting on our part. We just see the equality. 
Consequently, we might want to say that our judgment, in these instances, arises from pure 
intuition, and not from any fallible process of experience.  
But Hume allows no such intuitive faculty beyond ordinary experience, and although he sometimes 
says simple mathematical comparisons can be made with certainty, we must remember again that 
Hume’s conception of “certainty” does not pick out a distinct epistemological category. Even in the 
cases of very simple arithmetic, Hume will not allow that we can be certain in a way that eliminates 
the possibility of error. “The necessity,” Hume says, “which makes two times two equal to 
four...lies only in the act of the understanding, by which we consider and compare these ideas (T, 
166). Anyone who denies this risk of error in these processes must believe that some calculations 
are so manifestly simple that they are utterly immutable. Hume himself discusses the example of 
one-to-one correspondence. 
When two numbers are so combined, as that the one has always a unit answering to every 
unit of the other, we pronounce them equal; and it is for want of a better standard of equality 
in extension, that geometry can scarce be esteemed a perfect and infallible science. (T, 71) 
He admits that if we see two objects on the left and two on the right, then pronouncing the piles 
equal (on the grounds that each unit can be paired with another without any leftover) really does 
have the feeling of infallibility about it. But even these intuitions will not escape the depths of 
scepticism that Hume is willing to entertain. It will always remain possible that we are being 
deceived.  
IS THERE ANY CERTAINTY WHATSOEVER? 
Finally, let us consider what Hume might say about the most famous claim to certainty in the 
history of philosophy: cogito ergo sum. As every student knows, Descartes takes his own existence 
to be an absolute certainty, since, according to the argument, any doubt cast upon the conclusion 
will only serve to confirm it. That is: if I doubt the proposition that I exist, then, at the very least, I 
must exist in order to do the doubting.  
One reason to think Hume would deny the certainty of the cogito as it appears in Descartes is to 
point to its circularity. The “I” of the conclusion is already present in the “I think” of the premise. 
As Russell puts it, “When [Descartes] goes on to say, ‘I am a thing which thinks’, he is already 
using uncritically the apparatus of categories handed down by scholasticism. He nowhere proves 
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that thoughts need a thinker nor is there reason to believe this except in a grammatical sense.”295 
Hume, as we saw in Chapter Five, foreshadowed this line of thought when he denied that we 
experience any substantial unified self that underlies the perceptions that we have. The categories to 
which Russell is referring are those we have already discussed in Chapter Two: the categories 
inherited by the Scholastics from Aristotle, which provided the framework for the metaphysical 
distinction between substances and accidents (or modes). Russell’s point is that Descartes is 
assuming a suppressed premise that thought (an attribute) cannot exist with being the attribute of 
something more fundamental – a substance. Without that supressed premise one can’t get any 
further than the conclusion that “there are thoughts”. And insofar as what we can know for sure 
about the self, this is about as far Hume gets: there are bundles of perceptions. 
Perhaps, then, we have stumbled upon something that Hume really could consider to be an infallible 
claim. The sentence “there are perceptions” really does seem indubitable. We may doubt whether 
things really are as they appear, but what we cannot possibly doubt is the existence of the 
appearance itself. For example, we may doubt that a stick submerged in water really is bent, but we 
cannot doubt that it appears bent. Perhaps, therefore, Hume could have it that, “I am certain that 
there are impressions.” Or, at the very least, he could have it that, “I am certain that there exists this 
impression that I am having right now.”  
Certain or not, it is worth admitting that this conclusion is very boring. It does not mean that I am 
certain that my impression is of anything, or even that the impression is had by a thinking mind. 
The certainty of this conclusion is only the kind of certainty that can be generated by the fact that 
any expression of the form “something is going on here” cannot possibly be mistaken as long as the 
“something” in the sentence refers to the expression itself.  
Philosophers have long been very fond of these sorts of self-sealing certainties. Augustine argued: 
“If I am mistaken, I am”.296 Like Descartes, Augustine then went on to argue that this trivial 
conclusion also implies all sorts of other interesting things about metaphysics – for example, what it 
means to be “alive”.297 These latter metaphysical claims are not really certain in the sense we have 
been discussing. But the first point – that we cannot doubt the existence of errors – really does seem 
indubitable in the self-sealing sense. Indeed, Nicholas Rescher explains the point well in his 
contemporary book on error: 
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“How do you ever know that you are not in error now?” The answer is, “It all depends!” It 
will depend what is at issue in that supposedly error prone belief of mine. If it happens to be, 
“People sometimes err,” then it just cannot possibly be in error.298  
The reason that Rescher, (following Augustine), thinks that this belief is beyond any doubt, rests on 
a kind of logical trick: either people do make mistakes, (in which case the belief is true,) or else 
people don’t make mistakes, (in which case the belief is false, but therefore a mistake itself, and 
therefore true.) Either way, the belief that, “People sometimes err,” is true, and since there are only 
these two options to be had, we can be certain of its truth. 
Would Hume really regard these conclusions as infallibly certain, though, in the strictest sense? I’m 
not sure. We are well beyond the limits of what Hume considers in the Treatise, but since we have 
come this far, we might as well speculate. The answer, I think, is no. Since Hume disallows that we 
have any means by which to directly intuit logical truths distinct from experience, it would seem he 
has no grounds by which to make any claim for complete immutability whatsoever. Experience, on 
Hume’s view, always includes the possibility of error. Suppose, for example, someone asks why it 
is we are certain of the simple logical laws that govern our acceptance of the axioms that we have 
been discussing – e.g. that there are impressions, or that people sometimes err. Probably we cannot 
produce a reason for our belief in these logical laws. They are simply brute facts, we might think. 
But suppose you do come up with a reason. The persistent sceptic will then demand what reason 
you have to believe that reason, and what reason you have to believe the following reason, and so 
on, ad infinitum. At some point, psychologically speaking, this chain of doubts will probably stop 
making sense – we won’t be able to understand exactly what is being doubted or how the doubt is 
supposed to work. Hume, I think, would be inclined to make exactly that point. We would begin 
wondering what on earth the doubter is asking (and, of course, why we are asking at all). But even 
so, the point would remain that for Hume anything is doubtable in principle, even if we do not bring 
ourselves to doubt it.  
CONCLUSIONS OF THIS CHAPTER 
Of course, the notion that we are certain of nothing, and that all beliefs are open to error, is a bit 
absurd, and Hume, as much as anyone, is quick to acknowledge the fact. Indeed, for Hume, in the 
common operations of life, nature pleasingly puts an end to these obtuse chains of reasoning long 
before we run into the absurdities we have confronted. Let us remember the section Of Scepticism 
with Regard to Reason, where Hume tells us: 
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All knowledge resolves itself into probability, and becomes at last of the same nature with 
that evidence, which we employ in common life. (T, 181) 
For Hume, the apparent absurdity of this conclusion means that we cannot and will not accept it. If 
reason says there is no certainty, then so much the worse for reason. In the end, Hume defends the 
common sense position that nature makes us certain of all sorts of things.  
Shou’d it here be ask’d me, whether I sincerely assent to this argument, which I seem to take 
such pains to inculcate, and whether I be really one of those sceptics, who hold that all is 
uncertain, and that our judgment is not in any thing possest of any measures of truth and 
falsehood; I shou’d reply that this question is entirely superfluous, and that neither I nor any 
other person was ever sincerely and constantly of that opinion. Nature, by an absolute and 
uncontroulable necessity has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and feel... (T, 183) 
Indeed, Hume’s whole point, he tells us, in taking pains to outline the sceptical arguments against 
certainty was “only to make the reader sensible of the truth of my hypothesis ... that belief is more 
properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cognitive part of our natures.” (T, 183) Although the 
possibility of error attends all of our beliefs, we nonetheless can (and do) carry on believing, and 
being convinced.  
We are certain of logical relations, for instance, because of our strong natural sentiments. 
Nothing is more certain from experience, than that any contradiction either to the sentiments 
or passions gives a sensible uneasiness. (T, 205) 
It is because we cannot tolerate this sensible unease that we reject a contradiction with such 
assurance.  
…the mind must be uneasy in that situation, and will naturally seek relief from the 
uneasiness. (T, 206) 
Conversely, “certainties” strike us with the opposite feeling, which Hume calls a “sensible 
pleasure”.  
Whatever strikes in with the natural propensities…is sure to give a sensible pleasure. (T, 
205-6) 
In short: the difference between the various states of certainty, probability, doubt, and disbelief, are 
all explained along a spectrum in terms of natural facts about the way perceptions strike us. 
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So where does this leave us? In one sense Hume plainly allows that there are truths of which we are 
certain and these truths, therefore, seem to preclude the possibility of error. Certainty is to be found 
in relations of ideas rather than matters of fact – more so in simple ones than complex ones, and 
more so in algebra and arithmetic than geometry. But in another sense certainty – absolute certainty 
– is not possible. Hume denies that there is any path to knowledge beyond experience, and he 
allows, with the sceptics, that experience will always be prone to error. This is a very typical 
Humean process: Hume denies that certainty involves a distinct philosophical category over and 
above ordinary experience. But he does not deny that there is a distinction between certainty and 
probability that is there to be explained. Bertrand Russell once said that the question, “what do we 
mean by ‘knowledge’?” is just as vague as the question, “what do we mean by ‘baldness’?”299 And 
this, I have argued, is a very Humean sort of thing to say: knowledge and certainty are matters of 
degree.  
More practically, as we have seen, Hume also allows that we can employ all the usual methods by 
which to decide a question of how certain we ought to be about a given proposition. We can consult 
our reason and our intuition; we can discuss the evidence. But ultimately these methods are 
themselves to be explained in terms of descriptive facts about sentiments, and at base Hume’s 
explanation of certainty is completely reducible to psychological facts about the way an idea strikes 
us. Is an idea “firm” and “solid”? (T, 269) Is it “vivacious”? (T, 86) Is it “steady” and “precise”? (T, 
73) Can we “arrive at a decision at first sight, without enquiry”? (T, 70) Does it “seem to give a 
perfect assurance”? (T, 71) Does it give a “sensible pleasure”? (T, 205-6) Whatever the answers, 
they will explain the degree of certainty.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS: HUME AND HUMAN ERROR 
 
We have seen that Hume rejects the correspondence theory of error in the same sense, for example, 
that he rejects the traditional conception of substance. In its place, Hume offers his own theory of 
error which is cashed-out in descriptive terms by discussing the observable features of perceptions 
and the relations between them.  
The general tenor of my discussion has been that, all things considered, Hume does an admirable 
job. Often convincingly, he explains away the traditional metaphysics by substituting metaphysical 
questions for psychological ones. He substitutes, for instance, the philosophical question, “in what 
does error consist?” for the psychological question: “how do we come to regard an idea as an 
error?” In so doing, Hume provides a rich account of the ways in which we can variously believe 
things, doubt things, change our minds, revise our beliefs, and feel certain. He explains how we 
come to think of ourselves as agents of our actions and thus regard ourselves as the proper objects 
of blame for errors that we think could or should have been avoided. Since Hume does all of this 
while denying the traditional metaphysics, we are left with good reason to doubt the proposition that 
error that necessarily involves “…subscribing to some sort of realism”. 
Error calls for incorrectness, for conflict with the actual facts, and were there no actual 
matter of fact there would be no error either.
300
  
With only perceptions as tools, Hume shows that we can explain how we come to believe that some 
of our perceptions are mistaken. On Hume’s explanation, faulty ideas are not faulty because they 
fail to correspond to facts about external objects, but because, in terms of the relationships with 
other perceptions, they give rise to sentiments of disapprobation towards them. 
However, for all its richness and interest, Hume’s theory of error remains deeply sceptical, and for 
various reasons, unsatisfying. There is a wonderful phrase about knowledge in a poem by the 
ancient Xenophanes, called upon by Karl Popper to explain how it is we can have a conception of 
rational knowledge once Hume’s sceptical conclusions concerning induction are accepted: 
 …all is but a woven web of guesses.  
Popper uses this phrase to expand on what he takes to be a Humean position when he says that 
although induction is irrational we can nonetheless have a rational science in which we strive to 
falsify – to find errors with – as many hypotheses as we can. In this sense the task of the scientist, 
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according to Popper, is to admit that all is but a woven web of guesses, but to “endeavor to make 
the mesh ever finer and finer.”301 In this sense Popper contends that we are at least approaching 
something like knowledge of an external world. But Hume’s own view is more sceptical than this. 
In reading Hume we might usefully think of our knowledge as a woven web of guesses. But, 
contrary to Popper’s proposal, Hume remains agnostic about whether this web of belief actually 
captures an external reality. Although Hume certainly believes in external objects, he thinks there 
are no rational grounds for this belief. And although he says it is “happy” that nature trumps reason 
in this respect, he has ultimately has no foundation on which to support the conclusion that natural 
beliefs must also be true beliefs. On Hume’s view, therefore, there may be no sense in which we 
could strive to make the “mesh” of our web of knowledge “ever finer and finer” since, as far we 
know, there may be no external reality for our web of belief to catch. 
Hume supposedly mitigates this scepticism when he says that “carelessness and in-attention” can 
afford us a remedy, and assures us that “whatever may be the reader’s opinion” when she considers 
these philosophical matters, she will nonetheless return “an hour hence” to believing “there is both 
an external and internal world…” (T, 218) This is true enough as an observation about the things we 
commonly believe, but it is surely, at best, a palliative – a pain-killer – and not a “remedy” for 
scepticism. 
For Hume, the problem is not only that the possibility of error is everywhere, but that if we consider 
our whole system of perceptions en bloc we cannot speak meaningfully of error at all. Error can 
only be explained by comparing perceptions with one another and by discussing the natural 
principles by which we come to believe some rather than others. If we want to know if our whole 
“web of guesses” is along the right lines then we are out of luck, for we never experience anything 
apart from the guesses. This, perhaps, is the sense that Rescher has in mind when he says that if we 
want to explain the normativity of error then we must also speak of an objective external world. In 
that case, Rescher’s statement is true as long as it is expressed as the conditional: If there is a 
meaningful sense in which we can say that our whole web of perceptions is mistaken, then we must 
also be able to compare our web of perceptions to an external reality. But Hume need not accept the 
antecedent, and thus need not accept the consequent either. It may well be that “error” only makes 
sense as a relational concept between perceptions. That is: the term “error” may be applicable only 
to perceptions within the web, and not to the web itself. This, as we noticed in Chapter Four, is 
comparable to Owen’s example regarding Roman augury: “There is clearly a right and wrong way” 
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of interpreting the flight of birds, “…but we might still wonder whether the practice was 
warranted.”302 
Perhaps error must be understood within the system of perceptions, and makes no sense if we speak 
of the system of perceptions as a whole. Of course, we can still meaningfully ask the question as to 
whether the whole system is warranted, but any attempt to think of the whole system must itself be 
part of the system, since every thought is a perception.  Therefore, we cannot answer that question. 
As Hume puts it, we can never escape our narrow compass.  
(T, 67) 
It remains troubling, even maddening, to accept Hume’s agnosticism regarding external objects and 
the correspondence theory of error. Our unease is not made any better by the fact that Hume 
frequently allows that we are led by natural pleasure seeking principles (T, 205-6) to ignore 
sceptical conclusions. Hume is happy to allow the sheer fact, for example, that we often think of 
objects as being external, and he therefore also allows that we often think of error as involving 
correspondence between perceptions and the external world. But, nonetheless, he is emphatic about 
the fact that we cannot justify these beliefs by reason. Although it is true that our belief in external 
bodies is a “point which we must take for granted in all our reasonings,” this is only because 
“…Nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time.” (T, 187) 
We should find it strange, I think, that Hume regards this natural fact as “happy”, since, while we’re 
in a sceptical mood, it is not clear what reason Hume has to be so glad. The delight in natural 
principles would be fair enough if Hume’s conception of nature was that of a benevolent force, or 
the design of a benevolent deity. As we have seen, many of Hume’s contemporaries maintained that 
view. Turnbull, for instance, thought of the impulses of our nature as: 
 “…right guides, or guides which do not deceive, or lead astray.”303 
Beattie sometimes equated natural impulses with truth:  
I account that to be truth which the constitution of my nature determines me to believe.
304
  
But Hume does not hold this conception of nature. As Norton puts it: 
However often Hume may say that we have certain natural propensities to believe this or 
that, he does not go so far as to say that what we must naturally believe must be true. Hume 
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does not conflate psychological certainty with certain knowledge or unavoidable doxa with 
episteme.
305
 
For Hume, natural propensities are described in the Treatise as “carelessness or inattention”. (T, 
218) In the Enquiry they are, “action and employment and the occupations of common life.” (E, 
159)
306
 Nature is described as a “blind and powerful instinct.” (E, 151 – emphasis added) In a letter 
to Gilbert Elliot, Hume even wonders whether our natural propensity to assent to our impulses (in 
this case our belief in the premises of the teleological argument) is any “different from our 
Inclination to find our own Figures in the Clouds, [or] our Face in the Moon…”307  
Donald Ainslie reads Hume as arguing, optimistically, that we should, 
…make our peace with the human perspective and the world of appearances.308 
If this is right, Hume can think of error along the lines of William James: 
Our errors are surely not such awfully solemn things. In a world where we are so certain to 
incur them in spite of all our caution, a certain lightness of heart seems healthier than this 
excessive nervousness on their behalf.
309
 
But why should we be so peaceful or light hearted? Hume rightly observes that in our day to day 
lives we just do, (as a sheer matter of fact,) live at peace with our scepticism. But on what grounds 
can he recommend making peace with the world of appearances to those of us who feel a deep 
dissatisfaction with these conclusions?  
It is true that Hume can say that the dictates of Nature are preferable –that is, more pleasurable – 
than the consequences of Pyrrhonism which would have it that: 
…all human life must perish… all discourse, all action would immediately cease; and all 
men remain in total lethargy, ‘til the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their 
miserable existence. (E, 160) 
In this sense, Hume agrees with James that the dictates of nature are “healthier” than scepticism. 
But apart from allowing us to avoid the miserable Pyrrhonian fate, (which, admittedly, is a good 
thing) there is no further sense in which the dictates of nature are “happy”. They do not lead us to 
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objective truth or even to approximate it. At least, we do not know whether they lead to objective 
truth or whether there is any such thing to be had. Consequently, when the Humean epistemology 
implies that everything we know about truth and error must be explained in natural terms, we 
should hardly be overjoyed. 
310
  
The problem, as well as the appeal, of Hume’s account of error is that it most often reduces 
philosophy to psychology. H. H. Price said that Hume failed to “distinguish philosophical problems 
from psychological ones.”311 But the conflation is most often deliberate. As we discussed in Chapter 
Two, Hume thinks there is no other legitimate way to get at the problems of philosophy. As Stroud 
puts it, Hume sought to answer the problems: 
…in the only way possible – by observation and inference from what is observed. Hume saw 
them as empirical questions.
312
 
The Introduction to the Treatise makes the point explicitly. As for “all the sciences, and all the 
arts”, says Hume: 
None of them can go beyond experience or establish any principles which are not founded 
on that authority. (T, xviii) 
His intentions are made clear: 
…by confessing that my intention never was to penetrate into the nature of bodies, or 
explain the secret causes of their operations. For besides that this belongs not to my present 
purpose, I am afraid that such an enterprize is beyond the reach of human understanding… 
(T, 64) 
This view, to be sure, is not without appeal because it commands the support of our intuitions about 
scientific methodology. Psychological questions are testable in a way that the metaphysical 
questions are not, and for all its explanatory power the traditional conceptions of substance really 
are mysterious as Hume says they are.  
Nonetheless, we cannot help but feel that Hume has somehow dodged the important questions. If 
we set out to know what error involves – if we want to know what error is – we are not simply 
asking for a list of psychological facts about the various conditions that might lead someone to 
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revise a belief, or the conditions which would have us think badly of them if they failed to revise it. 
Yet these kinds of explanations are all that Hume can ultimately provide. 
I don’t know what we should do with the dissatisfaction we feel for this conclusion. Intuition looms 
large against it. Yet what other theory of error can we have if the metaphysics is rejected? Hume’s 
account is very sceptical but, as we have seen, it can meet the many of the challenges put forward 
by his critics, and it has a certain explanatory appeal of its own. In his own psychological argot, 
Hume can explain away many of the features of the experience of error that the traditional 
metaphysics was itself evoked to explain. 
I will finish with what is, perhaps, the strangest paradox of Hume’s theory of human error: that if 
his naturalistic theory is right, then that theory itself can only be evaluated in natural terms – that is: 
as considered in terms of its relationship with other perceptions. Let’s ask, therefore, according to 
Hume’s theory, what would it mean for us to say that Hume’s theory of error is itself in error? Well, 
as we have discussed, it would mean that we find evidence in our body of perceptions to reject it. It 
would mean that other competing perceptions are more “vivacious”, more “firm”, or more “steady”. 
It would mean that his theory does not cohere with our other beliefs. It would mean that believing 
the theory causes in us a sensible unease – a psychological displeasure.  
Strangely, I think most of us would say that these conditions really are met in the case of Hume’s 
theory of error. If this is true, then the strange implication is that if Hume is right about the way that 
error works, then it follows that he must regard his own theory of error as being, itself, an error.  
But lest we think we have just uncovered some deep inconsistency, we find that in the end this 
strange paradox is something that Hume can consistently admit. In the conclusion of Book I, Hume 
deplores the outcomes of reason in that they lead him to unbearable scepticism. 
I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning, and can look upon no opinion even as more 
probable or likely than another. 
Luckily, he says, nature steps in and cures us of this melancholy which reason has induced. In place 
of the rational philosophy which leads ultimately to Pyrrhonism, he offers his own naturalistic 
philosophy. 
I am concerned for the condition of the learned world…I feel an ambition to arise in me of 
contributing to the instruction of mankind…These sentiments spring up naturally in my 
present disposition; and shou’d I endeavour to banish them, by attaching myself to any other 
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business or diversion, I feel I shou’d be a loser in point of pleasure; and this is the origin of 
my philosophy. (T, 271 – emphasis added) 
…if we are philosophers, it ought only to be…from an inclination, which we feel to… 
employing ourselves after that manner. (T, 270) 
But, what if Hume’s own naturalistic philosophy is itself the cause of my current anguish? What if 
the fact that nature may be the only cure for rational scepticism (as Hume thinks) is itself the cause 
of our philosophical despair? In that case, Hume’s passage might just as well be read as doubling 
back on his own endeavour. And so, if our current state of mind is anguish, Hume would be well 
pleased that we have reached the end of these considerations, and may return now to leisure. 
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason is incapable of dispelling these clouds, nature 
herself suffices to that purpose, and cures me of this philosophical melancholy and 
delirium… I dine, I play a game of back-gammon, I converse, and am merry with my 
friends; and when after three or four hour’s amusement, I wou’d return to these speculations, 
they appear so cold, and strain’d, and ridiculous, that I cannot find in my heart to enter into 
them any further. (T, 269) 
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